The Stanley Foundation

This month, the foundation has released a policy analysis brief from BBC journalist Owen Bennett-Jones. The brief, titled US Policy Options Toward Pakistan: A Principled and Realistic Approach, makes clear recommendations for American diplomats and policymakers. Here is an excerpt of those recommendations:

Think long term. With so many crises, of which the assassination of Benazir Bhutto is just the latest, there is a risk that the urgent will crowd out the important. The country's problems are so deep-seated that only long-term policies will help bring Pakistan out of its current cycle of authoritarian rule, instability, and underdevelopment. The type of extremism represented by the murder of the former prime minister can only be rooted out by the establishment of the rule of law in Pakistan and the more successful development of the country’s economy. Everyone agrees the United States will be fighting its war on terror for 20 to 30 years. Policies could be formulated with this time frame, and not that of the electoral cycle, in mind.

Taking a long-term view might affect the way US commanders calculate the costs and benefits of air strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Waziristan. It is tempting to think that, since a majority of Pakistanis are moderates who oppose extremist interpretations of Islam, they will welcome operations such as air strikes conducted in the name of the US war on terror. In fact, polls show that Pakistanis react with anger to the breaches to their sovereignty and to the loss of innocent lives during such military actions.

The most important single determinant of Pakistan’s future remains in the minds of its people. Although the most obvious explanation for Ms. Bhutto’s death is that the Taliban or Al Qaeda killed her, most Pakistanis do not believe this but blame General Musharraf. It’s just one indication of the huge gap in operations between East and West. Similarly, many Pakistanis consider the military campaign in the tribal areas to be not only ill-conceived but also unjust. They point out that the tribesmen were once asked by the United States to liberate Afghanistan from foreign (Soviet) occupation. Now, because they are undertaking a similar effort to expel foreign (NATO) troops, they are considered terrorists. Finally, most Pakistanis do not support the US war on terror because they do not think the threat posed by Islamic extremism is all that grave. In terms of their own lives, it is a perfectly reasonable conclusion: even though there are frequent Islamist attacks in Pakistan, most Pakistanis are much more likely to suffer a premature death as a result of poverty or nonexistent medical services as they are from an Islamist attack.

Compared to some aid programs to different countries, Pakistan has been given a relatively free hand in spending the massive amounts of US aid it has been receiving. It could be encouraged, for example, to spend more of the aid funds on education.

While it is unlikely that Islamists will get their hands on a fully functional nuclear device and overload its safety and security features (partially because the parts for warheads are dispersed across several locations), there is a risk that they might access some of Pakistan’s radioactive material for a “dirty bomb.” The chief threat of theft and diversion of fissile materials comes from established nuclear industry personnel who become radicalized in middle age.

Read the full Policy Analysis Brief from Owen Bennett-Jones here.