The 2005 World Summit’s adoption of the responsibility to protect was an historic step in the evolution of human rights and humanitarian law. Much attention is focused on one aspect—forceful intervention—that creates political firestorms. However, responsibility to protect is richer, deeper, and more varied than forceful intervention. Much of what was articulated in the World Summit Outcome Document is not politically contentious, but rather requires further conceptual development and capacity-building. This brief addresses the conceptual underpinnings of the responsibility to protect, the political importance of it, and the steps that need to be taken to make it operational.

Also:
Read "Actualizing the Responsibility to Protect," the report of the Stanley Foundation's 43rd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade.

Listen to audio from "The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect," an October 2, 2008, event featuring Edward C. Luck. Part 1 (MP3). Part 2 (MP3).

Sixty years ago, the dual shocks of the Great Depression and World War II spurred the creation of international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and a sturdy global political order. Now we stand, or so it is widely said, at the threshold of another burst of invention—“Creation 2.0,” as it has been called. Rather than a world war, the ferment this time comes from the combination of a global financial crisis, the emergence of novel and interconnected transnational problems, and the swift rise of a new cohort of powerful states, all of which have exposed the limits of the post-war institutions, and perhaps rendered them obsolete.

Yet it takes a crisis of immense proportions to overcome the inertia that inheres in institutions—and even more, in the distribution of power within those institutions. And so a political handicapper would insist that the central issue is not, “Which institutions most need reform?” but rather “Where have the pressures for change become irresistible?” There will be significant changes, but they will be uneven rather than comprehensive; in other words, Creation 2.0 will probably not be a big bang, but a protracted evolution.

For all the discussion of the need to reform the world’s multilateral architecture, there has been a notable dearth of analysis of how such reform would work. A consensus has emerged that international cooperation should take a variety of forms (multi-multilateralism, one leading scholar has called it), but key questions remain. Which challenges demand new institutions, and how would they affect existing organizations? Under what circumstances should a state look toward one forum rather than another?

One major misconception has been to view the exclusion of important states (e.g., China and India) from the international corridors of power as the heart of the problem. Yet the real reason institutions don’t work is that major states don’t agree on how to tackle common challenges. Placing the priority on broader participation and inclusion, therefore, will likely increase deadlock, thus weakening the architecture of cooperation rather than strengthening it. The primary objective should instead be to bring about more effective international cooperation on critical challenges in a way that does not inadvertently worsen tensions with other states.

With this in mind, the brief distinguishes between different substantive challenges and the appropriate forms of intergovernmental cooperation for those challenges, given their associated political and practical realities. Some problems are best dealt with by limited circles of key states. For others, it is important to involve the entire world community (or as nearly universal cooperation as possible). A third category of issues are “local” concerns requiring cooperation at the regional or subregional level.

Shaun Breslin explores, in an East Asian context, why some countries join regional organizations and others don’t. Analyzing different Asian region-building initiatives, he argues that there is a lack of consensus over which countries are part of the East Asian region and which are not—in addition to the role of China as a driver in the debate between narrow and wider visions of East Asia. Breslin concludes that promotion of the wider vision of region in the East Asia Summit represents a deliberate attempt to create an "oversupply of region" and to neutralize Chinese power. Like APEC before it, he argues, the EAS is an "anti-region" supplied in order to prevent the emergence of a truly coherent regional community, and that so long as the "supply of this region is not in equilibrium with the demand for region" developing a form of region that "works" and evolves into functioning institutions will be problematic.

Is there such a thing as American nationalism or is it simply "patriotism"? Why do Americans view "nationalism" in such a negative light? Graham Fuller analyzes Americans' problem with nationalism, and why it is such a dangerous topic to ignore.

The United States and China are destined to be competitors. But can they manage this competition and avoid the costs of great power competitions of the past? This brief suggests that the United States can manage this relationship in a way that is beneficial to both.

Traditional state-centric approaches to nonproliferation cannot adequately address the proliferation pressures that will continue to mount under globalization. The diffusion of technology and the rise of nonstate actors will render existing frameworks and mechanisms anachronistic in the struggle to prevent catastrophic terrorism. In addition, the anticipated widespread “nuclear renaissance” and accelerating advances in biotechnology require recognition that denial regimes will have increasingly limited efficacy in countering potential proliferation threats. Our long-term nonproliferation goals will only be achieved by reducing global inequities in a serious effort to ensure worldwide minimum standards of technology governance. This article will discuss the potential threats that arise from the diffusion of technology in a globalized world, the waning efficacy of technology denial in containing proliferation pressures, and the need to move to a model based on technology governance. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 provides the mandate and potential mechanism to start moving expeditiously toward global standards and capacity for effective technology governance—within and between states. Achievement of sustainable implementation of the resolution will require turning its objectives into an opportunity for mutually beneficial North-South cooperation and making long-term investments in a shared future.

Multilateralism is attractive in the nuclear energy business, above all because it helps to overcome the large costs and high technological barriers involved. This is true, as Urenco (a consortium of the British, German, and Dutch governments) and Eurodif (European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium) show, even for wealthy advanced countries. For smaller or less advanced countries, it may be crucial; it can be their only realistic way to play an active role in a prestigious industry with evolving technology and potentially good profits. For all countries, it offers a gateway to security of fuel supply without political strings.

In addition, by obviating the need for nationally owned-and-operated facilities, multilateralism makes an important contribution to nonproliferation.

The model multilateral arrangement proposed in this brief is broadly applicable to any part, or any combination of parts, of the fuel cycle. The essential element is a commercial consortium composed of governments whose international board of directors will determine policy and deal with political issues while day-to-day operations will be run by a management company also internationally manned. Capital would be contributed in relation to shareholding, and profits distributed similarly. Equipment would mostly be leased rather than owned. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have special inspection rights and procedures, and protection against cheating by any participating country, including the host country, would be further enhanced by the presence of at least three nationalities in every working shift.

Other important elements of the model emerge from the recommendations listed in the brief.

Concerns about nuclear weapons have focused primarily on the spread of the bomb—to North Korea, Pakistan, India, and perhaps Iran—and on the terrifying prospect that Al Qaeda might acquire such weapons. Nuclear dangers, however, are not only "out there," they also exist in the policies of the United States and Russia, which continue to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Russia has abandoned its "no-first-use" policy and is replacing its aging arsenal, while the United States has called for the possible first use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear actors. This paper probes the sources of instability that are driving proliferation and continued reliance on nuclear weapons by major world powers. It reviews the recent use of diplomacy to resolve proliferation disputes and explores the link between regional and global disarmament. It traces the evolving political legitimacy and technical feasibility of nuclear weapons abolition, and concludes with suggestions to realize a future free of nuclear weapons.

Also:
Listen to audio from "Overcoming Nuclear Danger in US Policy: The Citizen Role," an April 2008 event featuring David Cortright here.