The Stanley Foundation - Press

Muscatine, Iowa – The next US administration should immediately undertake a review of US nonproliferation policy given recent stresses now threatening the fundamentals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them while the five nuclear weapons states agreed to take actions to lower their arsenals with the aim of eventually giving them up.

The NPT, and the core understanding animating it, held for close to 30 years, deterring states from pursuing nuclear weapons. In the two decades that have followed the Cold War, however, stresses have formed. NPT signatories such as North Korea and Iran have worked to develop nuclear weapons capability while remaining in compliance with the NPT; the international community's treatment of non-signatories like Israel, India, and Pakistan; and the shortcomings of nuclear weapon states like the US and Russia to reduce their stockpiles have increasingly threatened the grand bargain that buttressed the nonproliferation regime for most of the Cold War.

With this in mind, the Stanley Foundation convened "Aligning Expectations: The United States, Major Powers, and the Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" as a roundtable discussion at its 49th annual Strategy for Peace Conference near Warrenton, Virginia. The roundtable brought together leading government officials and scholars to discuss the most relevant and fundamental questions that the next presidential administration and Congress will have to grapple with, including:

• To what extent is the global nonproliferation regime able to cope with the emerging challenges of nuclear proliferation?
  
• What ails the Non-Proliferation Treaty and what regional dynamics are affecting its credibility and legitimacy?
  
• How should the next administration approach the nuclear nonproliferation regime?
  

Areas of Discussion
Throughout the course of the discussions, participants addressed a number of points through which to frame discussions of the past, present, and future of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and US policy, including:

• The state of the nonproliferation regime, including discussions of whether the NPT is facing a pending collapse and, if so, what factors have brought about such strains.
  
• The loss of strategic coherence over the last decade in US nuclear strategy.
  
• The need to focus on specifics related to a states’ choice to go nuclear instead of creating a generic template for nonproliferation, as the domino theory of proliferation is an oversimplification.
  
• Drawing distinctions between countries in the NPT who have (or may in the near future) violated the spirit and/or law (like the DPRK and Syria) and countries in the NPT who have the technical capabilities to violate the rules if they chose (like ROK, Japan, Brazil, Egypt, Argentina, South Africa, Taiwan, UAE), countries who proliferate out of the NPT system (like Israel, India, Pakistan), unhelpful actors in the system that could be more proactive in enforcing norms (like Russia, France, and Canada).
  
• Nonproliferation challenges, such as keeping NPT members with little incentive to drop out of the agreement from dropping out regardless of future changes to their security calculations, and preventing the successful proliferation of states already seeking to develop nuclear weapon capabilities or likely to seek these capabilities in the near future.
  
• The corrosive effects of actions by the US and other nuclear weapon states on the breakdown of the grand bargain.
  
• Gaps in nonproliferation regime such as the lack of capacity for detection and lack of institutional mechanisms to deal with noncompliance states; the key to giving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teeth is vesting it with more legal authority to be able to demand information quicker, to use the equipment they have without negotiating over it for so long, and for enforcing incentive-altering consequences for violators of the safeguards.
  
• Whether a strictly enforced rules regime is desirable or should an effective nonproliferation regime allow for country-specific exceptions; although there was agreement that a tougher rules-based regime, if enforced, will not necessarily change the security calculations of these countries, even if they could raise the costs of developing nuclear capabilities, there was lack of agreement on whether strictly enforcing NPT provisions for specific cases, particularly involving US friends and allies, is always in the best interest of the US.
  

US Policy Recommendations
In order for the United States to set clear priorities for a consistent and credible nonproliferation regime while reviewing its nuclear posture, the roundtable recommended that the next administration immediately undertake a policy review of US nonproliferation policy, including the following elements:

1.    Make nonproliferation a priority in action not just rhetoric. In order to solve the most pressing nonproliferation challenges of the day, the US should strategically prioritize its nonproliferation interests. Specifically, this includes:

• Setting clear priorities between security and nonproliferation interests and prioritize nonproliferation as a policy goal, as appropriate.
  

2.    Stabilize the current nonproliferation regime. In order to address current crises, stresses that are undermining the "grand bargain" and the possible expansion of proliferation challenges facing the international community, the US should:

• Comprehensively address the most urgent and immediate challenges threatening to undermine the NPT that may also have a cascading effect on nuclear proliferation behavior, including Iran and North Korea, and coordinate responses to those challenges with friends and allies (including extended deterrence and better coordination on more discriminating multilateral structures for counterproliferation, if/as needed).
  

• Explore the full range of policy levers, including incentives and coercive measures, for dealing with rogues who have defected from the regime but also with friends who might defect from regime. The US should work to end double standards that corrode overall regime legitimacy and address concerns about "discriminatory" regime framework.

• Seek common ground with Russia and get strategic arms control back on the agenda; also address missile defense and seek to neutralize space as a blocking issue to arms control progress.

• Work with other major powers and relevant stakeholders to reinvest momentum behind nonproliferation aims.

3.    Manage the fuel cycle more effectively. In order to enhance a proactive instead of reactive approach to nonproliferation concerns, the US should:

• Focus more on prevention by seeking a better understanding of the perspectives and legitimate needs of states without fuel cycle abilities so as to make more attractive potential regional or international enrichments and reprocessing arrangements (seek to limit spread of enrichment and reprocessing).

• Consider expanding the scope of safeguards by starting at the front end of the fuel cycle and including nonnuclear materials of interest.

• Consider expanding spent fuel take-back programs.

4.    Strengthen the IAEA. In order to empower the IAEA with credibility and legitimacy as a key organization in furthering nonproliferation interests, the US should:

• Enhance IAEA’s authority by strengthening legal framework outlining safeguard requirements, inspection protocols, and consequences for noncompliance.
  

• Increase budgetary contributions to the IAEA (for safeguards, verification, inspections, etc.).

• Strengthen physical protection of materials and nonstate diversion.

• Shorten the time between detection and action by the international community, including strengthening the ability to detect and creating an expedited pathway for action and automatic mechanisms (i.e., a UNSC generic resolution empowering the IAEA Board of Governors to make noncompliance automatically trigger UNSC consideration).

• Consider paying costs of monitoring of US safeguards.

5.    Uphold the US end of the bargain. Recognizing that there are a number of steps to take at home in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, the US should:

• Pursue an active agenda to achieve Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification domestically as well as globally.

• Use its diplomatic leverage to promote a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) but also support interim steps such as putting civilian nuclear facilities under safeguard in a nuclear weapons state.

• Reinvigorate strategic arms control efforts with Russia.

• Better explain reductions the US has already taken through renewed public diplomacy efforts aimed at bolstering legitimacy and credibility of the nonproliferation regime.

• Pursue creative approaches as well as practical and pragmatic steps to follow through on its commitments or to respond to initiatives others may put forward, such as a “global freeze and reduction.”

The Stanley Foundation will release a more comprehensive report on this Strategy for Peace Conference discussion in the coming weeks.

This document summarizes the primary findings developed at the event. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this document. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.


About The Stanley Foundation
The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. Online at www.stanleyfoundation.org.