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The moves in 2008-09, prompted by the global financial crisis, to convene the G-20 at the level of heads of state constituted the first major adaptation of global arrangements to better fit with the fact of the emerging powers. Clearly it will not be the last. G-20 negotiations have already given a critical impetus to governance reforms at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank.

Predictably, if somewhat ironically, the expansion of the G-8 to include a wider range of countries including from the “Global South” drew angry cries of exclusion, illegitimacy, and preemption at the United Nations. Early G-20 decisions also provoked a new bout of tensions between the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the international financial institutions.

Criticisms of the G-20 from within the UN focus on its illegitimacy (defined in UN-centric terms) and its potential usurpation of functions formally tasked to UN bodies by the Charter. The fundamental problem with the nascent rivalry between the G-bodies and the UN bodies is an underlying misconception of their comparative advantages and of the potential relationship between them.

Taking the idea even further, this paper asks whether the G-20 could play useful roles in broader institutional reform. The contemporary international system confronts a wide range of transnational and global problems. It also has a broad panoply of international and regional institutions—technical, political, and operational—geared to solving these problems. Yet these two realities don’t add up. Gaps, overlaps, incoherence and underperformance are chronic to the world of multilateral institutions. Can the G-20 help drive improved performance?
Background: Globalization and Global Arrangements
The pertinent context for any discussion of evolving global arrangements is the interconnected phenomena of economic and political globalization. These two currents, and the backlashes against them, have been the dominant forces shaping global life in the post-Cold War era. Three major effects of globalization are:

- Widening and deepening interdependence, in economic, health, climate, and even (partially) in security terms.

- Rising salience of transnational threats, and of “global issues.”

- The growth of the emerging economies and global financial centers—i.e., a shift in the economic balance of power.

The basic arguments about the nature of globalization and interdependence are by now well understood, and need not be rehearsed. So, too, are the issues of transnational threats and global issues, particularly in the setting of the United Nations.1 And the question of the emerging powers—more specifically the adaptation of the United Nations to the changed balance of power—has likewise loomed over the United Nations since the backlash against the Iraq War and the failure of UN Security Council (UNSC) reform in 2005.

That said, international institutions have not completely failed to adapt. Indeed, there has been far more adaptation of international (and, increasingly, regional) institutions than is generally understood. The evolution has taken place in three mini phases.

First, after the end of the Cold War, a set of enterprising states—primarily the western middle powers, with underlying support from the United States—worked with international organization secretariats to craft new tools to deal with a range of “human security” challenges.2 The flurry of activities and innovations in peacekeeping, mediation, humanitarian assistance, and international justice were a reflection not of great power politics, but of middle power activism.

Second, the 9/11 attacks on the United States intensified multilateral cooperation, both through formal and informal institutions, to tackle a range of transnational threats.3 The extent of adaptation of institutions to this transnational agenda has varied by issue and institution, but every major multilateral body has undertaken reform measures related to transnational threats. This line of reform continues, the next point notwithstanding.

After the 2003 launch of the Iraq War, institutional evolution has aimed toward a rather different goal, namely to constrain or frustrate US power.4 These reforms have been spread across the entire international system. Some have taken place within existing institutions—as in South Africa’s efforts in 2004 to kick-start UN Security Council membership expansion and drives for voting reform at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In other cases, the point was to upgrade existing institutions, most significantly China’s elevation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but also the French/German focus on European Union military planning capacity separate from NATO. Still other initiatives focused on creating new institutions in which the United States does not participate, especially in Latin America.5

Currently, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are, arguably, in a fourth phase of reform. Based on a change in approach by the US administration and the underlying mutual interests among the major and rising powers, the new phase emphasizes issue-based clubs of major powers—for instance, the G-20 for global finance, the Major Economies Forum (MEF) for energy/climate, and the upcoming Nuclear Summit for nuclear safety.
Now that informal “leadership clubs” have become the chief means of bringing together established and emerging powers, important questions arise regarding the future of global arrangements. Will power be concentrated within these informal great power mechanisms, or will they instead be used to spur decision making in other formal institutions? Will these informal forums acquire greater institutionalized trappings—e.g., a secretariat to the G-20? (Unlikely.) Most important: will they develop implementation capacities, or will implementation remain in the hands of governments and other intergovernmental organizations? If so, how will the major power clubs relate to the formal institutions?

A Changing and Challenging Institutional Landscape

To see where the G-20 countries could make a difference in multilateral institutions, we have also to review (briefly) the evolution of the institutional landscape itself. The post-Cold War era has seen a profusion of international, regional, and nongovernmental organizations arrayed to deal with state and human security challenges, economic and social development goals, and human rights and humanitarian agendas.

Much of the innovation has taken place within the formal institutions themselves. To illustrate the point, just recall that twenty years ago, neither the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations nor the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs existed. Humanitarian operations were largely conducted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and operated with a small fraction of the personnel, funds, and caseload of today’s multilateral humanitarian system. Now there are dozens of humanitarian agencies responding to crises in more than thirty countries, at a net annual cost of several billion dollars. For most of the United Nations history, peacekeeping operations were few and far between and, with occasional exceptions (e.g., in Congo in the 1960s), they were confined to force-separation and operating under Chapter VI mandates. The United Nations currently has over 110,000 troops in the field alongside a similar number from NATO. Traditionally, neither the UN Development Programme (UNDP) nor The World Bank had any major roles in post-conflict peacebuilding; now they are part of an alphabet soup of organizations and literally thousands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in post-conflict settings. Two decades ago, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization did not exist, nor did the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By 2008, the Yearbook of International Organizations listed 246 formal international institutions, and when the tally includes subsidiary bodies, treaty bodies, regional organizations, and technical agencies, the number tops 6,000.6

Then ask which of the following is more astonishing: the massive expansion of the machinery of international cooperation, or the fact that during this era of multilateral growth, not one formal international institution has been closed down due to anachronism? Either way, these twin facts have inevitably led to incoherence, coordination problems, and perverse competition (over turf, not performance).

But gaps and overlaps between traditional intergovernmental organizations are only part of the problem. New regional arrangements and evolving roles for existing ones add not only to the solution set, but also to the coordination challenge. The proliferation of NGOs has had the same effect. And in some areas, private corporations and foundations now play roles that are at least as large as those of official multilateral instruments.

Looking across the wide range of sectors, some common phenomena can be observed:

Coordination Challenges. As institutional and NGO proliferation gained momentum in the 1990s, it sparked a number of efforts at coordination. Initiatives to tame institu-
tional incoherence in particular sectors (Peacebuilding Commission [PBC] in peacebuilding, the Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for humanitarian actors) have either dealt only with part of the given problem or met with only partial success. In some cases, the coordinating entities, lacking the power to actually fix gaps and overlaps in mandates, have become actors in their own right—adding to, rather than minimizing, coordination problems.

**Hybridity.** A newer mode of operation is “hybridity,” whereby two or more organizations coengage in a given response, sometimes in parallel structures, sometimes under unified command (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK], United Nations Mission in Sudan [UNMIS]). This term is best known in the realm of peacekeeping operations but, arguably, also describes aptly the relationship between UN political missions and the NATO operation in Afghanistan as well as the informal links among the United Nations, the Elders, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue for their cosupported mediation efforts in Kenya. In the public health sector, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is a formally integrated structure between multiple institutions, and the Global Partnership was set up as a semi-formal hybrid arrangement between the United Nations, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and NGOs.

**Filling Gaps.** Even after multilateralism’s economic boom times, institutional proliferation has left important gaps in the international response to transnational threats. In many such instances, ad hoc policy initiatives—best described as “gap filling” measures—have served as an alternative to permanent formal mechanisms. Indeed, the G-7 showed particular agility in occasionally filling such gaps when formal organizations moved too slowly, for example, in tackling terrorist financing or proliferation through the policing of shipping lanes. But outside the financial realm, the G-7 often missed a trick in failing to set up links between these gap-filling mechanisms and other key multilateral bodies, adding to problems of duplication and coordination.

All this matters for three reasons. First, many transnational problems are interconnected in nature, and so the solutions must also be. Yet opportunities for collaboration are frequently undermined by turf wars between secretariats or theological disputes within governing boards. Basic lack of policy coordination within governments about the positions they take in the governing boards of institutions compounds the problem. (Governing boards blame secretariats; secretariats blame governing boards; the truth is a pattern of mutually reinforcing codependence with each using the other to block serious efforts at collaboration.) The recent institutional bickering over who would “own” the fund for donor responses in Haiti is only the latest dispiriting evidence that proliferation of agencies and mandates frequently overshadows performance, to say nothing of basic purpose.

Second, tackling global problems is expensive, and we’ve only begun to tally the costs of the financial crisis, fragile states, or the transition to a low-carbon world. Yet money and talent are being wasted in duplication and anachronistic approaches to problems.

Third, and most important, a mounting backlash against globalization is mingling with widespread loss of faith in the multilateral system—with the conspicuous gap between expectations and outcomes in Copenhagen being merely the latest example. This matters a great deal, because if publics believe that cooperation doesn’t work, governments will have greater difficulty marshaling the political will or financial resources to carry out multilateral solutions. Governments’ domestic political incentive then is to withhold needed funding and even publicly criticize institutions—fueling rather
than fixing the problem. We thus end up in a negative cycle of underinvestment and underperformance that, arguably, characterizes the United Nations’ core problem in contemporary international politics.

And then the establishment of several new major power groupings has the potential to add to the problem of institutional proliferation—as the G-7 did. However, there are non-trivial reasons to believe that the G-20 can do better.

Can the G-20 Help?

Many of the thousands of international and regional organizations that make up the multilateral system were designed for a different age. There are myriad overlaps and redundancies in international capacity—for example, in the mushrooming network of agencies and departments involved in post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding, to say nothing of NGOs. Yet gaps remain in other important areas, such as managing resource scarcity or building preventive defenses against biological threats.7

The G-20 can help. This may sound surprising, because the issue of UN/G-20 relations is usually cast in terms of the G-20 stealing the United Nations’ thunder. But this misunderstands the nature of the G-20, the purposes and strengths of the United Nations, and the potential relationship between the two.

Because the G-20 meets at the heads of state level, it has the ability to range across different policy sectors. Heads of state do not face the same constraints of institutional prerogative and can override turf defenses. Indeed, their job is to make trade-offs among priorities, see connections, and galvanize bureaucratic action—all areas where the governing boards of formal institutions often come up short.

Optimally, the G-20 could extract excellence from other multilateral institutions. From an incentives standpoint, the opportunity to bring issues before leaders of twenty of the most powerful countries in the world can serve as a serious spur to performance. For example, the United Nations’ most creative response to the financial crisis came not from ECOSOC or the General Assembly (GA) but from the Secretariat’s proposals to the G-20 for a trillion dollars in spending to prevent instability in small and medium economies, and a tool for monitoring social vulnerability. By making room on the agenda of G-20 sessions for different multilateral bodies to present their ideas, the G-20 can help drive such creative approaches.

The G-20 can also use such invitations to stimulate collaboration. For instance, it could ask The World Bank and the UN secretary-general to conduct a shared analysis of the likely impact of the financial crisis on renewed internal conflict or ask the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations to conduct a joint study of the impact of trade liberalization on the risk of violent conflict. Theoretically, nothing stops different international institutions from collaborating in this way without the spur of powerful governments; in reality, that spur is highly useful to shape incentives and prioritization.

Where the issue is not overlap but gaps in the response, the G-20 may well be in a better position than the G-7 to fill gaps in ways that build connections to existing arrangements rather than simply piling one multilateral mechanism on top of another.

G-20 decisions have already given life to IMF and The World Bank governance reforms that were long discussed and long delayed. It now seems set that the major “emerging” economies—specifically China, India, and Brazil—will gain greater voice in the management of the international financial system, just as the move from the G-8 to the G-20 boosted their influence.

Although the expansion of the G-8 to the G-20 prompted concerns at the United
As with everything, there are times and places where this will work well, and times and places where it won’t. At the United Nations, for example, a G-20 “position” on peacekeeping could alienate several leading troop contributors that are not represented in the G-20. But if approached with some skill and sensitivity, concerns could be assuaged through preconsultations and/or careful wording—in other words, effective diplomacy.

Why Should the G-20 Care?

Clearly the biggest source of controversy regarding G-20 (like the G-8) is its perceived lack of legitimacy. True, if the concept is taken narrowly. On the other hand, the frank fact of the 2008 financial crisis is that no formal institution could have mounted a collective global response the way the G-20 did, and there is a certain legitimacy that comes from successfully averting a catastrophe of historic proportions. Add in the fact that the G-20 represents 80 percent of the world’s population and 90 percent of the world’s finance, and the “no legitimacy” argument seems a little hollow. Here, of course, an important philosophical difference arises: between the one-state, one-vote system on which the state system of sovereign equality is predicated, and the counter-claim that other metrics such as population (i.e., weighted voting) should hold sway—by which measure the G-20 is vastly more representative than the United Nations.

But legitimacy, or the lack thereof, is not even the main reason the G-20 should worry about the connection to global institutions. Put aside ethical/legitimacy/democracy arguments for a moment. The real reason for the G-20 to care about its relationship to the United Nations lies in the pervasive nature of interdependence today and the fact that the problems we are confronting both affect and can be affected by most nations. The G-20 nations may, for instance, possess the bulk of the financial resources that can be devoted to fragile states, but Africa

Nations over lack of representation and lack of connection to the formal multilateral system, the emerging power members may actually be more motivated than the original G-8 would to forge links to the United Nations. On climate, China and India have both resisted efforts by some to move negotiations from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Major Economies Forum (basically a G-20 for global warming). Brazilian and Indian foreign policies have emphasized the United Nations as well as aspirations for increased roles there; they will thus have national interests in finding ways to connect the G-20’s work to broader institutions. Middle powers like Australia and Indonesia have likewise made a point of highlighting the United Nations’ roles in a wide range of issue areas.

Of course, the decisions of the G-20 countries do not automatically translate into action within any formal multilateral organizations, and there is no international institution (except perhaps the IMF) where consensus among the G-20 even constitutes enough votes for a decision. But neither is there any institution in which a G-20 consensus would not be a powerful position around which other states could rally and which could form a firm basis for negotiations. Most global deals on any subject are prebrokered by a “green room” of 15-25 leading countries plus representatives of other groupings. The G-20 process—or a G-20 caucus of permanent representatives—could play similar roles, especially if tentacles were even further extended via informal consultation with five or six others representing broader clusters of states.

The way in which the G-20 (and similar major power groupings) relate to formal institutions will differ from issue to issue. But when it comes to global and transnational problems such as climate change and fragile states, the G-20 can hardly ignore the longstanding structures and efforts of formal, inclusive institutions.
provides a critical quantum of troops for peacekeeping in those states. The G-20 may emit most carbon, but if a carbon deal does not have global political buy-in, investors will likely game the system by shifting to less restricted markets. The G-20 nations may have tremendous assets to throw at the counterterrorism fight, but any counterterrorism strategy that is limited to 20 countries is bound to fail. The G-20 countries can coordinate their responses to pandemic outbreaks, but if there is an outbreak of a deadly infectious disease in the 21st country, or in the 192nd, gaps in the response will aid in its spread. However much influence the 20 have, many of the problems they confront are the kind where the weakest link can break the chain. Therefore, inclusive collective action is absolutely critical, not just coordination among the biggest players. This is precisely what the United Nations has to offer.

Even in the realm of finance, the G-20 should spare a thought for the simple point that the basic structure of the international system is sovereign equality among nation-states. Odd though it is that a tiny nation has the same vote in the United Nations as China, that’s the rule on which international order is built, and we abuse it at some risk. The G-20 can blow past the structure of sovereign equality in a crisis (thankfully), but if it operates against that system over time, it will sow the seeds of instability in other elements of the international system. Denying some states a voice in the basic structures of international order only creates incentives for them to behave as if they have no responsibility to uphold or comply with the order’s norms and expectations. Given the number of issues that depend on broad cooperation, that is an unwise course. By contrast, the decision of the United States’ G-20 sherpa to make repeated trips to New York to consult with ECOSOC and least developed UN member states about the G-20’s agenda is both good politics and good substance.

Can the G-20 Help the United Nations?

More important than the above arguments is the basic point that the United Nations works when its most powerful members can cooperate; when North and South see past their (diminishing) differences; when rising powers and established powers see a shared interest either in direct cooperation, or in using the good offices of the United Nations to help them find common ground.

In the coming period, this will not be easy. In the Human Rights Council, the disjunctions of interests are likely to contribute toward still nastier and more dysfunctional politics in that body. The climate change fight will remain contentious, even if Mexico succeeds in devising a productive new relationship between G-group negotiations (through the MEF) and UN negotiations—which, after all, eluded the process leading to Copenhagen. The major and rising powers will also be in competition over energy and strategic resources, in the process ignoring established norms about good governance or good investor/donor behavior. (And lest the point be missed: the West is every bit as abusive of democratic norms in its own ways and in its own regions of dominance—notably, the Middle East—as China is in Africa.)

While it is not likely that these various sources of tension will escalate into a great power conflict, that possibility cannot be entirely ignored. Had John McCain been president in 2008, for example, and acted on his campaign’s stated policy on the Russia/Georgia crisis, it may have spiked not just tension but actual, if limited, confrontation. The US and Chinese navies are engaged in a dangerous game of cat and mouse in the South China Sea. Border tensions between India and China are mounting. And if Brazil goes ahead with nuclear cooperation with Iran, its relations with the West will deteriorate.

Ironically, the possible beneficiary of any great power tensions could be the UN itself,
within limits of course. After all, peace-keeping was born in the Middle East when the two superpowers of the day needed a UN solution to avoid direct confrontation when war between their respective allies escalated. The United Nations likewise played a major role in Kosovo in the late 1990s, not because the great powers saw eye to eye, but precisely because they did not. But such a world of endless tensions would make the United Nations useful in an entirely negative sense—as a tool of crisis avoidance rather than progress in achieving the ideals of the Charter.

In conjunction with the United Nations, the G-20 is an essential tool in avoiding this scenario. And here comes the good news. The place where the major and rising powers have the most deeply shared interests, and also where they most need cooperation from others, is precisely in the area where the United Nations (and the wider panoply of multilateral instruments) is best structured to respond: in confronting transnational threats; areas of civil and regional conflict and fragile states; public health and infectious disease; climate change; poverty; piracy; and even terrorism. This is where multilateral institutions already play important roles, with the potential to become even more effective.

No small grouping of member states, no matter how powerful collectively, can replace the geographic or political reach of the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its core. The United Nations has the following comparative advantages in dealing with transnational threats:

• Long experience. Much as its critics would like to denigrate UN performance, the fact is that the United Nations has spent most of the post-Cold War era dealing with transnational threats of a wide variety—especially those related to internal state weakness and conflict—and, in so doing, gained invaluable experience. Watching European institutions in the south Balkans and the United States in Iraq, in this decade, repeat all the same mistakes that the United Nations made and internalized in the early 1990s, is a reminder of the fact that institutions are capable of learning and are vital repositories of best practice. Granted, of late, the United Nations has sometimes slipped and seemed to forget those lessons, but this deterioration often stems directly from pressure by member states.

• Universality breeds consent. The inclusivity of the United Nations, as well as regional organizations in their own geographical sphere, often proves extremely helpful in giving an option for a member government to invite the organization to play a role. Time and again political leaders have shown they find it easier to welcome, and explain to citizens, an external presence of a body of which their nation is a member. The fact that even the smallest member state has an equal voice in fora such as the General Assembly gives that state, domestically, a credible storyline with which to defend its sovereignty while simultaneously seeking external assistance, peacekeepers, etc. This is the essence of the legitimacy of the United Nations when present on the ground. Those who eschewed the operational implications of sovereignty and legitimacy concerns have been learning the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• Geographical breadth. The fact that the United Nations operates globally can be a hindrance given the sensitivities at play whenever staff need to be assembled for a political department or mediation team. But it is a huge advantage in both policy and political terms, in the ability of the United Nations (and other global organizations like The World Bank) to mobilize governments on a global level, and to mix-and-match expertise from different regions and income categories. Think of Lakhdar Brahimi’s unique credibility with Afghans, or the ability to deploy neutral Scandinavians into political
debate in Africa (or to select from within a region to draw on regional networks and relationships).

- Substantive breadth. The more we learn about transnational threats, the more we see the powerful interconnections among different issues. Freestanding, single-issue organizations may have greater depth in comparison with a UN counterpart. But the United Nations has unique breadth and the ability to pull disparate elements of its portfolio together in integrated responses. That the United Nations frequently fails to make use of this comparative advantage is a source of frustration—but as noted above, this is where the G-20 can offer some assistance.

The United Nations needs to continue strengthening its performance in several of these areas, including peacekeeping and counterterrorism. In other areas, like combating poverty, the need is for a serious policy shift. And the evidence is mounting that in such areas as development in post-conflict and fragile states, both radical policy change and radical institutional surgery are necessary.

Whatever the appropriate strategy and reform path, the United Nations will need the G-20 countries on board. Support from the G-20 is not a sufficient condition of UN action—but it is a necessary one. Gone are the days when a coalition of western states with nominal support from African members could drive a forward agenda at the United Nations. The rising powers are flexing their institutional muscles and have the ability to block or frustrate reforms where those reforms don’t serve their interests. But this is not necessarily a recipe for gridlock, because in broad terms, the rising powers share interests with the West on transnational threats. Not one member of the G-20 has an interest in letting terrorists wreak havoc or seeing a proliferation of fragile states. Not one profits from the breakdown of regional security in the Middle East or elsewhere; not one established, rising, or regional power's security improves if nuclear weapons spread. The United Nations plays critical roles in combating each of those threats; the G-20 members have deep interests in seeing the United Nations succeed.

Not all on its own, of course. The United Nations will work ever more in hybrid and coordinated responses with regional organizations and other multilateral actors. And here again, the fact that G-20 members wield substantial influence not just in the United Nations but across that wider set of institutions, means that they can, if willing, help ensure that those integrated responses work more smoothly than they have to date.

**Conclusion**

G-20 members can play important roles in unblocking two major obstacles to improved UN performance. The first is gaps between governing mechanisms of the Secretariat and the governing mechanisms of agencies, already discussed. The second are gaps between security and economic governing bodies. Across a wide range of issue areas, the United Nations is caught between mechanisms that are largely the purview of the UN Security Council and thus the P-5, on the one hand, and the ECOSOC and the General Assembly on the other. Cleverly used, a G-20 caucus or informal consultation mechanism could bridge this gap and infuse the UN with political dynamics that are more representative of today’s power configuration. Related concerns that this would undermine progress to Security Council reform should not be heeded. First of all, right now there is no progress to UN Security Council reform, so little is being risked. Second, if G-20 collaboration, however informal, works toward greater international consensus, effective channels to resolve differences, and spurring improved UN effectiveness, it will only help ease the way to UNSC reform. If instead, more wide-ranging informal G-20 consultations within the United Nations reveal serious divisions,
we are surely better off knowing this before we lock in membership or voting reform at the UNSC.

If the G-20 succeeds in buttressing a stable international financial system and, thereby, reducing tension and conflict between the major and rising powers, it will have made a major contribution to a healthy global order. Sometimes, it may appear to usurp UN roles, or rough a UN process out of the way. But these are incomparably minor frustrations compared to the bigger picture—i.e., a stable global order in which the United Nations’ members can pursue their wider goals.

For truly transnational problems, only global institutions can marshal the broad collective responses needed. Despite current fears, the G-20 will not replace the United Nations or other global institutions, but it can—and should—help mobilize those organizations to do their jobs better.

Endnotes


5 The recent Rio Summit in Cancun, Mexico, saw the announcement of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes the United States.


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