



Aid, Trade, and Infrastructure: Economic Dimensions of New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia

July 2-4, 2007
Siem Reap, Kingdom of
Cambodia

Sponsored by The Stanley
Foundation in collaboration
with the Cambodian
Institute for Cooperation
and Peace

New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: Implications for Cambodia

July 6, 2007
Phnom Penh, Kingdom of
Cambodia

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This brief summarizes the primary findings of these conferences as interpreted by the project organizers. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this brief. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Economic Dimensions of New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia: Trends in Aid, Trade, and Infrastructure

Executive Summary

At a July 2007 dialogue on aid, trade, investment, and economic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific arena, the Stanley Foundation convened a weeklong series of meetings in Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to consider the means by which the United States and the international community can best encourage the process of structural change that is under way in Southeast Asia. The dialogue included discussion of the recalibration of policy to promote development of a peaceful and stable region that contributes to global growth. The foundation convened this dialogue in collaboration with the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, as well as the Asia Foundation, for the discussions in Phnom Penh. Participants in the dialogue examined three important aspects of the development agenda in contemporary Southeast Asia: (1) the efficacy of official development aid, (2) trade and investment trends in the region, and (3) the increasing importance of infrastructure development in Southeast Asia and the implications for new power dynamics and competition.

- Participants noted that sources of continued economic instability in Southeast Asia stem from broad structural changes affecting the entire Pacific community, and the struggle of individual countries with issues such as rural poverty, the rural/urban divide, environmental degradation, and lack of education.
- Traditional US development assistance to Southeast Asia is declining as a result of other worldwide needs and the general stability or progress, or lack thereof, that is evident in the region.
- It is imperative that the United States and multilateral donors continue to participate in the evolution of development policy in the region, bearing in mind the most visible disparities in the region, and the issues that emerge in identifying and addressing development disparities.
- In the wake of expiration of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the United States should now consider regional and sectoral liberalization accords through APEC, and develop alternative economic and trade enhancement strategies in Southeast Asia.
- US policy must take into account the interests of other regional powers in Southeast Asia's long-term economic success, and the region's fuller integration

into the rules-based global trading system. Participants discussed ways in which the United States could support regional reforms in education, infrastructure, and other areas that can enhance its competitiveness in the face of new and powerful players.

- Participants considered a rising China as both a competitor and a partner for the nations of East Asia. They also discussed how the nations of ASEAN can adapt to this reality, and to tap into China's growth to enhance their own competitiveness.
- China has eclipsed Japan in its strong support for infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Accepting this phenomenon, participants considered ways in which Chinese investments in infrastructure development can be channeled to impact needed improvements in human capital and technology transfer, particularly in the region's least developed countries. They also underscored the need for Chinese investments to be consistent with the standards of transparency, stakeholder participation, and environmental protection employed by the international financial institutions and major bilateral donors.

Introduction

One decade after the 1997 financial crisis struck Southeast Asia, the region has largely recovered. Per capita incomes have returned to or surpassed pre-crisis levels, poverty rates have fallen, and in 2006 the region averaged 6 percent growth.¹ Strong external demand has boosted the region's exports and created current account surpluses and healthy foreign currency reserves. Southeast Asian nations have also continued their economic integration efforts through ASEAN, as well as through ASEAN-led and other bilateral agreements with external trade partners. Yet despite these successes, inequality in the region continues to worsen, threatening to undermine the economic, social, and political gains of recent years and creating new sources of instability.

At the same time, power dynamics have shifted within Southeast Asia as they have in the rest of the world, altering the roles of the region's major players. Two decades of high economic growth have significantly increased China's economic and political influence in the region. Having only recently

emerged from a decade-long economic slump, Japan has found its regional role weakened relative to China's. The Bush administration's focus on the Middle East and on combating terrorism has led to a dramatic shift in the United States' interest in Southeast Asia, and US policy has come to focus less on economic aid and more on security.

At a July 2007 dialogue on aid, trade, investment, and economic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific arena, the Stanley Foundation convened a weeklong series of meetings in Siem Reap and Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to consider the economic aspects of the region's new power dynamics. The conference brought together policymakers, scholars, analysts, and nongovernmental practitioners to discuss the effectiveness of official development assistance to Southeast Asia, trends in trade and investment, and the growing importance of infrastructure development in addressing sources of instability. Particular attention was paid to the United States' role in the region and to evaluating the efficacy of its policies and to producing a set of concrete recommendations for their improvement. Discussions also considered the policies and roles of other major regional players, and resulted in additional policy recommendations for these countries. While this policy brief reports on the substance of these discussions, it does not necessarily represent a consensus among the participants.

Development Assistance

As noted above, although Southeast Asian countries have made substantial progress in improving their overall economic well-being, bridging inequalities among them remains a significant policy challenge. Demand for skilled labor, for example, has driven up wages for skilled and educated workers, widening the income gap between these workers and the uneducated poor. Also, because Southeast Asia's development has been sequential and multi-layered, demands for aid have varied throughout based on the recipient country's level of development. International aid efforts have an important role to play in addressing these sources of inequality, provided that they are properly coordinated between donors and recipients and create opportunities for sustainable development.

While the region has numerous donors at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, fragmentation among these donors at times undermines aid effectiveness. When there are many donors, each with its own agenda and value system, coordination of aid efforts

¹ *Asian Development Outlook 2007*, Asian Development Bank.

among donors becomes more contentious and difficult. Moreover, poor coordination between donors and recipients results in supply-driven aid programs that are often ill-suited to meeting the development needs of recipient countries. Participants were especially concerned by the “dysfunctional” nature of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and there were calls for further ADB reforms and for greater US attention to that institution.

Growing economic prosperity within Southeast Asia and among its neighbors has also allowed for the entrance of new donors such as China and India. China’s assistance, in particular, often competes with that of more traditional donors such as the United States, Japan, and the multilateral development banks. The presence of these new donors tends to exacerbate the problem of donor fragmentation as their aid programs are less transparent than those of traditional donors. The development impact of these new programs is open to considerable scrutiny, especially in cases where aid is directed toward natural resource extraction and not toward the creation of new opportunities for capacity-building, human resource development, or economic development.

While new donors have assumed a greater role in Southeast Asia, America’s role as a donor to the region has been diminished in many ways. Although US assistance to Southeast Asia has increased, largely as a result of the efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), traditional US assistance to Southeast Asia has declined since 2001. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, US aid has shifted away from development and toward political and security issues. Many recent efforts to address political and security issues have been reactionary and suffered from insufficient planning and the lack of a long-term strategy.

Finally, US aid efforts continue to be hampered by less than optimum interagency coordination. Participants stressed the difficulty of discerning the true levels of US assistance. And in the post-September 11 environment, US assistance efforts could be characterized as reactive, and as “pushing money into countries with the hope of making a real difference.” Others called for greater analysis of where assistance programming has worked well and reasons for its success. These should not be purely academic exercises, but should be based on practical examples. The result should be a more

effective matching of donor objectives to the recipient country’s objectives and its real needs.

Participants also addressed the critical issue of capacity development. Development programs need to be “owned and led” by the target institution and should involve both long-term resource availability and agreement on broad objectives.

While there were several calls for greater coordination among donors, there was also recognition that donors often have different value systems and policy objectives upon which their assistance programs are based. It might still be possible, however, to cooperate more fully in information-sharing. This could include the establishment of technical working groups among donors.

The United States should:

- Work with the region’s recipient countries to achieve greater coordination among and between donors in order to leverage aid efforts more effectively and reduce donor fragmentation. Improved coordination is especially important for new donors such as China and India and could promote greater transparency in these and other countries’ aid programs.
- Place greater emphasis on long-term institutional capabilities through a variety of capacity-building measures.
- Recognize and appreciate that the region’s diversity means that aid programs should be tailored to the needs of individual countries. In Cambodia, for example, it might be appropriate to create a counterpart to the Vietnam Education Fund.

Asian success is not uniform, and all donors must consider the two faces of Asia in their strategies and approaches. New donors, as well as private sector initiatives and new foundations, are dispensing aid in ways that are changing the provision of development assistance. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the global and regional monitoring of development indicators put a premium on development impact. In international financial institutions (IFIs)—and in traditional aid agencies—governance, selectivity, and new partnerships are the new themes. As development bank concessional loan mechanisms are replenished, increased pragmatism is accompanying the normal scrutiny by donors.

Trade and Investment

The composition of Southeast Asia's trade flows has undergone a significant transformation in recent years. Exports of light manufactured goods have declined, as exports of raw materials to China to fuel that country's rapid economic development have increasingly delinked Southeast Asia from the global economy. The shift away from the production of light manufactures has led to decreased employment opportunities in many Southeast Asian countries and contributed to increased inequality and environmental degradation.

At the same time, the region has become more economically integrated. ASEAN remains at the center of this integration and is moving toward the planned completion of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Although ASEAN's integration has increased trade within the block, more than half of the grouping's trade continues to be with external trade partners. ASEAN has therefore sought to expand these external trade links through bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with neighboring economies such as China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as Australia, India, and New Zealand, all of which remain ASEAN's largest trade partners. Other models for regional economic integration also exist, including a free trade area centered on the East Asian Summit and a US-proposed APEC-wide FTA.

Participants stressed the importance of the composition of trade between ASEAN and China, which is moving into commodities and impacts the nations of Southeast Asia differently. They also called for the process of regional integration that would enable businesses to conduct their activities seamlessly across the region. Policy dialogue should focus on regulatory best practice. Participants lamented the lack of an institutional regulatory infrastructure, which contributes to a higher risk of investing in these countries.

The United States has taken a number of steps to strengthen its own economic integration with Southeast Asia. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) has signed bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with all ASEAN members except for Burma and Laos, and in late 2006 USTR concluded a TIFA with ASEAN itself. The United States also initiated bilateral FTA negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand, although the expiration of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in July 2007 appears to have postponed indefinitely the conclusion of talks with both countries. The United States has also resumed its push

for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific through APEC. Until or unless Congress renews TPA, however, the United States is likely to remain limited in its short-term trade policy options.

Several participants asserted that the halt in US FTA negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia resulted not only from domestic political pressures but also from the fact that the United States' "take-it-or-leave-it template" approach is simply too rigid. It was suggested that this approach heightens perceptions of US arrogance, particularly when the FTA template requires few if any concessions from the United States. Still, other participants believed that the US template approach is a way to avoid being honest about the minimum conditions for FTA approval by the United States Congress.

Yet even without TPA, there is much the United States can do to improve its trade relations with Southeast Asia. In this regard, it should:

- Maintain an open policy that supports regional integration, in whatever form. US policy and US participation in ASEAN should be used to ensure that integration is guided by ASEAN's leadership.
- Institutionalize the ASEAN Plus One relationship. An important first step toward this would be the nomination and congressional approval of an ambassador for ASEAN Affairs. This would be a significant confidence-building measure and would send a much-needed signal to ASEAN that US interest in the region remains strong.
- Consider trade preference programs for Asia-Pacific Least Developed Countries similar to measures already in place in Africa and the Caribbean. Existing preference programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative not only have increased subject country exports to the United States but also encourage economic and political reform because of the conditional eligibility for such programs.
- Extend the Support for Trade Adjustment and Reform (STAR) program to Cambodia and Laos as a means of strengthening linkages between aid and trade to help these countries benefit from increased economic openness. An expanded STAR program could be used to provide

technical and legal assistance to the two countries. Such a measure would also provide training and capacity-building to help these countries implement commitments under and take advantage of bilateral trade agreements with the United States and the World Trade Organization.

Infrastructure

Further development of regional infrastructure networks remains essential for addressing sources of economic instability. Transportation, power, and educational infrastructure can help to reduce rural poverty, narrow the rural-urban divide, and provide education and training for the region's poor and unskilled workers. Yet the changing dynamics of infrastructure development present a number of challenges to the region. Additional challenges are also posed to IFIs and countries that support such development, including the United States, Japan, and China.

Within the region, many countries struggle to balance the benefits of infrastructure development projects with the potential negative impacts of those projects on society. In Cambodia, for example, the construction of roads and other physical infrastructure has reduced poverty and created new economic opportunities for Cambodians. This development has also raised domestic living standards by facilitating tourism and trade and linking provincial areas into a single internal market. However, the increased value of land adjacent to newly constructed roads has led to the expropriation of land from the poor. Hydropower projects also contribute to landlessness by forcing the rural poor from land that is to be flooded. Such displacement often occurs without fair compensation to those displaced, increasing economic and political instability.

Infrastructure projects also pose potential environmental threats to the region. Dams and navigation projects along the Mekong River's upper length have helped to provide electricity and create new transportation networks for the flow of goods—yet these projects also threaten the livelihoods of downstream communities in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In Cambodia, for example, the livelihoods of many poor Cambodians depend on the river's continued flow to feed Lake Tonle Sap—a major source of food, water for irrigation, and an important means of transportation.

One participant stressed that Taiwan has also played an important role in regional infrastructure

development, and that it was one of the early and significant investors in Vietnam. The point was made that while we understand the challenges of dealing with Taiwan, it is counterproductive to pretend that Taiwan does not exist, given its regional economic role and despite the lack of formal recognition by China and the international community.

As with aid and trade, the region's new power dynamics have also affected external players' roles in regional infrastructure development. As China has increased its investments in physical infrastructure, the United States and IFIs have reduced their involvement in infrastructure development projects. Growing trade between China and Southeast Asia has biased recent infrastructure development in favor of projects linking the two through a North-South corridor. This tactical construction would facilitate exports of raw materials from Southeast Asia, which are needed to fuel China's growth. An East-West corridor has developed more slowly, despite the fact that such a corridor might better serve the economic development needs of the region. An East-West corridor would reduce transportation costs and times, improve the movement of goods and people, and encourage the development of border areas—thus creating new economic opportunities for their populations.

The United States should:

- Not neglect smaller infrastructure projects, especially where they stimulate economic development in individual countries. US policymakers should also remember that such projects often also have significant public relations value and help to improve the nation's image in the region.
- The United States should take greater interest in projects related to the Mekong River Delta. US policy should also encourage adherence to environmental standards in infrastructure projects in the Delta. The United States has much to offer in sharing its past experiences and mistakes with infrastructure development and could contribute through information-sharing or other cooperative efforts.
- Work with China to look for ways to cooperate with Southeast Asian countries on regional infrastructure development. This includes encouraging China to introduce greater transparency in its aid programs. The United States should also consider cooperation on health, education, and other areas, helping to lay foundations for sustainable

development in the region. Such cooperation would also help to defuse political tensions over various countries' roles in the region.

- Work with ASEAN and other countries involved in the region toward the creation of a uniform code of standards in order to encourage effective regional infrastructure development. The United States should comply with these standards and harmonize its own standards with those of the region.
- Work with countries in the region to develop a mechanism that addresses land rights issues related to the various types of infrastructure development. This mechanism should include an effective system of consultation and compensation to minimize the adverse social effects of displacements caused by the construction of roads, dams, and other projects.

Participant List

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Siem Reap, Kingdom of Cambodia

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Production: Amy Bakke and Margo Schneider