Great Expectations

By Alexander T. J. Lennon

The Stanley Foundation recently convened a three-day workshop to provide an opportunity for a handful of Asian and European policymakers to meet with US analysts. This brief draws on this workshop, addressing future directions for US foreign policy and how best to align expectations between the United States and other major powers. In this spirit, both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific should pay strong attention to the following recommendations:

• Before the United States can credibly reengage in international negotiations for a post-2012 climate change framework, Washington needs to pass domestic legislation, a hard task given economic anxieties. An approach relying on new technologies would not sufficiently assuage European concerns.

• A new US administration is expected to change US nuclear policies, both in preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation and accelerating its own nuclear weapons reductions. Depending on Iranian interests, working level or multilateral talks may be possible early on but beyond that, Iranian elections and Iraq will delay the process with Iran.

• While optimism reigns over prospective climate change and nuclear security policy, the world, particularly Asia, is justifiably pessimistic about the next US administration’s potential trade and economic policy. Presidential campaign rhetoric describes an economy that no longer exists.

• While a new administration will not act as unilaterally as the Bush administration has, skepticism about multilateral institutions is widespread in the United States. Such institutions need reforms, but what kind? Divergent stages of international development and views will have to be accounted for.

• Beyond Iraq and the Middle East, a new administration will need to pay sufficient attention to Asia.

Don’t like what the United States has done recently? The Bush administration must be responsible. It has been arrogant, lectured other countries (the ones it deigns to talk to), and thrown its military might around with reckless abandon. At least it won’t be around for much longer…

That appears to be a common global perception, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, with expectations for the next US administration much higher. The US presidential campaign, especially the hotly-contested and highly publicized
Democratic race between an African-American man and a woman for the world’s most powerful office, has attracted worldwide attention and rekindled hopes for the United States.

On one hand, a new administration will certainly be different, with both John McCain and Barack Obama likely to close Guantanamo Bay and unlikely to use tactics such as waterboarding to combat terrorism. On the other hand, any US administration will still be inclined, and come under significant domestic pressure, to use force against terrorism, sometimes in instances that others may believe to be unnecessary and counterproductive. So how much will really change? Have expectations for a different US administration been raised too high, potentially leading to disappointment, disillusionment, or worse in the months and years ahead?

To answer this question, the Stanley Foundation recently convened a three-day workshop to provide an opportunity for a handful of Asian and European policymakers to meet with American analysts. Participants held informal and off-the-record discussions, from which this article anonymously draws, on future directions for US foreign policy and how best to align expectations between the United States and other major powers.

Key Issues

Expectations for transatlantic and transpacific relations are not limited to the ubiquitous debates on Iraq and terrorism but are simultaneously being made about a range of significant issues such as climate change, nuclear security, global economics, and US multilateral participation. What does the rest of the world expect of the United States, and how much will US policy actually change in a new administration?

Climate Change

Climate change is where the next administration is likely to make its first impression that it marks a departure from the Bush administration. The Economist recently advised “the very fact that anti-Americanism is focused so much on Mr. Bush himself offers the next president a golden opportunity to improve the world’s view of America. The most obvious way to do that is to play a more active role in combating global warming.” A November 2006 Zogby International poll revealed the stunning amount of domestic support for such an initiative, with nearly half (49.5 percent) of Americans responding that global warming was either very (28.8 percent) or somewhat (20.7 percent) important in whom they voted for in the 2006 House and Senate elections.

The question, though, is this: What might the next administration actually do? US analysts at the Stanley workshop bluntly stated that the next administration “will not ratify Kyoto” but will focus instead on a post-2012 agenda to replace it. While that may not be surprising, those analysts also warned that a comprehensive, low-carbon strategy may not be coming “any time soon” because of American anxiety about the economy. This anxiety is likely to continue manifesting itself in two ways.

First, before the United States can credibly reengage in international negotiations for a post-2012 framework, Washington needs to pass domestic legislation to prove it is serious and, as some might say, to put its money where its mouth is. That is precisely the problem. An expert from the United States explained that “it would take some time [for Congress] to pass legislation regardless of who is president” given domestic economic concerns. One approach has already been considered in the 2008 Climate Security Act (otherwise known as Lieberman-Warner) which failed to pass in early June.

With a new administration that is unlikely to veto such a bill and with a new and more strongly Democratic Congress that is likely to support similar legislation, it is still not clear what a new Congress might accept. One workshop analyst confessed that other countries are “hopeful, but realistically cautious, because the US public may be less ready to accept the steps needed to address climate change than many think, even with a new Congress.” It is not clear that the American public is prepared to make significant economic sacrifices in the face of the subprime mortgage crisis and financial volatility. Instead, there is tremendous optimism that new “green” technologies can enable both economic growth and environmental protection. The 2006 Zogby poll, for example, found 75 percent support for Congress to “pass legislation promoting renewable and alternative energy sources” but did not determine whether Americans are willing or feel compelled to make immediate economic sacrifices to counter global warming in 2009. An approach relying on new technologies would not sufficiently address European concerns.
Second, because of this economic anxiety, any US administration will need to ensure that international agreements do not disproportionately harm the US economy at the expense of developing countries, such as China and India, which have not historically been comparable to the United States in terms of carbon emissions. As early as 1997, workshop participants noted, the Byrd-Hagel resolution laid down a marker that the US Congress would not agree to mandatory emissions restrictions unless developing countries also agreed to “new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” Participants warned that, today, public pressure was against binding targets on the United States if China and other developing countries only committed to aspirational targets.

Participants from developing countries reflected these high expectations for US leadership under a new administration. They made it clear that countries like China already recognize the threat of climate change to themselves and the world and that it was not a matter of choosing between the economy and the environment. One participant stated, “China recognizes that without successful transformation of its economy in the next few decades, it will be impossible for China to have 8-10 percent economic growth each year.” These participants also pointed out that these countries have already begun to act, as China did at its 17th Party Congress in October 2007, making significant commitments through steps such as fuel efficiency standards.

The terms of an agreement with the United States, even once it was substantially engaged, would be difficult, however. Asian participants emphasized the importance of technology transfers to developing countries as part of any international agreement. Even then, however, they predicted it would be difficult for these countries to agree to mandatory restrictions, particularly if those restrictions did not acknowledge that per capita emissions or “the per person pollution from developing countries is low.”

None of this means that the next US administration will not accomplish anything, either domestically or internationally, but it will be hard to meet the level of expectations for US engagement to combat global climate change, especially initially, given economic anxiety and disagreement about how much developing countries must do. The conference discussion reveals that, while Europe and the United States have been at odds about the seriousness of the US commitment during the Bush administration, a more committed US administration may still find it difficult to pass legislation and may shift the center of gravity of the international debate to a more pronounced front with developing countries in Asia.

Nuclear Security
A new US administration is also expected to consider changes to its nuclear policies, both in preventing Iranian nuclear proliferation and accelerating its own nuclear weapons reductions, potentially toward long-term nuclear disarmament. On Iran, participants echoed the expectation that an Obama administration would dramatically change US policy, with the candidate having declared his willingness to meet with leaders of Iran, among others, while McCain declared such an approach “appeasement.” In late May, United Kingdom Foreign Minister David Miliband reportedly “queried” Obama’s foreign policy advisers about the candidate’s statements, as the United Kingdom and France have supported maintaining pressure through UN and even European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran. Other European countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain have been more reluctant, at least on the EU front. Nevertheless, even while supporting dialogue, Obama will not give up the sanctions track, with one workshop expert explaining the US perception that similar pressure on Argentina, South Africa, and more recently North Korea has worked, while Obama himself has publicly maintained that he would support tough sanctions against Iran if Tehran “continues its troubling behavior.”

In addition, Obama may wait to reach out to Tehran until after Iran has held its own presidential elections in 2009, recently stating, “There’s no reason why we would necessarily meet with Ahmadinejad before we know that he was actually in power. He’s not the most powerful person in Iran.” That statement raises the question about Iran’s unique system and whom to talk to—the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, or the president. Particularly because any Democratic US president will need to prove he is tough on national security, while simultaneously trying to draw down troops in Iraq, it is unlikely that a President Obama will be talking with the Iranian leadership early in 2009, although working level or multilateral talks may be another story, depending on Iranian interest.
On the broader nuclear weapons and disarmament agenda, one conference analyst explained that with nuclear tests in the last decade by India, Pakistan, and North Korea as well as ongoing international tensions with Iran, “the world faces the prospects of nuclear anarchy unless behavior is changed in the nuclear area.” Expectations for the US agenda on this front have been reshaped in the last two years by a pair of bipartisan Wall Street Journal editorials, in part drawing on Ronald Reagan's vision for a conservative audience. Written by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, these editorials advocate “the goal of a world without nuclear weapons,” with short-term steps to facilitate that end.4

A participant from a nonnuclear country applauded the logic behind these recommendations, explaining that “it is important for the world to see nuclear disarmament is important to the United States.” While both an Obama and a McCain administration will likely consider some of the recommended near-term steps, such as bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with Russia and reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, more controversial steps will take a long time, “perhaps decades” an expert predicted, to accomplish.

One conference analyst warned that more aggressive steps, such as cuts to nearly 1000 strategic warheads, have started to raise international concerns in countries like China, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan that are reluctant to reduce their arsenals for a variety of reasons, as some participants from those countries reiterated at the workshop. Cuts to those levels also raise concerns in nonnuclear allies about the credibility of the US extended deterrent to countries like Germany and particularly Japan, as one participant expressed concerns about both North Korea and China and suggested that Washington consult with Tokyo throughout any deliberations.

At least one non-American participant recommended that the next administration be more forthcoming with incentives, rather than sanctions, to solve ongoing proliferation threats like Iran and North Korea. More broadly, participants concluded with the expectation that a new administration will accelerate a process of bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with Russia, particularly to address concerns that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will expire in December 2009, and to begin a concurrent longer-term multilateral dialogue—“a discussion” as a US expert emphasized—in an effort to prevent proliferation and strengthen nuclear security.

Darker Expectations: Economics and Globalization

While optimism reigns over prospective climate change and nuclear security policy, the world, particularly Asia, is pessimistic about the next administration’s potential trade and economic policy, and with some justification. Conference participants expressed concerns over the severity of US pressure on China over its trade surplus with the United States and the exchange rate of its currency, as well as the dim prospects for the US-Korea free trade agreement. The Economist recently declared that “worry about globalization is deeper and broader [in the United States] than it has been for decades. It has spread...from the Democrats to the Republicans....America has seen a bigger decline in support for free trade over the past five years than any of 35 countries studied by Pew; indeed, Americans now lead the world in hostility to free trade.”

The problem, American workshop analysts explained, is not limited to trade policy, but to the economy as a whole. Presidential campaign rhetoric describes an economy that no longer exists. One expert declared that “the US economy has fundamentally been changing for 25 years and no one has discussed it with the American people or talked about how to bring the infrastructure of the US economy into the 21st century.” Over that time, the United States has been transformed from a manufacturing to a service economy, where 70 percent of US jobs now reside, while much political discourse continues to focus on hard-hit manufacturing communities. This fact does not minimize the pain and hardship in those communities, but improvements in US manufacturing productivity have been made without increases in labor. In other words, those manufacturing jobs are not coming back. Meanwhile, it has become politically expedient for politicians to blame others—and trade—for those lost jobs.

One analyst declared that “the goal of the campaign is to engage the American people in a discussion about what it takes to compete in today's global economy” and to reform the US economic as well as global financial architecture for the 21st century. The question is whether that discussion can happen in a heated political campaign. Another analyst cited Senator Max Baucus's assertion that
China could become a potential economic “Sputnik” if rising economic competition could force the United States to address its own domestic economic challenges and provide a new social compact for the contemporary US economy. Such a compact would help those dislocated communities adjust to, and thrive in, today’s economy by improving training for service-sector jobs, health care for the unemployed, and education for future generations. Until that conversation happens, analysts warned, “US trade agreements have come to a standstill, Doha will not be completed, the president [will] not have trade promotion authority, and free trade agreements face grim prospects.” No wonder expectations for trade are low.

Multilateralism

Overall, the greatest expectation may simply be that the next administration will not act as unilaterally as the Bush administration has. While that is certainly likely, workshop participants also emphasized that skepticism about existing multilateral institutions is still widespread in the United States. At War With Ourselves, a 2003 book by Newsweek reporter Michael Hirsh, predicted that the first terms of the first two post-Cold War US administrations were probably extreme bookends, with no future administration likely to be either as multilateral as Bill Clinton or as unilateral as George W. Bush.10

One American workshop analyst relayed that many Democrats, perceived to be more favorable to multilateralism, have been shaped by some Clinton administration successes but also the failures of the 1990s such as Rwanda and Kosovo. These experiences have led to the conclusion that multilateralism is “useful, but flawed” and needs to be more effective. Specifically, the existing architecture was not created to address challenges such as climate change, proliferation, and terrorism. Power configurations are also different today with the rise of Brazil and countries in Asia and the creation of the EU, requiring architecture be reformed—such as financial institutions as well as the UN Security Council. The question is how.

One participant explained that Europe had been doing its own analysis of the lessons of the 1990s for how to make “effective multilateralism.” Five years after the 2003 EU security strategy emphasized the importance of the UN Security Council, the perception that it was sacrosanct has eroded. Some European states, for example, recently recognized Kosovo and have considered sanctions against Iran when the United Nations did not act. Nevertheless, they explained that this only reflected frustration with existing institutions, not with the principle of multilateralism or Europe’s commitment to it. Europeans remained confident that making the rules of the United Nations and other new international institutions was a source of strength, not weakness, in shaping the world order.

In Asia, ironically, participants appeared even more committed to the United Nations, as long as Security Council membership was reformed. At the same time, while commitment in Asia to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries was evolving on issues like North Korea and Burma, it still remained fundamentally “cherished” with a “firm commitment” throughout the continent, where nationalism has not been as discredited as it has been in Europe. Asian participants explained that this principle remains critical to the unfinished business of nation-building in developing Asian countries, including China itself because of unresolved issues like Taiwan. Asian countries are therefore not ready to share sovereignty, even if European ones are.

Such divergent stages of international development and views complicate UN efforts to authorize intervention in other countries or to embrace the “responsibility to protect,” which would empower the United Nations and arguably make it more effective. Given such divergence, one American analyst explained, what Frank Fukuyama has called “multi-multilateralism” holds some appeal in the United States. In other words, multilateralism may continue to be pursued outside of institutions like the United Nations in issue-specific coalitions, such as the gathering of the 15 “major emitters” on climate change, even after Bush leaves office.

Additionally, one American analyst explained, frustration with existing institutions has spurred a search for new ones. Proposals for a Concert or League of Democracies to act when the United Nations would not is one particularly high-profile, and controversial, example. Contrary to some perceptions, this proposal is not simply another strain of American pro-democracy ideology. Without question, US support spans a range of diverse—and sometimes contradictory—impulses, with some seeking to use such a Concert to pressure the United Nations to be more effective, while others
despaired of the United Nations ever getting its act together and sought an alternative.

As examples of the potential effectiveness of such an organization, proponents cited using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the late 1990s to circumvent Russia’s threat to veto UN authorization of military force in the Balkans; relief provided by a quad of Pacific democracies (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) to victims of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami; and ongoing efforts to impose sanctions on Iran unless Tehran suspends uranium enrichment. It could carry even greater legitimacy if it were institutionalized. The obvious concern, expressed by participants from all continents, is that such an organization would inevitably be perceived by nonmembers like China and Russia as instruments of neo-containment, particularly after the Bush administration’s rhetorical democracy crusades undermined prospects for future international cooperation.

Still, the emerging US debate reflects dissatisfaction with either unilateral or existing multilateral options. A bipartisan quest for new alternatives for the next administration is drawing considerable interest. Conference participants revealed similar support for multilateralism in general, but a search for institutions that were more effective was ongoing in both Europe and Asia.

**Divergent Transcontinental Agendas Ahead**

As complex as the agendas for Iraq, the Middle East, climate change, nuclear security, globalization, and multilateralism may already appear to be, critical transpacific and transatlantic relationships have immensely complex, and distinct, agendas waiting for a new US government.

**Transpacific Agenda**

Analysts on both sides of the Pacific expressed concern that Iraq and more broadly the Middle East will continue to prevent the United States from giving sufficient attention to Asia. Many issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, terrorism in Southeast Asia, environmental security, energy security, and regional democratization will remain important and require attention. Relations with India will also remain crucial, with the next administration likely to pick up where the current administration leaves off, although where exactly that will be depends upon Indian politics and its consideration of the controversial civilian nuclear deal.

However that turns out, another four urgent or strategically central issues will shape the future of Asia and require high-level US attention. First, the North Korean nuclear issue will remain unresolved, with the six-party talks producing meager results but no better alternatives clearly available. One Asian participant speculated that North Korea may expect it could get a better deal, particularly from an Obama administration, if it waited out the remaining months of the current administration. A US expert conceded that, more fundamentally, “the next administration may even need to think about what living with a nuclear North Korea means for the United States and the region.”

The success of those six-party talks are instrumental to part of the second issue, Asian security architecture, with calls, particularly from Asian participants, continuing to make the six-party talks permanent for a Northeast Asian security forum and have them address nonnuclear issues. One participant called the nuclear talks “a stone in the road of Asian integration for years to come” and advocated addressing a broader agenda through the forum. Meanwhile, others criticize the lack of progress and any suggestion of including North Korea without resolving the nuclear issue first. Asian workshop participants advocated at least an annual trilateral meeting among China, Japan, and the United States. For the region more broadly, the proliferation of forums, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the East Asian Summit, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, was “inefficient,” needing to be rationalized, and could use new ideas from a new US administration or elsewhere.

Third, the next administration will have to manage what some participants from both sides called a “slightly adrift” relationship that “needed to be modernized” with Tokyo, while Japan continues to seek to normalize itself and its regional relations. A new administration will find Tokyo undoubtedly scuffling with its own political uncertainty while debating whether to change or reinterpret its constitution and the regional ramifications of such a decision. While Japan’s relations with China have improved dramatically in recent months and should continue to do so, Tokyo will still have concerns about China’s social stability, its military transparency, and the potential that Washington will put relations with Beijing before Tokyo, in what one participant feared would be a “China-first approach” to the region.
Those immensely complex US relations with China and China’s “peaceful rise” are the fourth transpacific strategic issue for the next US administration. US analysts described a US bureaucracy fraught with divergent opinions and “growing tensions in the interagency” process about how to manage its relations with China. While military transparency remains a problem, Chinese participants assured that its own military bureaucracy is “on track with being more comfortable with its counterparts” and is becoming more accustomed to transparency, as demonstrated by recent Defense White Papers, even if they “still need some time” and were not yet as open as their Western counterparts. All of these issues will compete with, among others, the Middle East, climate change, nuclear security, and trade for the next administration’s attention.

Transatlantic Expectations
Across the other ocean from the United States, the transatlantic agenda awaiting the next administration is similarly complex—but on different issues such as Russia, Afghanistan, and Iran, and arguably with a greater emphasis on climate change than in Asia. Nevertheless, expectations in Europe seem even higher for the next US administration than they are in Asia. Analysts and government officials on both sides of the Atlantic have begun to warn against such lofty anticipation, including one US expert who predicted “yet another transatlantic crisis—this time one of rising expectations unfulfilled.”

Beneath these giddy expectations about a post-Bush America, workshop analysts expressed one overwhelming concern: in seeking to avoid acting unilaterally, the next US administration will ask for help from Europe on a wide range of global security issues—such as “Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Africa” and other state reconstruction or global stability operations as well as “energy security, cyberterrorism, and radical extremism”—only to find Europe incapable of answering the call. Perhaps emblematically, European participants disagreed over how unified Europe was capable of being. Some made the case it was increasingly capable as an international actor on security issues, while others described the EU as more of “a process than an actor,” with no common foreign and security policy.

One workshop participant recommended the United States and Europe seek more opportunities to work together in stability and reconstruction operations to help build transatlantic comity. None, however, expressed optimism that Europe would be able to meet the demands of the next US administration, with analysts from both sides of the Atlantic leaving the impression that the seeds of transatlantic tensions may be being planted, with the potential for high expectations on both sides to be dashed.

Beware Continuity in US Foreign Policy
A new US administration will certainly bring changes in policies, as it always does, but there is a risk that expectations have been set too high. A new administration will change tactics in the war on terror, can not sustain significant military forces in Iraq, and will seek to do something about climate change. Economic anxiety, however, will complicate the domestic and international climate change debate while also raising fears about broader US economic policies.

Outside of these issues, on a vast range of the complex global security agenda, one US analyst recently wrote: “It’s not hard to imagine the next president—even a Democrat—pursuing basically the same set of policies as Bush has in recent years on such big subjects as North Korea’s nuclear program, Arab-Israeli peace talks, development and conflict in Africa, Russia’s increasing belligerence and China’s integration into the world.” Whatever its predilections, wrote another, “the next US president will not hold a strong hand of cards. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, instability and extremist violence in Pakistan, nuclear ambitions in Iran, an economic downturn at home, a deeply divided electorate—these inauspicious conditions will constrict the administration’s room for maneuver as it seeks to pursue a new brand of statecraft.”

A recent article in The Economist went so far as to warn that “the main challenge facing the next president will [be] to make sure that American triumphalism is not replaced by a grumpy and irresponsible isolationism.” While such concerns about US isolationism in a post-9/11 world are probably misplaced, a related and very serious concern revealed by the workshop discussions is that the next administration will be perplexed and taxed by a daunting and dynamic global agenda, including but more complex than terrorism, that is at the same time less confident in the United States’ abilities. The risk is not necessarily isolationism but paralysis in the face of this multifaceted agenda and
limited multilateral options to deal with them. While this does not necessarily mean that any overseas audiences, particularly in Europe, will be yearning for the good old days of the Bush administration any time soon, it does mean that expectations for radical improvements in foreign policy areas are premature.

The fact is that there remains no consensus on an organizing principle, or principles, for today’s global security agenda or how to respond to it. The next administration will be the first new US administration to take office after the September 11 attacks shattered the nation’s sense of security and invulnerability. The policies of the Bush administration may reasonably be viewed as wounded overcompensation in response to such vulnerability, but that does not mean that the next administration will necessarily perform dramatically better or even differently in many areas. While the next administration will make some changes, what it may most clearly reveal to analysts is just how much those attacks have changed the United States itself.

**Endnotes**


**Participant List**

**Co-Chairs**

Michael Schiffer, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Julianne Smith, Director and Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Participants**

Scott Bates, Vice President and Senior Fellow, The Center for National Policy

Kit Batten, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy, Center for American Progress

Reinhold Brender, Counselor (Political), Delegation of the European Commission

Dongxiao Chen, Vice President and Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institute for International Studies

Reginald Dale, Director, Transatlantic Media Network, Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Rory Domm, Administrator, Transatlantic Relations, Council of the European Union

Marc Sandalow, Former San Francisco Chronicle Washington Bureau Chief

Sujit Dutta, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses

Randy Scheunemann, Foreign Policy Director, John McCain 2008, Inc.

Charles Freeman III, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Randall Graham Schriver, Armitage International

Kyudok Hong, Dean, College of Social Science, Sookmyung Women’s University

Melanie Standish, Program Associate, Intellectual Exchange Program, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership

Masafumi Ishii, Minister, Head of Political Section, The Embassy of Japan

Jan C. Techau, Director, Alfred Von Oppenheim-Center for European Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations

Lionel C. Johnson, Government Affairs, Stanford Financial Group

Georgy Toloraya, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy, Brookings Institution

Yoichi Kato, Bureau Chief, American General Bureau, The Asahi Shimbun

Binh Vu, Board Member, Vietnam-USA Society

Fumiaki Kubo, A. Barton Hepburn Professor of American Government and History, Faculty of Law, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo

Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Global Economics & Industry Analysis Department, Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute

Alexander T.J. Lennon, Editor in Chief, The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Wei Wang, Vice Dean, Institute of Social Sciences, Shanghai University

Yoichi Kato, Bureau Chief, American General Bureau, The Asahi Shimbun

Dr. Michael Williams, Head, Transatlantic Programme, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Liao Dong, Counselor, Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the United States of America

Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Joey Long, Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Thomas Wright, Senior Researcher, The Princeton Project on National Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Barbara S. Miller, President, Center for Transatlantic Relations

Marcin Zaborowski, Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies

Lars Zimmerman, Founder and Executive Director, Public Policy Group

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.
The Stanley Foundation

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The Stanley Foundation
209 Iowa Avenue
Muscatine, IA 52761 USA
563-264-1500
563-264-0864 fax
info@stanleyfoundation.org

Production: Amy Bakke, Anne Drinkall, and Jeff Martin