


# The Next 100 Project: Leveraging National Security Assistance to Meet Developing World Needs



An Executive Summary of the Report  
by The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation

2009

*This publication is the executive summary from the final report for “The Next 100 Project,” a collaborative effort between the Cooperative Nonproliferation Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation targeting sustainable implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The focus of the project was to identify new sources of assistance for addressing endemic threats in the developing world, including poverty, corruption, infectious disease, and economic underdevelopment, by tapping national security resources and addressing mutual concerns.*

The recent expansion of the nuclear club from five states to nine, the use of biological weapons by terrorist organizations and rogue scientists, and the increasing incidence of illicit dual-use technology transfers to state and nonstate actors contribute to the growing evidence that the world has entered a new era of proliferation. The end of the Cold War touched off an unprecedented era of war demobilization, transferring a growing menu of sophisticated technologies from government to private hands. This coincided with an array of new economic forces that would accelerate the spread of those same dual-use technologies into the hands of more nonstate actors in more countries around the world than at any other time in human history. Export-oriented growth models in developed and developing countries lowered barriers to trade and, along with advances in information, transportation,

and communications technologies, spurred a fantastic growth in global trade. As trade grew, however, nonproliferation norms often became secondary to the economic benefits of globalization.

Governments of the developed North have instituted a tighter and more rigorous set of “supply side” restrictions on the transfer and movement of materials and technology designated “of proliferation concern.” For over forty years, the spread of weapons and technologies was held in check by a patchwork of “technology denial” regimes based upon an interlocking set of treaty obligations. But each of the major treaties comprising the nonproliferation regime—including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—reflected state-centric solutions to the threat. This presumed that the state was the main repository of the technology or items being controlled, as well as the guarantor of its security from other, illegitimate actors.

Today, as innovation, research and development (R&D), production, and distribution have gone global, so too has the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Wealthy governments of the North speak of proliferation dangers emanating from, or fostered by, weak controls in the Global South. This situation is driven by both a fundamental capacity deficit, and by countervailing strategies for development.

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While the most technologically advanced governments are challenged by the proliferation of advanced technologies and the blurred lines between peaceful and nefarious uses of that technology, the response capacities of less developed countries are even more severely limited. Even the most conscientious developing country government, sensitized to the dangers of proliferation of weapons, materials, and expertise of mass destruction, faces immense practical difficulties in preventing proliferation in a globalized economy.

Convincing these governments to make greater investments in counterproliferation activities while their public education and health infrastructures suffer from neglect is not an easy—or even reasonable—task. Indeed, the perceived unwillingness of these poor governments to fully embrace nonproliferation standards is also a conflict over technology itself. The tightening of controls demanded by the North is seen by many poor countries as a gambit to stymie competition and keep the developing world in a perpetual state of underdevelopment. The global financial crisis only exacerbates the developing world's need for the most basic human services, even in the face of a rising tide of proliferant opportunity.

In April of 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540. The goal was to reinforce global supply-side controls over sensitive weapons, materials, technologies, and know-how. It sought to rectify the inadequacies of existing measures and the particular challenge of WMD proliferation to nonstate actors. Today, nearly five years into the experiment with 1540, progress toward its implementation has not been entirely encouraging. For instance, although the resolution required all member states to report their progress on implementation of the measures encompassed by the resolution to the 1540 Committee within six months of passage, only 161 countries have submitted their reports to date. Another 31 reports remain outstanding. Even more distressing has been the pace at which governments have developed national implementation plans to ensure full compliance with the tenets of the resolution.

In addition to the reporting requirement, 1540 stipulates that all states in need of assistance should request it, and that those states capable of providing assistance should offer to do so. In reality, however, potential donors have not been matched to prospective recipients.

We find that in light of the resolution's importance in preventing acquisition and potential use of WMD in general, and by a nonstate actor specifically, the international community needs to overcome the impediments to achievement of 1540's primary counterproliferation objectives. We further find that the assistance mechanism embedded in the resolution offers the best hope of closing the growing divide between the haves and have-nots and between the security-conscious North and the developing South.

To assure effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), the first priority is to correct the misperception of donor states that technical assistance or provision of equipment alone will achieve this purpose. Neither one-off trainings nor high-tech equipment will provide enduring solutions to the longstanding governance needs in many regions of the world. Due to the overwhelming barriers to implementation, recipient states must experience the value of receiving assistance in connection with 1540 so that their perception of the resolution as a North-driven priority—at the detriment of the

South—will be changed. We therefore conclude that there is a need to demonstrate the potential benefits of 1540, first in meeting urgent domestic priorities in recipient states, and secondly, in serving as a foundation for effective and sustainable counterproliferation measures.

When viewed in detail, the resolution provides a unique opportunity for poorer countries to tap into “dual-use” security-related assistance to meet many of their development and capacity-building objectives. For instance, the technical assistance and communications infrastructure to address detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction is equally critical for emergency management authorities and first responders in the event of a natural disaster. The ability to apprehend and prosecute criminals who may be marketing materials of mass destruction requires a well-trained police force and functioning judiciary. The prevention of human or small arms trafficking relies upon many of the same resources and capacities that can detect and prevent nuclear proliferation. Countering the scourge of infectious diseases or the detection of, and response to, the use of a biological weapon require a functioning disease surveillance and public health infrastructure. And “safe ports” standards that challenge governments’ ability to remain competitive in the global supply chain can be achieved, in part, with nonproliferation security assistance that ensures that borders and ports are both secure and efficient.

Although development and security programs are treated as conflicting priorities in national budgets, untapped opportunities leverage and mutually support each other. This entails not simply a reallocation of resources, but also a wiser, more strategic expenditure of those investments. We propose an innovative “whole of society” approach to bridging the security/development divide that would leverage donor investments in both security assistance and development assistance, so as to ensure recipient state buy-in and an enduring return on investment.

Western political leaders, academics, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropists are all fond of decrying the divisions between the development and security communities. But until there is a greater financial allocation of resources toward poverty eradication, trade enhancement, basic education, infrastructure development, public health, and other critical development priorities, the world will be beset by a growing array of security threats—including terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Using, among other tools, UNSCR 1540, the international community should now leverage existing resources and mechanisms to circumvent the stove-piped proclivities of governments and bridge the development/security divide.

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## The Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. The foundation frequently collaborates with other organizations. It does not make grants. Online at [www.stanleyfoundation.org](http://www.stanleyfoundation.org).

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## The Stimson Center

Located in Washington, DC, the Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to offering practical solutions to problems of global security. From the beginning, the Stimson Center has been committed to meaningful impact, a thorough integration of analysis and outreach, and a creative and innovative approach to problems. The Center has three basic program areas, including: Reducing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Building Regional Security; and Strengthening Institutions of International Peace and Security. These three program areas encompass work on a wide range of security issues, from nuclear and biological weapons proliferation to regional security in Asia to peace operations and post-conflict stability. By engaging policymakers, policy implementers, and nongovernmental institutions as well as other experts, we craft recommendations that are cross-partisan, actionable, and effective.

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