



# United States–China–Japan Working Group on Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)

A Stanley Foundation  
Project Report

2008



The  
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## Executive Summary

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CSBMs reduce misperceptions, enhance communication, and provide venues for personal relationships among government officials, military officers, and scholars.

The continuing security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is largely contingent on enhanced cooperation among the region's three dominant powers: China, Japan, and the United States. Yet security in the region today is highly fluid, unstable, and vulnerable to both internal and external pressures for confrontation and possibly conflict. In the words of Harvard professor Ezra F. Vogel, "One side of the triangle, the United States and Japan, is bolstered by a strong security alliance built on mutual trust from half a century of close cooperation.... Despite the high level of contacts between China and Japan, trust is lacking." As global economic interdependence deepens while energy and natural resource competition rises, East Asia faces altogether new venues and opportunities for cooperation as well as competition. Because of institutional weakness and the close operating proximity of militaries in the region, numerous analysts have pointed to an urgent need for a more robust regime of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the region. There are few illusions that CSBMs, in themselves, can create a sustainable and enduring cooperative regional framework and melt away the issues of contention among the United States, China, and Japan. But during a period of power transition when uncertainty about intentions, misapprehension, or even an accident could spark an unwanted and unintended confrontation in the Pacific, the development of a robust trilateral CSBM regime can play a key role in stabilizing the region.

### Key Recommendations:

- **Give priority to CSBM efforts.**

All three working groups agreed that, although the legacy of the Cold War still runs deep in East Asia and therefore CSBMs may be difficult to establish, this is precisely what makes them all the more necessary. CSBMs reduce misperceptions, enhance communication, and provide venues for personal relationships among government officials, military officers, and scholars. Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo should engage in CSBMs through both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.

- **Talk more, at different levels.**

Over the course of the trilateral working group's meeting, a recurring theme was the importance of reducing misperceptions among the three powers. As one participant explained, "Without knowing common interests, we cannot work together; without knowing disagreement, we cannot compromise." Establishing redundant channels of communication at all levels of the government hierarchy as well as keeping unofficial channels open is a critical investment that all countries should proactively make in peacetime.

- **Start with the low-hanging fruit.**

Initially, CSBMs should focus on low-cost, easily implemented areas of collaboration. Although there are no "cost-free" CSBMs, the three powers should try to keep the costs of initial CSBMs low so that they are attractive for all three parties.

- **Promote specific actions.**

Participants agreed on submitting a series of eight CSBM proposals to their respective governments. The proposals call for the establishment of:

1. A trilateral strategic security dialogue.
2. A working group to enhance joint humanitarian and natural disaster monitoring and response.
3. A working group to discuss and plan bilateral naval exercises.
4. A trilateral consultative mechanism to discuss maritime safety.
5. A trilateral defense telephone link (DTL).
6. A bilateral Japan-China Peacekeeping Operation Center (PKOC).
7. Trilateral gaming simulations focusing on a fourth-party nontraditional security threat/crisis.
8. Workshops to discuss standardization of information sharing.

### About CSBMs

Among the topics covered over the course of these meetings were: What constitutes a CSBM? How can CSBMs mitigate the security dilemma? What kinds of CSBMs are both desirable and effective? What are the opportunities and challenges for bilateral and trilateral naval, transparency, communication, and nontraditional CSBMs?

CSBMs should contribute to a reduction of uncertainty, misperceptions, and suspicions and thus reduce the possibility of incidental or accidental war. CSBMs are often divided into three categories: (1) declaratory measures, which are statements of intent, including commitments not to attack or use certain types of weapons; (2) transparency measures, which include exchange of information, notification, and observation/inspection invitations; and (3) constraint measures, which include exclusion or separation zones and risk-reduction regimes. CSBMs have common denominators: they must be viewed in “win-win-win” not “zero-sum” terms, and they should be built upon regional norms, realities, and cultures. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional forum established in 1994 to enhance security cooperation, is an example of a CSBM.

There are several types of CSBMs. Communication CSBMs (hotlines, regional communication centers, regularly scheduled consultations) are communication channels and consultative mechanisms designed to prevent crises or to encourage adversaries to talk before crises escalate. Constraint CSBMs are designed to prevent military forces from inadvertently coming into contact or otherwise threatening each other. Examples include advance notice of movement of large military units, and geographic or size limits on military exercises. Transparency CSBMs (such as military data exchanges) are designed to create greater openness of military capabilities and activities. Verification CSBMs (such as aerial inspections, ground-based sensors, on-site inspections) are measures created to collect data or provide firsthand access to confirm or verify a state’s compliance with a particular treaty or agreement. Nontraditional CSBMs (CSBMs on nontraditional security

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In the case of United States-China-Japan, issues for possible trilateral CSBMs include but are not limited to striving for stability on the Korean peninsula, ensuring maritime security, fostering economic growth, and meeting economic challenges.

issues) pertain to topics such as energy, maritime security (such as South China Sea piracy), and economic development.

CSBMs cannot work when the parties concerned lack the political will. All sides need to adopt realistic and incremental approaches, such as unilateral declaration measures, bilateral agreements, and trilateral meetings. The successful negotiation and implementation of CSBMs demand sustained leadership. In the case of United States-China-Japan, issues for possible trilateral CSBMs include but are not limited to striving for stability on the Korean peninsula, ensuring maritime security, fostering economic growth, and meeting economic challenges.

# Findings

## The Big Picture

- **Both traditional and nontraditional CSBMs should be pursued.**

Although there was some disagreement on whether CSBMs should focus primarily on traditional security problems such as Taiwan or the Korean peninsula or on nontraditional concerns like energy security, protection of shipping lanes, or natural disaster relief, all participants agreed on the rising importance of nontraditional CSBMs and advocated a combination of both traditional and nontraditional confidence-building measures. Some suggested that it might be easier to start CSBMs in nontraditional areas and then expand them to cover more contentious traditional security issues at a later time once a basis for trust and understanding exists among the three powers.

- **Trilateral dialogue can develop within multilateral institutions.**

Instead of starting from explicitly trilateral institutions, trilateral cooperation within larger frameworks can be a practical and useful approach for strengthening United States-China-Japan ties. Although there was some disagreement on how bilateral or trilateral CSBMs would mesh with existing regional or international regimes and institutions, participants recognized the value of using existing venues as springboards for enhanced cooperation among the lead nations in Northeast Asia.

- **Working groups are effective means but not ends.**

Participants agreed on the clear need to continue discussions on a number of topics and stressed the usefulness of trilateral working groups in furthering these important debates. Participants also recognized that working groups should not be considered the end, despite their merit, but rather as a tool to deepen mutual understanding and build consensus toward practical policy proposals.

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## The Finer Points

### Trilateral Security Dialogue

A broad trilateral security dialogue is important. Participants agreed on the need to establish a trilateral dialogue that can develop into a ministerial-level 2+2+2 broad strategic consultative mechanism capable of discussing issues of relevance to all three countries. While discussing the challenges and opportunities facing the countries, building personal relationships among top leaders will serve as an important enabler with positive spillover effects, reducing misperceptions and enhancing mutual understanding and trust. Participants expressed differing opinions on how to initiate the trilateral strategic dialogue, with some proposing a 2+2+2 trilateral consultative mechanism at the deputy minister level and then working toward a transition to the minister level, while others proposed organizing a 1+1+1 trilateral consultative mechanism at the minister level, either among ministers of

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foreign affairs or ministers of defense, and then expanding it into a 2+2+2 trilateral consultative mechanism. Some participants proposed seizing ad hoc opportunities for trilateral meetings at current multilateral forums, such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) or EAS (East Asia Summit) ministerial summits, while others proposed establishing the mechanism as an independent institution. Participants reached consensus on the importance of having both civilian and military participation in order for there to be meaningful strategic security dialogue.

Proposals for trilateral security dialogue shared the goal of enhancing high-level political dialogue but diverged in terms of details, with some proposals suggesting a broad, top-level, strategic political dialogue and others suggesting a working-level consultative mechanism.

#### **Agreement**

##### *Building toward broad trilateral security*

Participants agreed that there is a need to build capacity gradually, so that a trilateral dialogue can develop into a ministerial-level 2+2+2 broad strategic consultative mechanism. While some participants argued that focusing on technical issues would serve as a practical approach to building momentum for the institutionalization of the consultative mechanism, all participants agreed that the ultimate goal of the trilateral consultative mechanism should be broad security dialogue on issues agreed upon by all three countries.

#### **Divergences**

##### *“Strategic dialogue”*

Although participants shared broad consensus on the need for trilateral top-level dialogue on strategic issues, some members believed that framing the consultative mechanism as a “trilateral security dialogue” would be more effective in winning domestic support for the initiative, given political sensitivities to the establishment of “strategic” dialogues.

##### *Functional participants*

Participants expressed differing opinions on how to initiate the trilateral security dialogue. Some proposed organizing a 2+2+2 trilateral consultative mechanism at the deputy minister level and then working toward a transition to the minister level. Others proposed organizing a 1+1+1 trilateral consultative mechanism. Some members stressed the importance of having both civilian and military participation in order for there to be meaningful security dialogue.

##### *Ad hoc vs. institutionalized*

There was some disagreement on whether the mechanism should be established by seizing ad hoc opportunities for trilateral meetings at current multilateral forums, such as ARF or EAS ministerial summits,

or whether the mechanism should be established independently from the beginning.

#### *Agenda*

Participants agreed that there is a need for a specific agenda for this consultative mechanism but disagreed on whether the agenda for this CSBM should be set from the beginning so that respective governments would have concrete incentives to participate, or whether the agenda should stay fluid at the initial stage so that the mechanism can focus on institutionalized regular trilateral communication. One participant suggested the CSBM proposals of this working group as possible initial agenda topics for the trilateral strategic dialogue mechanism. Another participant suggested focusing agenda items primarily on topics of global relevance.

#### **Joint Humanitarian and Natural Disaster Monitoring and Response**

Participants agreed on the importance of focusing on the prevention and mitigation of humanitarian and natural disasters by building national capacity in terms of institutional structures and common operating procedures. Doing so is a win-win opportunity for the three countries since they can deepen their understanding of each other's operational cultures while limiting the impact of nontraditional security threats such as pandemics, earthquakes, and tsunamis. For joint monitoring, participants agreed to explore ways to share information in order to develop trilateral cooperation. A critical steppingstone toward this goal is identifying the appropriate lead agencies in the respective countries. For disaster response, participants agreed that a working group should be formed to discuss best practices among the countries in order to build momentum for the development of joint response capabilities. Participants agreed that, although the ultimate goal would be to achieve operational and functional benefits, even the largely symbolic gain of trilateral cooperation at early stages is important. Participants generally agreed that trilateral mechanisms should not duplicate efforts by international and regional organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations, but some thought that because there is already cooperation within multilateral forums related to these common threats, they are a good venue to focus on strengthening trilateral relations at an early stage. Participants also stressed the importance of respecting national sovereignty and providing assistance only at the request of an affected country.

Proposals differed primarily in degree of ambition.

#### **Agreements**

##### *Sequential steps for increased joint monitoring and response*

Participants agreed to synthesize their multiple proposals into a single CSBM for monitoring and response; the CSBM would essentially

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For joint monitoring, participants agreed to explore ways to share information in order to develop trilateral cooperation.



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...the CSBM would essentially provide a roadmap for progressive incremental steps leading to robust trilateral disaster monitoring and response.

provide a roadmap for progressive incremental steps leading to robust trilateral disaster monitoring and response. There was widespread consensus that even though the ultimate goal would be to achieve operational and functional benefits, at early stages merely symbolic gains from trilateral cooperation would also hold merit.

#### *Joint monitoring*

For joint monitoring, participants agreed in principle to share information in order to develop trilateral cooperation. Although some participants wondered whether China in particular would be willing to share information given concerns over secrecy, participants agreed that information on natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, typhoons, and landslides would be relatively easy to share. As an initial step, participants agreed to chart which agencies within the three countries take the lead in collecting and disseminating information related to humanitarian and natural disasters, either independently or through a working-group forum. This chart would serve as a building block for the next stage: linking trilateral counterparts in information-sharing initiatives.

#### *Joint responses*

For disaster response, participants agreed that the initial stage should be to convene a workshop bringing together working-level technical experts from the three countries to discuss best practices and lessons learned from past experience in order to deepen the understanding of each other's operational cultures. This working group would then discuss ways to cooperate operationally in future humanitarian and natural disasters.

#### *Building national capacity*

Participants agreed on the importance of emphasizing prevention and mitigation by building national capacity in terms of institutional structures and common operating procedures. Many participants stressed that having this in place before a major humanitarian or national disaster strikes will have a large impact on the efficacy of the response.

#### *Respect for sovereignty*

All participants agreed that this mechanism must respect national sovereignty and provide assistance only at the request of the affected countries. As one participant stressed, "We're not talking about intervention, we're talking about assistance."

#### **Divergences**

##### *Trilateral vs. multilateral*

There was some disagreement on how to integrate trilateral mechanisms with existing multilateral mechanisms since disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and pandemics affect the entire region. Participants agreed that trilateral mechanisms should not duplicate the efforts of

international and regional organizations such as the WHO and United Nations, but some believed that, because there is already cooperation within multilateral forums related to these common threats, it is a good venue to focus on strengthening trilateral relations at an early stage. There seemed to be consensus on framing joint trilateral cooperation in terms of cooperation among lead nations in Northeast Asia.

#### *How functional*

Although there was broad consensus on sequentially deepening the scope and depth of trilateral cooperation in this area, participants diverged on how far it should go. Some participants, for example, asked whether building capacity in each country's respective national command center would be more effective than creating a single joint command center.

#### *Information sharing*

Some participants questioned to what extent the three countries would be willing to cooperate in information sharing. Most participants, however, stressed that the technology used for monitoring natural disasters is not considered sensitive and that each country's scientific community would likely be happy to share information. Some discussants stressed that disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrated that the real challenge in sharing information is not an unwillingness to share information but rather a lack of clarity on whom to share that information with. Some participants stressed that sharing information on nontraditional security threats such as pandemics would be in and of itself a significant step toward building transparency. Others reiterated the importance of not duplicating existing information-sharing systems and suggested that trilateral information sharing should concentrate on responding to natural disasters.

#### *Appropriate actors*

There was some ambiguity regarding who would be primarily involved in trilateral cooperation. Participants stressed that lessons learned from previous experience suggest that disaster response is handled by diverse actors in each country and coordinating them may require difficult changes to national laws related to disaster-response protocol. Participants agreed on the need to better understand which agencies take the lead on disaster response in each country as well as how China can participate in joint response outside its borders.

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### **Naval Exercise and Maritime Security**

Participants agreed that developing robust and multiple connections among the navies of the three countries was a worthy goal. In addition to broadening and deepening ties among the respective militaries while providing mutual logistical support, joint naval exercises and maritime safety initiatives will foster good will as people-to-people exchanges lead to positive spillovers such as participation and collaboration in a range of civic projects

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and cultural events. While discussing specific naval exercise CSBMs, participants focused on a range of specific bilateral and trilateral suggestions, such as port visits, maritime safety measures, and search and rescue exercises aimed at both mitigating the risk of conflict at sea and enhancing mutual understanding of naval operational cultures.

In their proposals, participants endorsed the suggestion to begin with relatively easy-to-accomplish measures before moving on to more complicated operational measures. Participants also agreed to propose the establishment of a bilateral China-Japan consultative mechanism to discuss maritime safety issues in order to devise mechanisms for enhancing mutual adherence to established international protocols and to determine whether a more proscriptive trilateral agreement for maintaining air and sea safety should be adopted.

#### **Agreements**

##### *Gradualist approach*

Participants agreed on the need to adopt a gradualist approach to naval exercises and maritime safety. Participants generally endorsed the suggestion to begin with bilateral and trilateral open ship-port visits, farewell exercises, chief naval officer visits, basic ship-handling exercises, and the creation of bilateral hotline channels before moving on to more operational measures such as search and rescue exercises, submarine rescue exercises, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, antiterrorism operations, multilateral naval exercises such as Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), and eventually trilateral naval exercises. Participants recognized the vulnerability of some of these measures, such as port visits, to political manipulation but agreed on the whole that developing robust and multiple connections among the three countries was a worthy goal. As one participant noted, “Port visits will be subject to political manipulation, but that’s no reason not to do it; the more options political leaders have, the more opportunity they’ll have to promote confidence.” Participants also stressed that although relatively basic initiatives such as port visits may seem merely symbolic, opportunities for interaction have very significant practical effects.

##### *Ad hoc vs. institutionalized: Working toward regularized meetings*

Although participants generally agreed to continuing discussions on deepening trilateral naval exercises and maritime safety through the establishment of a working group, some members stressed that in order to build understanding of the respective naval cultures, ad hoc working groups are not as desirable as regularly scheduled meetings.

##### *Spillover potential*

Participants agreed that by strengthening navy-to-navy ties and mutual understanding of operational cultures among the three countries, they could lay the groundwork for positive spillovers in other service branches.

#### *Start with a working group*

Participants agreed that although there was agreement in principle, there was not enough consensus on details for many of the proposed initiatives. In order to flesh out the specifics, participants agreed to propose the establishment of a working group to continue these discussions on a more technical level.

#### *Establish a DTL*

Participants agreed that although a “hotline” carried negative Cold War connotations, a DTL could be a valuable tool in a crisis. In order to foster the habitual use of the DTL, participants agreed that using the DTL to implement measures and procedures related to a fourth-party accident or incident may be effective.

#### **Divergences**

##### *How far, how fast*

Participants failed to reach consensus on how far initiatives for naval exercises and maritime safety should go or what a suitable timeline would be. Participants deferred decisions on these details to a yet-to-be-established working group.

##### *Hotline: Functional actors*

Most participants agreed on the benefits of establishing a hotline but failed to agree on who would use the hotline and whether it should link local or national actors. Participants also came short of agreeing on what guidelines should be established so that the hotline will be functional in the midst of a crisis.

##### *Incident at Sea agreement*

Some participants stressed that the idea of Incident at Sea (INCSEA) agreements is rather unpopular among the American defense community given their Cold War nuances. INCSEA was in fact an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. Participants failed to reach consensus on whether or not to propose a revamped INCSEA for the three countries but stressed that if an INCSEA agreement is proposed, it must not be exclusionary or create special exceptions to established international law and norms governing behavior at sea. Participants also agreed that an INCSEA-like agreement would be best conceived as a bilateral agreement between China and Japan.

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Participants agreed that although a “hotline” carried negative Cold War connotations, a DTL could be a valuable tool in a crisis.

#### **Transparency and Communication CSBMs**

Participants agreed that transparency was clearly a goal of many of the proposed CSBMs discussed. Participants noted the value of gaming exercises and agreed on the merit of engaging in trilateral joint simulations. Some participants emphasized the importance of using real world scenarios in the gaming exercises and suggested concentrating on hypothetical nontraditional

security threats in fourth-party crisis scenarios. Some participants suggested limiting the scenarios to actual near-crisis case studies. All participants agreed that highly controversial issues such as Taiwan and North Korea should not be used as scenarios due to the political sensitivities involved.

Participants also agreed that a bilateral Japan-China consultation on Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) would be mutually beneficial. Some participants suggested integrating Chinese military representatives into the PKOC that is being established in Tokyo. Participants also agreed that bilateral activities could involve third-party actors in order to build broader regional capacity.

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Participants also discussed defense budgets and information sharing and agreed that there was some ambiguity in what was being requested in calls from the United States and Japan for China to “increase” the transparency of its defense budget. There was some disagreement on whether the root cause of the lack of transparency was a lack of clarity in the request or a lack of willingness or ability to share certain information. Participants agreed to propose the establishment of a working group to build consensus on trilateral standardization of information-sharing metrics, particularly in relation to defense budgets. Participants recognized that since bilateral or trilateral transparent information sharing may be politically sensitive, it might be helpful to advocate more internal transparency within the three countries as an initial step in the development of norms and habits of making detailed information public.

Participants generally did not support the idea of creating a mechanism to coordinate trilateral policy toward Taiwan, but Japanese and American participants supported the idea of encouraging China and Taiwan to engage in more direct dialogue.

Proposals discussed in this session centered on standardizing the metrics for transparency of information sharing and joint simulations.

#### **Agreements**

##### *Ambiguity in requests for “transparency”*

Participants noted that China had significantly improved its transparency in information sharing but agreed that there was still room for improvement. Participants focused particularly on lack of transparency in defense budgets since discrete procurement information is not available to the public, which complicates the ability to draw meaningful comparisons among the three countries. Most participants agreed that the United States and Japan need to be clearer about what specifically they expect from China when they call for increased “transparency.”

##### *Focus on domestic transparency*

Participants agreed that since bilateral or trilateral transparent information sharing may be politically sensitive, it might be helpful to begin by

advocating more internal transparency within the three countries in order to develop norms and habits of making detailed information public.

#### *Joint simulation related to fourth-party crisis*

Participants noted the value of gaming exercises and agreed on the merit of engaging in trilateral joint simulations. Some participants emphasized the importance of using scenarios in the gaming exercises and suggested focusing on hypothetical nontraditional security threats in fourth-party crisis scenarios, such as a Russian oil spill in the East China Sea, a joint response to a maritime terrorist or piracy act, a pandemic, or a noncombatant evacuation from a fourth-party country. Some participants suggested deepening mutual understanding with attention to actual near-crisis case studies such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade or the 2001 EP-3 incident when a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided with a US Navy EP-3 surveillance plane in the air space above the East China Sea. All participants agreed that highly controversial issues such as Taiwan and North Korea should not be used as scenarios due to the political sensitivities involved. Some participants expressed support for the idea of staging a joint simulation in conjunction with another CSBM such as one of the working-group meetings proposed in previous discussions.

#### *China-Japan PKOC*

Participants agreed that bilateral China-Japan consultation on PKOs would be mutually beneficial. Some participants suggested integrating Chinese military representatives into the PKOC currently being established in Tokyo by Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF) armed force. Participants also agreed that bilateral activities could involve third-party actors in order to build regional capacity, with some participants supporting the proposal to conduct joint training on Mongolian territory.

#### *Continue the discussion on transparency*

Participants agreed that strict reciprocity is unrealistic but that transparency would be a long-term objective. In order to flesh out the details and to resolve some of the areas of disagreement related to the transparency of CSBMs, participants agreed that a workshop should be established.

#### *Continue the discussion on defense budgets*

Participants agreed that although defense budgets are complicated and often impossible to compare across countries, there is a need to examine the ways in which defense budget transparency can be enhanced. Participants supported the idea of establishing a working group to continue discussing this issue.

### **Divergences**

#### *Causes of the transparency gap*

Participants disagreed on whether conflict among the three powers over questions of transparency stemmed from a lack of consensus on what

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dialogue.

exactly transparency entailed or from an unwillingness (or inability) on the Chinese side to disclose that information.

*Transparency: Goal vs. byproduct*

Although participants agreed on the importance of transparency, there was some disagreement on whether transparency should itself be the goal of a CSBM or whether it is better to approach it as a desired byproduct of other CSBM processes.

*Strategic deterrence*

No consensus was reached on how to draft a proposal related to transparency on strategic deterrence.

*Consultative mechanism to coordinate trilateral policy toward Taiwan*

Participants appreciated the proposal on Taiwan since there was widespread agreement on the centrality of the Taiwan question to regional security and stability, but no consensus was reached on how best to engage trilaterally on this controversial issue. Participants generally did not support the idea of creating a mechanism to coordinate trilateral policy toward Taiwan, but Japanese and American participants supported the idea of encouraging China and Taiwan to engage in more direct dialogue. Most of the Japanese and American participants agreed that high-level, cross-Strait dialogue must have no preconditions, such as “dialogue in order to prevent secession.”



## Next Steps

### Further Work and Recommendations for Possible Trilateral CSBM Development

Participants agreed to submit a series of eight CSBM proposals to their respective governments. The proposals would establish:

1. A trilateral strategic security dialogue.
2. A working group to enhance joint humanitarian and natural disaster monitoring and response.
3. A working group to discuss and plan bilateral naval exercises.
4. A trilateral consultative mechanism to discuss maritime safety.
5. A trilateral DTL.
6. A bilateral Japan-China PKOC.
7. Trilateral gaming simulations focusing on a fourth-party nontraditional security threat/crisis.
8. Workshops to discuss the standardization of information sharing.

For further work, some participants suggested discussing questions such as political will, resource requirements, expected returns on investment, and the likelihood of success within the CSBM proposal.

Meanwhile, participants widely supported the idea that representatives from all three countries engage in collaborative roll-out events in Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing once they have agreed upon the final products. Participants agreed that it would be difficult to stage working-group breakouts to finalize language in the next few months, and therefore they will try to coordinate via email. Participants also recognized the utility of this working group and supported the idea of filling the role of one of the proposed working groups as a new mission for continued meetings in 2008.

During a period of power transition when uncertainty about intentions, misapprehension, or even an accident could spark an unwanted and unintended confrontation in the Pacific, the development of a robust trilateral CSBM regime can play a key role in stabilizing the region. CSBMs should be prioritized, both traditional and nontraditional CSBMs pursued, *trilateral strategic dialogue* advanced, and progress toward these goals measured. In this context, more talk at different levels, recognition of the value of multi-lateral institutions as springboards for enhanced cooperation, “starting with the low hanging fruit,” and amassing the political will to advocate practical policy proposals are necessary.

With regard to *Joint Humanitarian and Natural Disaster Monitoring and Response*, a proposed initial step is the creation of a chart of nationally responsible agencies that would link trilateral counterparts in information-sharing initiatives. This is a good example of the importance of *transparency* in a CSBM context. Other proposed steps include the creation of

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Participants agreed to submit a series of eight CSBM proposals to their respective governments.



working groups for technical issues within *Joint Responses* and *Naval Exercises and Maritime Safety*. In the latest case, a China-Japan consultative mechanism to discuss mutual adherence to both existent and possible additional trilateral agreements for maintaining air and sea safety is welcome. With further regard to *Transparency and Communication* of CSBMs, engaging in trilateral joint simulations related to fourth-party crisis and a China-Japan PKOC are also very welcome proposals that should be pursued.

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## Acronyms

...more talk at  
different levels,  
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ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CMS	China Marine Surveillance
CSBMS	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
DTL	Trilateral Defense Telephone Link
EAS	East Asia Summit
INCSEA	Incident at Sea Agreements
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
PKOC	Peacekeeping Operation Center
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise
WHO	World Health Organization
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium

# Appendix A: Proposals

## Trilateral Joint Humanitarian and Natural Disaster Monitoring and Response

### Description of Proposed CSBM

In order to support joint monitoring of humanitarian and natural disasters in Asia, establish a working group with representatives from all three countries to clarify respective lead agencies and appropriate interlocutors and outline ways in which they may be able to share information more effectively. This will stand as the first step in increasing the flow of information shared among the countries.

In order to discuss possible steps toward joint responses to humanitarian and natural disasters, this working group will also discuss best practices and lessons learned from past experience in order to draw from each country's strengths and capabilities in eventually discussing ways to cooperate operationally in mitigating and, if necessary, responding to future humanitarian and natural disasters while respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Enhancing disaster prevention and responses will help build trilateral institutional and military relationships. This working group will also explore ways to collaborate with the United Nations and Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC).

### Type

Nontraditional CSBMs, cooperation

### Criteria Met

Not done previously, enhances the process of confidence building (promoting confidence in the act itself), builds relationships among people, serves as an enabler with positive spillover effects, is win-win for participants, does no harm to external actors

### Goal/Objectives

Reduce suspicion/enhance trust building, facilitate emergency management/response, generate further activities, promote cooperation, enhance security, increase communication, contribute to problem solving

### Functional Participants

Officials of American, Chinese, and Japanese foreign ministries, defense ministries, foreign aid institutions, and militaries; United Nations; ADPC

### Targeted Actors/Institutions

Officials of foreign ministries, defense ministries, foreign aid institutions, militaries

### Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral

Trilateral

### Phasing

Workshops: short-term

Joint responses: medium- and long-term

### **“Political” Challenges**

Lack of clarity in identifying domestic lead agencies, need to define who will be responsible for what parts of the response, misperceptions of enhanced military activity related to increased monitoring and response

### **Implementation Metrics**

Confirmation of appropriate lead agencies in respective countries, creation of a metric to gauge how well the militaries are able to work jointly

## **Trilateral Gaming Simulations**

### **Description of Proposed CSBM**

In order to deepen mutual understanding and enhance transparency in decision making, officials and scholars from United States, Chinese, and Japanese defense and defense-related ministries, agencies, and academic institutions will conduct simulations on security issues of common interest. Simulations can be added on to other working-group meetings and will focus on nontraditional security threats involving fourth-party crises. Nongovernmental and Track 2 actors will lay the groundwork by developing rules, formats, and scenarios for the simulations.

### **Type**

Preventive, crisis management

### **Criteria Met**

Enhances the process of confidence building, builds relationships among people, strengthens problem finding, does no harm to external actors

### **Goal/Objectives**

Establish a positive and friendly atmosphere among militaries, establish the habit of joint problem finding and preventive thinking, establish the habit of pragmatic cooperation

### **Functional Participants**

Track 1.5 and Track 2 actors (think tanks, research institutes within defense ministries, former government officials with relevant experience)

### **Targeted Actors/Institutions**

Officials from American, Chinese, and Japanese defense ministries, academic and research institutes

### **Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral**

Trilateral

### **Phasing**

Medium- to long-term

### **“Political” Challenges**

Choice of scenario topics

### **Implementation Metrics**

Simulations conducted once or twice a year, joint reports on outcomes

## Naval Exercises

### Description of Proposed CSBM

In order to discuss the technical details for charting a gradualist approach to enhancing mutual understanding and trust, fostering good will, and exchanging best practices through bilateral and trilateral naval exercises, establish a trilateral working group. Topics for discussion will include how to build off multilateral cooperation in order to enhance bilateral and trilateral reciprocal naval exchanges, open ship-port visits, farewell exercises, chief naval officer visits, basic ship-handling exercises, search and rescue exercises, joint humanitarian relief operations, joint disaster relief operations, joint antiterrorism operations, multilateral naval exercises including WPNS and RIMPAC, and submarine rescue exercises.

### Type

Communication, prevention of incidents and accidents, humanitarian aid

### Criteria Met

Easy to do, practical, enhances the process of confidence building, serves as an enabler with positive spillover effects, builds relationships among navies, deepens mutual understanding of military cultures, is win-win for participants, does no harm to external actors

### Goal/Objectives

Establish a positive and friendly atmosphere among militaries, establish the habit of exchanges, establish the habit of collaboration, establish a framework for emergency management and response, reduce misperceptions, reduce suspicions, increase communication, enhance security

### Functional Participants

United States Navy and Coast Guard

Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and Coast Guard

Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), Navy, and China Marine Surveillance (CMS)

### Targeted Actors/Institutions

American, Chinese, and Japanese defense ministries and militaries

### Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral

Bilateral and trilateral

### Phasing

Working group: short-term

Exercises: medium- and long-term

### “Political” Challenges

Increasing direct military-to-military relations among the three countries, balancing the number of port calls with fourth-party nations, the US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear material on board US military vessels, vulnerability to linkage politics, the CMS is part of the armed police (and therefore under local defense force command), sovereign immunity

### Implementation Metrics

Creation of working group, set of recommended exercises with a timetable, metric to gauge how well the coast guards/navies are able to work jointly

## Trilateral Strategic Security Dialogue

### Description of Proposed CSBM

In order to discuss regional and global security issues of common interest, establish a United States-China-Japan security dialogue consultative mechanism at the deputy minister level, structured similarly to the United States-Japan “2+2” strategic dialogue mechanism. The ultimate goal of the consultative mechanism will be to work toward a ministerial-level trilateral “2+2+2” to provide a venue for the most senior-level defense and foreign policy leaders in all three countries in which they consult regularly on a range of shared strategic challenges and opportunities while building personal relationships over time that will allay suspicions, build trust, and bolster mutual reassurance.

### Type

Communication, transparency, strategic/political CSBM

### Criteria Met

Not done previously, serves as an enabler with positive spillover effects, builds relationships among people, is win-win for participants, does no harm to external actors, reassures external actors

### Goal/Objectives

Establish the habit of discussion, discuss security issues of common interest, find common ground, reduce misperceptions, enhance transparency, reduce tensions, reduce suspicion/enhance trust building, crisis management/prevention (includes accident management), deterrence/reassurance, enable further activities, promote cooperation, enhance security, increase communication, contribute to problem solving

### Functional Participants

United States Under Secretary of State  
United States Under Secretary of Defense  
Japanese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Japanese Deputy Minister of Defense  
Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Chinese Deputy Minister of Defense

### Targeted Actors/Institutions

American, Japanese, Chinese foreign policy and defense policy bureaucracies

### Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral

Trilateral

### Phasing

Establishing a deputy ministerial dialogue: medium-term  
Expanding to a ministerial-level trilateral dialogue: long-term

### “Political” Challenges

May be hard for the United States and Japan to mesh the current bilateral 2+2 with a trilateral 2+2+2, may be a struggle for the United States to build support for engaging in “strategic” security dialogue with China, may be difficult for China to feel like an equal member given the United States-Japan alliance, vulnerability to linkage politics, agenda setting/choice of topics

### **Implementation Metrics**

Establishing a trilateral deputy ministerial-level strategic dialogue, expanding the trilateral deputy ministerial-level strategic dialogue into a ministerial-level dialogue

### **Trilateral DTL**

#### **Description of Proposed CSBM**

In order to limit the possibility of an incident or accident at sea, establish a trilateral DTL among the United States, China, and Japan

#### **Type**

Communication

#### **Criteria Met**

Builds relationships among people, enhances confidence building, is win-win for participants, does not harm external actors

#### **Goal/Objectives**

Enhance transparency, reduce misperception

#### **Functional Participants**

Defense ministries and militaries

#### **Targeted Actors/Institutions**

Defense ministries and militaries

#### **Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral**

Trilateral

#### **Phasing**

Short-term

#### **“Political” Challenges**

Avoiding the perception of a “2 against 1” phenomenon, establishing a viable DTL that actually affects how the militaries interact in times of crisis

### **Implementation Metrics**

Setting up a DTL between appropriate actors, creating a metric to gauge how and when it is used

### **Japan–China PKOC**

#### **Description of Proposed CSBM**

In order to share data and experiences related to peacekeeping operations, Japan and China will set up a joint peacekeeping center in Tokyo, in conjunction with the Japanese center currently under development. Visiting Chinese fellows will participate in joint training programs, which may also involve other regional third-party countries.

#### **Type**

Nontraditional with strong traditional security implications

**Criteria Met**

Practical, not done previously

**Goal/Objectives**

Enable further activities, promote cooperation, enhance trust building

**Functional Participants**

Chinese and Japanese officials in defense ministries/institutions, foreign ministries, and the ministry of public security

**Targeted Actors/Institutions**

Chinese, Japanese militaries and defense ministries

**Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral**

Bilateral

**Phasing**

Setting up the center: medium-term

Engaging in joint training/operations: long-term

**“Political” Challenges**

Lack of mutual understanding of PKOs’ respective visions and missions

**Implementation Metrics**

Establishment of center, joint training

**Trilateral Consultative Mechanism on Maritime Safety****Description of Proposed CSBM**

In order to promote common understanding of maritime and air force activities in accordance with international law—including the principles and regimes reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—the United States, China, and Japan will encourage and facilitate annual consultations among delegations authorized by the US Department of Defense, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, and the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The principal aim of these consultations will be to devise mechanisms for enhancing mutual adherence to established international protocols and to determine whether a more proscriptive trilateral agreement for maintaining air and sea safety should be adopted. The consultation will start bilaterally between China and Japan to explore self-restraint measures related to potential flashpoints and then be upgraded to regular and higher-level meetings with the aim of reaching consensus on an INCSEA-type agreement, at which point it will expand to include the United States in a trilateral venue.

**Type**

Maritime (air and sea) safety

**Criteria Met**

Not done previously, serves as an enabler with positive spillover effects, enhances the process of confidence building (eases suspicions and promotes confidence), is win-win for participants, does no harm to external actors

### **Goal/Objectives**

Reduce misperceptions, enhance transparency, reduce suspicion/enhance trust building, promote cooperation, enhance security, increase communication, prevent escalation, enhance crisis management/prevention

### **Functional Participants**

US Pacific Fleet, Chinese PLA Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), Japan Coast Guard

### **Targeted Actors/Institutions**

US Department of Defense, US Pacific Command, JMSDF, Chinese PLA Navy

### **Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral**

Start with bilateral China-Japan consultations and then expand to trilateral United States-China-Japan consultations

### **Phasing**

Bilateral consultations: medium-term

Trilateral consultations: long-term

### **“Political” Challenges**

Convincing all three governments that this agreement will enhance adherence to established international protocols and address safety issues outside of those established protocols, maritime territory disputes, the Taiwan question

### **Implementation Metrics**

Working group meeting with functional participants held within six months of the adoption of the proposal, regular reports on implementation of agreed items during annual meetings

### **Standardization of Information Sharing**

### **Description of Proposed CSBM**

In order to examine the root cause of the gap in defense transparency metrics among the United States, China, and Japan, scholars and government officials from all three countries will engage in workshops in order to explore concerns and potential convergence in information sharing so that durable transparency based upon accumulated strategic trust building can be maintained. The goal of the workshops will be to work toward consensus on what type of discrete data for strategic force capabilities should be included in defense ministry publications.

### **Type**

Transparency

### **Criteria Met**

Not done previously, serves as an enabler with positive spillover effects, is win-win for participants, does no harm to external actors, is practical or easy to do

### **Goal/Objectives**

Foster a common understanding of “transparency,” enhance transparency, reduce misperception, reduce suspicion/enhance trust building, deter/reassure, promote cooperation, enhance security, increase communication



**Functional Participants**

Defense ministries and related institutions (civilians and officers)

**Targeted Actors/Institutions**

American, Chinese, Japanese militaries

**Unilateral/Bilateral/Trilateral**

Trilateral

**Phasing**

Authorized Track 2 workshops: short-term

Track 1.5 official dialogue: medium-term

**“Political” Challenges**

Overcoming strategic distrust and hedging, sensitivity to providing discrete information on defense and force expenditure

**Implementation Metrics**

Establishment of workshops, eventual standardization of information-sharing metrics

## Appendix B

### Participant List

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.

#### Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Working Group

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in collaboration with the  
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies  
January 10-11, 2007  
Honolulu, Hawaii

#### Co-Organizers

David Fouse, Assistant Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Michael Schiffer, Program Officer, Policy Analysis and Dialogue, The Stanley Foundation

#### Participants

Hiroyasu Akutsu, Senior Fellow, The Okazaki Institute

Roger Caryassos, China Desk Officer, United States Pacific Command

Chen Dongziao, Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institute for International Studies

Elizabeth Davis, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

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#### **Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Working Group**

**Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation**

**March 22, 2007**

**Hotel Monaco, Washington, DC**

#### **Project Manager**

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#### **Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Working Group**

**Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in collaboration with the**

**Shanghai Institute for International Studies**

**August 24-25, 2007**

**Shanghai, People's Republic of China**

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**Trilateral Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Working Group**

**Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in collaboration with the  
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**

**December 4-6, 2007**

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