Bridging the Security/Development Divide with UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Case Study Approach

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Celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Charter of the United Nations in 2006, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan reflected upon the lessons learned throughout the history of that organization and what those lessons foreshadowed for a rapidly changing world. Speaking in the United Kingdom, he uttered these now famous words:

More than ever before, the human race faces global problems—from poverty and inequality to nuclear proliferation, from climate change to bird flu, from terrorism to HIV/AIDS, from ethnic cleansing and genocide to trafficking in the lives and bodies of human beings. So it obviously makes sense to come together and work out global solutions… [T]he three freedoms which all human beings crave—freedom from want, freedom from war or large-scale violence, and freedom from arbitrary or degrading treatment—are closely interconnected.

There is no long-term security without development. There is no development without security.1

The Secretary General’s remarks encapsulated not only the recent ruminations of security and development thinkers and practitioners around the world, they helped to define a larger trend gripping the planet in which regional economies, societies, and cultures are becoming increasingly integrated through ever-tightening networks of exchange—a trend often subsumed under the moniker of “globalization.”

There can be little doubt that globalization has yielded unprecedented advances for the human condition: life expectancy has doubled in the past 100 years; new capabilities to diagnose and treat illnesses are more widely available than ever before; new technologies are being applied to bolster food production across the developing world; and the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty in 2008—that is, those living on $1 a day—is a fifth of what it was in 1960.2

Of course, those same economic forces and innovative capacities used to benefit society have also been harnessed by criminal elements. Prevailing indicators reveal that the problems these activities generate, so-called “transnational threats,” are a growing cancer on the human condition and threaten an increasingly violent future for our planet. For instance, one quarter of the annual US$4 billion trade in small arms is unauthorized or illicit.3 According to the US government, approximately 800,000 incidents of international human trafficking occur annually.4 The UN Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that the global drug trade is worth $322 billion annually, with 52,356 metric tons of opium, cannabis, cocaine, and amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) produced each year.5 And from January 1993 to December 2007, 303 incidents involving unauthorized possession and related criminal activities were confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB).6 Eighteen of those involved highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. The impact of these threats to governments and the corrosive impact they have on individual lives together represent both catastrophic security threats and unparalleled development challenges.
Unfortunately, although there is a growing recognition of the interconnected relationship between “security” and “development” within policy and academic circles around the world, it has yet to be followed by a commensurate shift in national spending habits or operating procedures of many donor countries. In 2007, top-line net development assistance worldwide was approximately US$117 billion, while total military expenditures exceeded US$1.25 trillion.vii Although development and security programs are often treated as competitive priorities, untapped opportunities exist to leverage each in mutual support. As exhorted by the former Secretary General Annan, in order to meet the challenges of globalization, the international community must work toward identifying pragmatic efforts to eliminate the artificial boundaries between often stove-piped security and development efforts. Our goal should be to maximize the effectiveness of both domestic government spending and foreign aid for the mutual betterment of society and the security of all.

In a rapidly globalizing world, the need for governance that transcends national boundaries is a given. But finding pragmatic opportunities to innovate and break traditional patterns of government and human behavior is challenging. This paper discusses one important opportunity in the field of nonproliferation that accomplishes this goal. The security/development model offered herein has already borne tangible results in the Caribbean, and could do so elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, across Latin America, and beyond. Its application would not only better leverage limited foreign aid, it would both meet the identified needs of the host country and yield a more sustainable model of nonproliferation.

**The Changing Nature of the Proliferation Threat**

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction had emerged as a national cause célèbre for many industrialized nations. Proliferation challenges seemed to lurk around every corner of the globe and governments, often led by the United States, eagerly sought to expand the array of efforts designed to “to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the world’s most dangerous hands.”viii

During the Cold War, firm international norms against the possession and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons had grown rather successfully. In general, the world community expected at least some reduction in the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, even if their eventual elimination seemed a distant hope. While the number of nuclear-armed states grew from five to nine since China’s entry into the nuclear club, many more countries had abandoned their nuclear ambitions and arsenals—Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan among them. Moreover, the supply of weapons, materials and technologies was tightly controlled by a limited number of governments, while demand was comparatively minimal and more easily tempered under the influence of the superpowers. Global trading patterns were predictable and commerce, while international in scale, was relatively leisurely in pace. Although the
forces of globalization and trade liberalization were gathering in the latter decades of the Cold War, they had not yet matured to a level where diverse networks of both licit and illicit middlemen could as readily access the nuclear market.\textsuperscript{ix} Furthermore, the scientific community capable of marrying dual-use components to fissile material was limited in size and strictly governed by the nuclear powers.

By the 1980s, however, the simplicity and stability that supported a generally successful nonproliferation regime began to erode. Globalization, privatization, technological innovation, the ease of international communications and transport, free trade, financial liberalization, and the advent of the “virtual world” all collided with the end of bipolar stability to challenge the nonproliferation regime. The focus on states both as potential proliferators and as the bulwark for the proliferation regime was increasingly doubted as a new array of powerful forces began to shape social, political, and economic interactions. New sub-state actors emerged—including a more independent private sector with access to and control over sensitive weapons technologies and dual-use products, and terrorists intent on acquiring WMD—all acting to diminish and potentially supersede state sovereignty. Governmental controls over their nuclear arsenals, while necessary, became insufficient in a global economy where states could no longer be expected to exert seamless control over their territory. In many cases, the transfer of equipment and technologies once under the exclusive management of national authorities transitioned to private hands. Innovation spurred and brought to market new dual-use and commercial technologies just as the pace of global commerce reached heretofore unimaginable heights.\textsuperscript{x}

As a result, the growing impact of second-tier proliferation from countries such as Pakistan is becoming a more broadly recognized threat. But even in this environment where the opportunity for determined states to cross the WMD threshold is growing, a potentially even greater threat is looming. In February 2001, Osama bin Laden was tried \textit{in abstenitia} in the US District Court, Southern District of New York, for his role in the American embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The revelations of the US Government’s star witness in this case, a Sudanese al-Qaeda defector named Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, shocked the national security community. He testified that, as early as 1993, he was involved in al-Qaeda’s unsuccessful attempts to purchase uranium in Sudan. According to al-Fadl, al-Qaeda had been willing to pay $1.5 million for an unknown quantity of bomb-grade material.\textsuperscript{xi} Seven months after the trial, three thousand people would die at the hands of that terrorist organization in a coordinated series of attacks on the United States.

While the events of 9/11 did not accelerate the likelihood that terrorists would obtain a WMD capacity, the tragedy did crystallize in the minds of policymakers and citizens around the world the confluence of technology, globalization, proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. The subsequent exposure of the AQ Khan network added new urgency to the need to modernize the nonproliferation toolkit. Spurred by the unimaginable consequences of a WMD terrorist incident in a modern city, the policy community redoubled its efforts to counter wider proliferation. Additional preventive
efforts became ever more focused on export controls, strengthened and expanded safeguards, sanctions, and even regime change.

Although the lion’s share of emphasis since 9/11 has been on technology denial approaches, and despite a dearth of traditional global arms reduction initiatives in the field over the past decade, the international community has made some important advances in collaborative nonproliferation. One largely anonymous but important example is UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

**UN Security Council Resolution 1540**

In April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540, which mandates that all Member States implement a set of supply-side controls related to the nonproliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and to criminalize proliferant activities within their territories. In the face was what was seen as an urgent need for action, and eschewing the time intensive process of negotiating a new international treaty, the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII authority for only the second time in its history. Occurring in the immediate wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, seven months of contentious negotiations led to the development of an initial draft of the Resolution. Some Member States objected strongly to the imposition of economic or even military sanctions for noncompliance. Others were insistent that the Committee formed to oversee implementation of the Resolution not be given deliberative power to evaluate State compliance with the terms of the Resolution. Still others questioned the legitimacy of the Security Council’s action which was seen as a direct circumvention of the traditional treaty-making process.\xii

Despite this acrimony, in April of 2004 a final Resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. That legally binding resolution calls upon states to:

- adopt and enforce laws that prohibit any non-State actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
- develop and maintain measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
- develop and maintain effective physical protection measures;
- develop and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking; and
- establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items.

The Resolution also established a Committee of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of the Resolution. UNSCR 1540 further calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from adoption of this resolution to the 1540 Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement its provisions, and recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of
the resolution, inviting other States in a position to do so to offer assistance in response to specific requests.\textsuperscript{xiii}

To date, at least 83 per cent of countries have issued their first report to the UN 1540 Committee—the first step toward compliance with the terms of the Resolution. Much effort has been exerted in raising the necessary awareness to encourage both the mandated reporting on the status of national implementation of 1540, as well as national action plans that fulfill the mandate of the Resolution. The subject of 1540 has been raised and debated formally at the ASEAN Regional Forum, within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and at the Organization of American States (OAS). UN-sponsored implementation workshops have been held in the Africa, the Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Indonesia, Argentina, and elsewhere. Additional awareness raising workshops have been convened by a host of non-governmental organizations, and the subject has found its way into the deliberations of the Senior Political Committee of NATO and the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Japan.

The result has been the issuance of formal statements of support from a multiplicity of foreign ministries and regional organizations.\textsuperscript{xiv} In addition, a greater share of national operating authorities is at least aware of their obligations under UNSCR 1540. The number of reports, while still not complete, has increased, even if their quality and completeness varies dramatically from country to country. And the 1540 Committee in New York has received sporadic requests for assistance. Beyond this, some have concluded that little material progress is evident on the ground, and as a result, have pronounced 1540 moribund. These skeptics point out that broad swaths of the globe are plagued if not by non-reporting, then by under-reporting to the 1540 Committee. The Committee is itself said to be under-resourced for the herculean task it has been assigned.\textsuperscript{ xv} And the tangible political will needed to turn 1540 from a multi-faceted mandate to a pragmatic instrument in the nonproliferation toolkit has more often than not been lacking on the part of both potential donors and the Global South where proliferation concerns have been growing for decades.

In many ways, this is hardly surprising. Governments of the developed world have often proven unimaginative in their nonproliferation assistance, favoring quick “technology drop” fixes to more sustainable and longer term approaches. Too, even now that debate over the legitimacy of the Resolution has been largely mitigated, the vast majority of the developing world, where anti-proliferation measures are often judged to be most lax, remains far more transfixed by the concerns confronting daily life—colossal public health challenges, endemic underdevelopment, eroding educational infrastructures, pervasive civil violence spurred by drug flows and small arms trafficking and so on—than by the seemingly distant fears associated with WMD proliferation. Convincing these governments to make greater investments in counterproliferation activities while their public education and health infrastructures suffer from neglect is not an easy—or even reasonable—task.

Despite this halting progress, one area where we have seen a dramatic rise in both state reporting and tangible evidence of pragmatic implementation of UNSCR 1540 is in the
Caribbean basin. In one year, the Caribbean as a region has gone from a 1540 black hole to a model for implementation of the Resolution around the globe. This progress was not a result of dictating legal mandates from the Security Council, but rather is a reflection of their realization that 1540—as with the governments advocating the resolution most vociferously in New York—is in their vested interests.

Nonproliferation in the Caribbean Basin: The Security/Development Nexus

Two years after adoption of UNSCR 1540 by the UN Security Council, and one full year after the deadline for reporting on national implementation of the Resolution, only one half of all Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members had fulfilled this most basic obligation under the Resolution.xvi More distressing still was the lack of recognition on the part of many members to the broad swath of obligations the Resolution imposed, much less a dedication of domestic resources to develop and implement national action plans to meet them.

Proliferators recognize that the denial regime is only as strong as its weakest link, and a Caribbean region insufficiently guarded against the proliferation threat could have serious implications for global security. There is growing concern among intelligence agencies around the globe that terrorists intent on developing and using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon in a catastrophic incident are being drawn to the developing world in search of safe havens from which to plan and perpetrate attacks. The Caribbean is no exception. Already, the linkage between drug-trafficking and terrorism is clear in some countries of South America. Such connections have similar potential across the Caribbean Basin to create a hotbed of terrorist activity that has serious implications for the region and for America’s “third border.”

An airliner hijacked from an airport in the Caribbean—as was attempted in Montego Bay, Jamaica in April of this year—could reach the United States or points south within the hour. Islamic radicals are taking advantage of the lawlessness in some areas in Latin America and the Caribbean by establishing safe havens and raising money. In addition, the market across the region for falsified passports, visas, and other identifying papers creates a vulnerability that terrorists could easily exploit.

Insecurity in the Caribbean also has implications beyond the region’s immediate neighbors. Though small in terms of population and economic activities, the region constitutes a significant and expanding junction for international trade. For instance, more than 10 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) were transported through the Caribbean Basin alone in 2007.xvii Terrorists and other criminal elements could disrupt or take advantage of shipments transiting the Caribbean to move illicit products or weapons of mass destruction to points around the globe.

Throughout their history, the individual economies of the Caribbean islands have relied on rather modest exports of fish, bauxite, iron, nickel, petroleum, and timber. Far and away, however, tourism remains the mainstay of the region’s economy. After Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors, Caribbean economies were the most severely
affected by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For instance, tourism officials in the Dominican Republic reported a loss of $450 million in revenues from September 11, 2001 through December 2002. Throughout the region, the tourism industry remained essentially stagnant until the spring of 2003, dealing a crippling blow to the already fragile economies of the Caribbean.

While numerous attempts at market expansion have been made through export diversification and off shore banking, the struggle to develop the political and economic infrastructure necessary to successfully respond to market fluctuations, and loss of competitiveness in key export sectors remains a continuous struggle for most Caribbean governments. More recently though, with close proximity to the Panama Canal and as a focal point for north/south Atlantic trade and trade with the east and northern coasts of South America, the Caribbean is emerging as a growing hub for trans-oceanic trade. Recognizing the opportunities globalization can yield, a large number of trans-shipment ports have been developed in the region, including the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Barbados, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and Trinidad and Tobago. Additional trans-shipment ports are either under construction or are being planned. This represents a significant opportunity for economic development across the region.

As always, capitalizing upon the benefits of increased trade has brought with it the darker side of globalization. Long caught in the crossfire between the world's biggest suppliers and consumers of cocaine, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Caribbean is increasingly suffering the consequences of the international drug trade, small arms trafficking, and accordingly, the rise of violent youth gangs.xviii A 2007 report by the World Bank and UNODC found that murder rates (often linked to the drug trade) in the Caribbean—at 30 per 100,000 population annually—are higher than for any other region of the world. The report also found that while transshipment of cocaine to the United States, the most significant flow in economic terms, appears to be in decline, and that cannabis production for export from Jamaica, the largest cannabis producer in the region, appears to be in a slump, large quantities of drugs continue to transit the Caribbean. In 2005, it was estimated that about 10 tons of cocaine transited through Jamaica, and 20 tons through Haiti and the Dominican Republic.xix Crime is stifling their economies, and where violent crime and corruption flourish, socio-economic development lags and democracy is undermined. Much of this is a result of the region’s inability to adequately secure their ports and borders.

In 2002, President Bush signed into law the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The goal was to protect the United States’ maritime community from terrorist attacks. One month later, the International Maritime Organization adopted the International Maritime Security and Port Facility Code (ISPS), which requires ships on international voyages and the port facilities that serve them to take enhanced measures against security incidents. This was followed by an array of national legislative edicts, such as the US “Scan-All” cargo legislation. In aggregate, these requirements set a high bar for governments around the world—including in the Caribbean—to meet. In many cases, these governments lack the necessary resources to achieve full compliance.
Without the capacity to ensure safe, reliable movement of goods through their ports, the sustainability of the Caribbean plans for economic diversification is in doubt. For governments of the region therefore, nowhere is the intersection of development and security more apparent than in the domain of export controls and port/border security. Caught between the constraints on their plans for economic diversification and development, and the growing challenges associated with transnational crime and endemic poverty, it is little surprise that governments of the region were reluctant to refocus their attention and limited resources to implementation of UNSCR 1540.

**The Next 100 Project: Leveraging National Security Assistance to Address the Development Needs of States-at-Risk**

In 2007, the Stimson Center, a nonprofit, non-governmental organization, launched an initiative designed to develop scalable, sustainable, and replicable pilot efforts that pragmatically pair states in need of development assistance with those states willing to offer such assistance under the auspices of national security using UNSCR 1540. Unlike traditional assistance programs, this effort bridges the gap between global development needs and traditional security objectives like nonproliferation and counterterrorism, by addressing the immediate needs of the developing world while building governments’ capacity to promote sustainable security.

When viewed in detail, 1540 provides a unique opportunity for poorer countries to begin tapping security-related assistance to simultaneously meet many of their development and capacity building objectives. For instance, the technical assistance and communications infrastructure to address detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction is equally critical for emergency management authorities and first responders in response to a natural disaster. The ability to prosecute criminals who may be marketing materials of mass destruction requires a well-trained police force and functioning judiciary. The prevention of human trafficking relies upon many of the same resources and capacities necessary to detect and prevent nuclear proliferation. And “safe ports” standards that challenge governments’ ability to remain competitive in the global supply chain can be achieved, in part, with nonproliferation security assistance that ensures borders and ports are both secure and, ultimately, efficient.

In February 2007, at the behest of the former chairman of the UN 1540 Committee, the Stimson Center joined with the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS and the Stanley Foundation to co-convene a regional meeting in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The goal of the gathering was to operationalize this security/development strategy. The discussion focused on local concerns—citizen security, human and drug trafficking, border and maritime security, public health, disaster preparedness and mitigation—and sought to pair the need for responsive capacity-building with novel avenues of financial support—in this case, under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Since 2002, governments and non-governmental organizations have worked closely with the OAS and CARICOM to address the looming challenges to regional economic stability. Various efforts have focused on reviewing the status of the compliance of ports
across the Caribbean and raising awareness about new shipping standards. But while the educational efforts across governments and the private sector that have resulted are important for meeting the standards imposed by ISPS and other international regulations, unless the financial resources exist to make the investments needed to meet these standards, then serious economic dislocation is certain. At both the forum in the Dominican Republic, and at a subsequent meeting hosted by the Stimson Center in Kingston, Jamaica, 1540 was discussed through the prism of leveraging mutual interests rather than meeting externally imposed legal obligations. The leadership of CARICOM immediately recognized that export controls and port and maritime security are not only critical in promoting free commerce, development, and successfully executing regional plans for economic diversification, they are also critical elements of 1540 implementation.

Figure 1: 1540 Implementation in the Caribbean Basin

![UNSCR 1540 Diagram]

Earlier this year, the Caribbean Community submitted its first formal request for assistance to the 1540 Committee in New York. As a result of that specific request for assistance, CARICOM has not only hired a full-time regional coordinator, it has received additional legislative assistance to ensure compliance with a broad range of international obligations, and has conducted an initial workshop that has marketed the assistance tool to governments, port managers, and private sector constituencies across the region.

Furthermore, with the assistance of the regional coordinator, CARICOM is working to identify new streams of assistance for: the development of legal frameworks, institutional
capacity building, equipment, training, customs enforcement, global competitiveness and economic development, logistics and infrastructure assistance and other areas that overlap with the provision of assistance under these broad counterterrorism and nonproliferation resolutions. None of this assistance need be drawn from overstretched development accounts of the traditional donors, but instead, may come from the “dual use” security assistance accounts of governments committed to 1540 implementation.

Today, all but one member state has either completed or is nearing completion of their formal report to the Committee. Moreover, most states have named a single point of contact within their governments and are actively pursuing “dual use” implementation of the Resolution. As important, the Caribbean has shown that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 can be an important new tool in providing an innovative new stream of resources to help meet port and border security needs while promoting the Caribbean’s economic interests. Ultimately, linking the Caribbean’s economic self-sufficiency could promote sustainable solutions to enduring proliferation and terrorism threats resident in or transiting the region. The result is win-win-win for the target government, for CARICOM, and for the international security and development donor communities.xx

Beyond Paradise: “Dual-use” Implementation of 1540 Around the Globe

CARICOM has now proven that implementation of UN Resolution 1540 need not be a burden on governments of the Global South. Indeed, if viewed more expansively, the Resolution provides a unique opportunity for developing countries in particular to identify new assistance streams required to meet critical development and capacity building priorities while simultaneously preventing the acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by terrorists. The result is sustainable security and enhanced development for both donor and recipient states.

Although CARICOM has been especially interested in marrying 1540 implementation to their port and border challenges, in fact, the “dual-uses” of 1540 go well beyond this particular nexus of the security and development agenda. By way of example, the same security prerequisites for 1540 implementation can as readily be applied to:

- revenue generation and economic development through customs enforcement and tariff collection;
- disease surveillance and laboratory infrastructure development;
- trade and supply chain security;
- incident preparedness and response to both naturally occurring and man-made disasters;
- strengthening the transportation and communications infrastructures;
- expanding tertiary education;
- local and transnational crime prevention through community building and police training;
- building and enhancing local scientific and technological capacities;
- promoting good governance;
- judicial and penal reform;
• enhancing the rule of law;
• financial sector reforms;
• combating the illicit trafficking of drugs, humans, counterfeit intellectual property, and small arms; to name but a few.

The same approach to 1540 implementation in the Caribbean can and should be attempted elsewhere. Below is a starting point for discussion in three strategic regions of the globe:

(i) Central America

In many ways, the most prominent issues facing Central America parallel the development and security challenges of their Caribbean neighbors—and are inextricably tied to them given both their proximity to one another and to the United States.

Once plagued by Cold War politics, countries of Central America have more recently experienced an enviable economic turnaround. Like their Caribbean neighbors, governments of the region have sought improved competitive advantage by integrating their economies into larger world markets. To take advantage of the United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and other global trade opportunities, Central American governments are also improving their competitiveness by lowering transaction costs across borders; harmonizing regional commercial, tax, environmental, and labor laws and policies; and taking advantage of the region’s rich natural resources by promoting niche market products that utilize third-party certifications. These policies have yielded direct economic benefits. The United States alone exported nearly $11 billion in goods to Central America by 2003, more than US exports to Russia, India and Indonesia combined. This strong trading partnership helped to increase Central America’s per capita income to $1,972 by 2004, a level that has increased every year until the present.xx

Despite this success, there exist several immediate threats to Central America’s plans for long term economic growth and development. According to the International Monetary Fund, the decline in commodity prices and economic slump in advanced economies—especially the United States, the region’s largest trading partner—is depressing external demand and lowering revenues from exports, tourism, and remittances across all of Central America.xxii As a result, the IMF anticipates that the growth experienced in the past decade will turn to a net decline in 2009 and perhaps beyond.xxiii

While these external exigencies are beyond the capacity of Central American governments—or any government—to manage, two additional challenges may compound the anticipated economic slump, and again lock the region into cyclical period of privation and conflict. Central to the region’s plans for economic development is an adequate communication, transportation, and educational infrastructure that will support not only the movement of goods and services through the country, but a well-trained workforce operating in an environment governed by the rule of law. In order to build this environment, Central American countries have relied heavily upon foreign assistance.
Development assistance to the region continues to fund activities in, among other areas, rural development, education, economic growth, trade development, rule-of-law, democratic governance, and human rights. Nonetheless, with the budgets of development agencies strapped, and with a greater proportion of resources being dedicated to higher profile countries in distress such as Mexico, it is also likely that potentially deep cuts to foreign aid in the region will threaten the infrastructure investments from abroad, compounding the immediate economic downturn across Central America, and laying the seeds for longer term structural weakness.

Finally, while countries of the region have escaped from Least Developed Nation status, the fragility of their political systems combined with growing incidence of crime threaten to seriously undermine the stability requisite to advance their plans for economic development. Transnational crime in particular remains rampant across the hemisphere, fed often by the trafficking of narcotics and small arms.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

Central America remains a key transshipment point for both cocaine and heroin from South America headed to lucrative markets in North America and Europe. Cocaine seizures in Costa Rica for instance, have increased from 2,955 kilos in 2002 to more than 32,000 kilos in 2007, ranking that country sixth in terms of worldwide seizures.\textsuperscript{xxv} As always, localized violence has accompanied the movement of these drugs. Government officials throughout the region have expressed concern that the escalating drug war in Mexico may be driving drug traffickers to Central America. The ability of regional governments to engage in effective counter-drug operations is limited by real capacity constraints, particularly in securing the countries’ borders against the illicit movement of contraband. Lessons learned regarding the corrosive impact of the drug trade on the legitimacy of government and human welfare are ubiquitous across South America.

Of course, the violence wrought by illicit narcotics and the small arms violence that so often accompanies it is not the only factor undermining the stability necessary for sustained economic growth. According to the US State Department, Central American society is still plagued with the instability engendered by human traffickers. For instance, the Annual Trafficking in Persons Report states that, “Guatemala is a source, transit, and destination country for Guatemalans and Central Americans trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Human trafficking is a significant and growing problem in the country, particularly the exploitation of children in prostitution. Guatemalan women and children are trafficked within the country, and to Mexico and the United States, for commercial sexual exploitation.”\textsuperscript{xxvi}

As with the transit of illicit drugs through the region, the growth of human trafficking will undoubtedly compromise the region’s promising economic and democratic development. In the face of even localized instability or lawlessness, commercial interest in the countries of Central America will wane. Tourism will decline. Trade and the transshipment of licit cargo will suffer. And when private investment departs, it will be unlikely to return.
Governments across Central America recognize these challenges and are making significant efforts to mitigate the threats. For instance, during the past year, the Government of Costa Rica approved national legislation to prohibit and punish all forms of human trafficking, and has improved victim assistance and prevention efforts. Even still, effective law enforcement efforts to ensure that trafficking offenders are held accountable for their crimes sometimes remain lacking in some countries of the region, in large measure due to insufficient enforcement capacity. Combating these security challenges will require new financial and capacity resources. The US Department of State, for example, has encouraged governments of Central America to not only implement and enforce the new anti-trafficking laws, but to intensify efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses, convict and punish trafficking offenders, and improve data collection for trafficking crimes—recommendations that will not be inexpensive to implement.

In short, supporting regional governments’ plans for economic development while preventing more serious economic backsliding across Central America, particularly in the face of the global financial slowdown, will require significant new investments in the countries’ national enforcement infrastructure, border and customs capacity, police and legal capacity, tertiary education system, communications infrastructure, and other core development efforts—investments that the government themselves may be ill-equipped to leverage. In an era increasing demand and decreasing resources, reliance on foreign aid to meet these challenges could prove increasingly difficult. Fortunately, many of these requests could be met through targeted requests to the 1540 Committee. It is not inconceivable, for instance, for a government committed to combating the drug trade to submit a request for border control assistance, police training, legal assistance, and communications infrastructure development that serves the dual purpose of preventing the flow of WMD across the borders of their country. In short, UNSCR 1540 could provide critical assistance even in the face of declining foreign assistance from traditional donors for infrastructure development, tertiary education, rule of law, and economic development. Such assistance would not only promote the implementation of 1540, it would simultaneously help mitigate the threats of human and drug trafficking across the region, promote stability, and reinforce the successful economic development efforts of the past 20 years in Central America.

Figure 2: 1540 Implementation in Central America
(ii) China and Southeast Asia

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Southeast Asia bears the lion’s share of the global disease burden. On a global scale, the region accounts for more than 75% of leprosy cases, 90% of rabies deaths, 38% of tuberculosis cases, approximately 6% of people infected with HIV/AIDS, 33% of maternal deaths, and 29% of all deaths under the age of five. Recently, the region has borne the ignominious distinction of experiencing the first cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and H5N1 Avian Influenza—so called “bird flu.”

Recognizing the limitations of the 1969 International Health Regulations—legally binding regulations designed to facilitate international cooperation in the prevention of disease—to meet modern health challenges, the WHO helped promulgate updated guidelines that expand the spectrum of notifiable diseases and promote the development of rapid response plans in the event of outbreaks. The new international health regulations adopted in 2005 require nations to develop the capacity to detect and respond to disease outbreaks with the potential for global transmission. Of course, while the goal is laudable, many of the most disease-plagued countries—including many in Southeast Asia where animal populations are known to harbor potentially dangerous flu strains for instance—are hotbeds for outbreaks because of an endemic lack of capacity and money to improve disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, and emergency medical response.
In Guangdong, China in November 2002, a local farmer reported to the First People's Hospital of Foshan with fever, lethargy, and a variety of other non-specific symptoms. He was treated and released but died soon after. At the time, no definitive diagnosis was made on his cause of death, and a wider outbreak soon ensued outside of the knowledge of the World Health Organization. Although early public health intelligence indicated a “flu outbreak” in China, the WHO did not request information from Chinese authorities until December of 2003. By the time the WHO activated a coordinated global outbreak response in mid-March, over five hundred deaths and an additional two thousand cases had already occurred worldwide. The delay in diagnosing and reporting on SARS undoubtedly led to a wider and more deadly impact. Between November 2002 and July 2003, 8,273 official cases of SARS were diagnosed in sixteen countries from China to Canada and from Vietnam to Kuwait resulting in 775 deaths directly attributable to the virus. The incident revealed the significant problems plaguing regional healthcare systems, including increasing decentralization, red tape, and insufficient communications capabilities. These challenges, combined with a desperate lack of public health capacity in many of the smaller developing countries of Southeast Asia make public health a central challenge to all governments of the region.

In light of these pressing challenges, it is little surprise that many governments of Southeast Asia have not enthusiastically embraced 1540 implementation. While the region boasts near complete reporting to the Committee, security analysts question the efficacy of proliferation prevention efforts in many governments of the region. Particularly in the wake of the AQ Khan affair, several governments of the region came under intense scrutiny for their lack of regulatory controls and material compliance with 1540. Beyond submission of their initial report, several key governments in Southeast Asia have exhibited an unwillingness to divert scarce national resources to proliferation prevention. Particularly in these cases, the dual use aspects of UN Security Council could provide an effective gateway to sustainable nonproliferation.

Building upon the tangible need for enhanced disease surveillance and laboratory capacity to detect, diagnose, and ultimately treat infectious disease, governments of the region should develop tangible requests for assistance to the 1540 Committee that meet these domestic priorities, promote full adoption of the International Health Regulations (IHR) and meet the nonproliferation goals of UNSCR 1540. Not only would such a strategy simultaneously address multiple demands on these governments, but by appealing to the security agencies of donor states via the Committee, innovative new streams of financial and technical assistance could be developed thus relieving intense pressures on the existing foreign donor base for public health emergencies in the region.

Figure 3: 1540 Implementation in China/Southeast Asia
The threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials, while awesome in its scope, is in fact dwarfed in its complexity by the problem of the nefarious transfer of weapons knowledge. For instance, in the wake of the Cold War, the plight of the former Soviet weapons community was indicative of the widespread inability of Russia and the other FSU states to support the massive Soviet weapons complex that they inherited. Given the poor economic performance of Russia and other FSU countries, many scientists who could not find jobs elsewhere faced a choice: literally go hungry or sell your expertise, materials, or equipment to the highest bidder. Together, G8 governments responded with an array of programs designed to engage the human element of the Soviet weapons program—efforts that continue to this day.

In an era of globalization, the proliferation of dual-use weapons know-how and technologies has the potential to traverse the planet increasingly unfettered. Today, innovation and dual-use knowledge generation is occurring in more hands in more countries than ever before. The Global Innovation Index 2008 notes that while knowledge creation, competitiveness, and wealth creation all continue to be dominated by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan, leading indicators also suggest an emerging innovation capacity among newly industrialized and even developing world economies. The biological sciences are particularly telling. Cuba, for example, was one of the first countries to have developed a vaccine against the group B
meningococcus. Egypt has developed several innovative diagnostic and therapeutic products for hepatitis C. India developed and now produces a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine and is one of several developing countries, including Brazil, which has launched a major nanotechnology initiative. In many cases, the knowledge and equipment necessary to make astonishing advances in human health could be repurposed to develop biological weapons. While the invasion of Iraq did not unearth weapons of mass destruction or even their immediate precursors, it did uncover a stable of scientists whose knowledge, capacities, and equipment in the wrong hands could present significant challenges to international security.

At the 2009 gathering of the World Economic Forum, experts agreed that the most expedient route for the Middle East out of the global economic crisis is through technology innovation. Although the Middle East already scores high in terms of global wealth, thanks in large part to oil revenues, those reserves will one day run dry. In anticipation of that, many governments of the region have already mobilized internal resources to capitalize upon technology for future growth—most notably the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Kuwait. An equally interesting trend across the Middle East as of late has been the growing interest exhibited by regional governments in civilian nuclear power generation. Of the more than 30 governments around that have initiated at least long term development plans, 11 are Middle Eastern. As with every other region of the world, as new technologies and processes are developed, the potential for nefarious diversion increases. This is especially true considering privately-owned companies not only produce and operate nuclear, chemical, and biological industrial equipment, but also carry out, by far, the greatest share of the basic R&D for the relevant technologies, goods, and methods of application. In addition, university research is often commercially funded, and governments have expanded public-private partnerships even in some of the most sensitive areas of technology in order to take advantage of cost reductions and innovation. Of course, the array of private entities that could aid—either deliberately or unwittingly—the activities of a terrorist or committed state proliferator goes far beyond those firms that operate fuel enrichment facilities, experiment with select biological agents, or produce toxic chemicals. A broad swath of dual-use technology innovators and manufacturers are also involved in information security, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, and many other sectors that could have direct applications in proliferation efforts—including many in the Middle East. Preventing the spread of these (often-life saving) advanced technologies is neither feasible nor desirable; however, maximizing transparency and increasing confidence should be the goal of every government around the world.

Wisely, Resolution 1540 calls upon states to develop appropriate ways to work with industry to promote nonproliferation and diversion of sensitive items. Updating and applying the tools of science engagement first leveraged in the states of the former Soviet Union—but with the private sector rather than governments as prime collaborators—could provide Middle Eastern countries with the human capital needed to promote technological innovation and result in enhanced competitiveness and economic diversification. Such an effort would also provide the international community with greater transparency into the activities of the region’s scientific community through
collaborative projects and advanced information sharing. And the technologies that these collaborations yield could ultimately help provide solutions to other pressing global issues from the environment, to public health, to alternative energy supplies.

Figure 4: 1540 Implementation in the Middle East

**Conclusion:**

Although there is a growing recognition of the interconnected relationship between security and development around the world, it has yet to be followed by a commensurate shift in national spending habits of many donor countries. To many developing world governments, Northern donors are obsessed with the seemingly remote security preoccupations associated with weapons of mass destruction to the neglect of real-world threats: poverty, small arms and drug trafficking, health insecurity, economic underdevelopment. Although the United Nations Security Council is rightly concerned with the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, with some members especially alarmed by the growing opportunities for proliferators to use the Global South as a haven for weapons development, when viewed in this light, it is little wonder that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has received little attention across the southern hemisphere.
To assure effective implementation of UNSCR 1540, the first priority must be to correct the misperception of donor states that technical assistance or provision of equipment alone will achieve this purpose. Neither one-off trainings nor high-tech equipment will provide enduring solutions to the immediate needs in many regions of the world. Due to the overwhelming barriers to implementation, recipient states must experience the value of receiving assistance in connection with 1540 so that their perception of the Resolution as a North-driven priority—to the detriment of the South—will be ameliorated. In short, there is an urgent need to demonstrate the potential benefits of 1540, first in meeting immediate domestic priorities in recipient states, and second, in serving as a foundation for effective and sustainable nonproliferation. When considered more innovatively, the Resolution provides a unique opportunity for poorer countries to tap into “dual-use” security-related assistance to meet many of their development and capacity-building requirements.


xvi The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an organization of 15 Caribbean nations and dependencies. CARICOM's main purposes are to promote economic integration and cooperation among its members, to ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably shared, and to coordinate foreign policy. Their members include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.


xxiii Ibid.


xxvii Ibid.


