



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Strengthening barriers against new CBRN threats: preliminary lessons learned

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Overview

SIPRI has been conducting research into the role of arms control in security building since the 1960s. However, after 1996 the Institute progressively developed a range of field activities in functional areas connected to the research programme.

The field activities currently being undertaken include a number that are of relevance to the operational paragraphs of UN Security Council resolution 1540. The objective of this presentation is to provide a brief overview of the approach and methodology that has been used by SIPRI in field activities, to recount in general terms our experience with the implementation of field activities and to discuss how we have adapted our methodology in light of lessons learned.

Given the past history of SIPRI research, the starting point for our activities was to exploit our knowledge of arms control and disarmament processes when working with colleagues in the particular countries on which projects were focussed. However, through experience in the field we quickly came to realize that this was not an optimal approach.

Arms control was intended to address the dangers that can arise from *militarily significant* quantities of *weapons* in the hands of the *organized armed forces* of *states* by developing rules for *self-restraint*. The problems that Resolution 1540 targets have some characteristics that are fundamentally different from those that arms control was developed to address.

To develop effective implementation of 1540 it is necessary to reach down to the working level in agencies and facilities that are responsible for specific functional areas that do not work with weapons and that are not part of the military establishment. In developing a shared understanding of why particular measures are needed the underlying assumptions on which 1540 rests are either unknown to the relevant stakeholders, or they are contested if presented under the rubric of a threat of mass impact terrorism.

Using a traditional arms control framework in these conditions can quickly build barriers to collaboration in exactly the constituencies whose assistance is needed if Resolution 1540 is to achieve its objectives.

If Resolution 1540 is to be a vehicle for managing some of the new threats that have been identified (and this is an open question) it will be necessary for the responsible authorities to start thinking differently about how to organize activities. The effort to implement 1540 will need to reach out to new partners and connect with a wider range of networks and programmes in order for capacity-building to take place at the national level.

The presentation will focus on two areas of field activity: strengthening national export control systems for dual-use items and strengthening laboratory biosecurity. Using these cases some suggestions will be put forward about the kinds of approach that might succeed in achieving the objectives of Resolution 1540.