

US Policy in Southeast Asia: Fortifying the Foundation

A Report and Recommendations
From the
Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century:
Issues and Options for US Policy Initiative

The Stanley Foundation

2003-2005

Table of Contents

Introduction	5
US Relations With Southeast Asian Muslims: Beware the Paradigm	7
Rising to the China Challenge	13
The United States and ASEAN: A Case for Group Think	17
Project Overview	21
Participants	22
The Stanley Foundation	32

Introduction

In the present decade, Southeast Asia has figured more prominently in US foreign policy than at any time in the past 30 years. Soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan, US policymakers declared Southeast Asia to be a “second front” in the global war against terrorism. The 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines confirmed assumptions of Al Qaeda’s widening range and its common cause with regional extremist networks. A crisis of a different nature, the December 2004 tsunami that inflicted grave damage on the Indonesian province of Aceh and parts of Thailand’s western coast, brought added attention from US policymakers, as well as from everyday Americans. At a more incremental pace, China’s growing role and influence in Southeast Asia is changing the balance in the region’s external power relations. However, despite the growing inclination in US defense circles to view Beijing as a threat in Northeast Asia, American policymakers have not completed their assessment of China’s intentions toward Southeast Asia.

Beyond these topical concerns, the United States has enduring interests in Southeast Asia. The Strait of Malacca is critical to international shipping—especially to Japan, China, and South Korea, which import more than 80 percent of their oil from the Gulf—but Southeast Asia is the most pirate-prone region in the world. Thailand and the Philippines, both treaty allies

of the United States, have contributed forces to the coalition in Iraq, and Singapore has also provided support. Indonesia ranks as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, and one of the world’s few Muslim-majority democracies. While the US administration seeks to promote Iraq as a model of democratization for the Muslim world, it pays relatively little attention to the lessons offered by Indonesia. Southeast Asians play an increasingly prominent role on the international stage. In 2003, Malaysia served as chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as of the Non-Aligned Movement. And Thailand’s Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi recently completed his term as director-general of the World Trade Organization.

The US policy community was not prepared for the sudden renaissance in relations with Southeast Asia. Security partnerships in the region reflected conventional Cold War patterns and alliances and did not necessarily capture the nature of counterterrorism. US policy toward the Muslim world was based more on paradigms of Middle Eastern Islam than on religious interpretations on the “periphery” of the Muslim world. Washington’s longstanding inclination to deal with Southeast Asian governments on a bilateral basis left US policy increasingly out of sync with new aspirations for regional integration. Each of these factors was exacerbated by a dearth of discussion on Southeast Asia in Washington think tanks and other policy fora.

This report was prepared by Catharin E. Dalpino, Visiting Associate Professor of Asian Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

As a result, in this new era, US policy toward Southeast Asia—and Southeast Asian views of the United States—often careen between extremes. Empathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11, and some degree of tolerance for the Afghanistan invasion, has given way to perceptions of American hostility toward Muslims. Southeast Asians were heartened by the US response to the tsunami disaster last winter, in the context of a broader international relief response. However, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's decision not to attend the annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Laos last summer created a negative backlash with Southeast Asian governments.

US relations with Southeast Asia are sharply uneven because they lack a strong foundation. Moreover, improvements in relations are often confined to the official sector or other elites in Southeast Asia. Broader populations in the region often view the United States with greater suspicion. Nowhere was this more evident than in the lead-up to the Iraq war, when some Southeast Asian leaders supported US actions, but virtually every Southeast Asian public opposed it.

To address these issues and problems, the Stanley Foundation launched a project on “Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century” in 2003. The project brought together American and Southeast Asian scholars, analysts, government officials, leaders of civil society, and journalists for a series of roundtables, workshops, and conferences in the United States and Southeast Asia. It commenced with a set of roundtables at the Stanley Foundation's annual Strategy for Peace Conference at Airlie House in Virginia in

October 2003 and concluded with a two-day conference in Bangkok in March 2005. Some activities were cosponsored with leading institutions: the National Defense University; the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs; the Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University; and the Asia Foundation.

This report reflects the breadth of discussion across the two-year project. It attempts to provide a succinct rendering of the project's major findings and recommendations that is faithful to the substance and tenor of the dialogue. However, the project did not seek consensus among participants; as a result, specific observations and recommendations should not be attributed to individual participants, their institutions, or the Stanley Foundation. Moreover, because the project was divided into thematic discussions, most individuals participated in some but not all of the activities.

This report does not take a zero-sum approach, which assumes that every aspect of present US policy toward Southeast Asia should necessarily be overturned or reversed. Indeed, some obvious gains have been made in the post-9/11 era, such as the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and, more recently and subtly, improvements in relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the report does find significant gaps—in understanding as well as in action—that must be addressed in order to put relations on sounder footing. Nor does this report attempt to cover every issue in US relations with Southeast Asia or offer an indiscriminate “wish list” of recommendations. Instead, the analysis and recommendations are focused on three priority policy areas: relations with Southeast Asian Muslims, meeting new

challenges posed by China, and strengthening cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

It is a fundamental assumption of this report that the United States would be well rewarded for investing greater attention and effort in Southeast Asia. The region has found itself on the US policy screen because of problems: terrorism, natural disasters, and new dynamics with rising powers that could affect US interests. However, it also deserves a place because of its potential—for economic development, political liberalization, and religious and communal diversity. It is in both US and Southeast Asian interests to cooperate in helping the region realize that potential.

US Relations With Southeast Asian Muslims: Beware the Paradigm

Although the US and Southeast Asian governments have common goals in the war against terrorism, they often disagree on causes and approaches. Not surprising for a global superpower, the United States tends to focus on international terrorist networks that directly threaten the United States; just as understandably, Southeast Asian governments often worry more about the subnational threats within their own borders, whatever their cause. Since 9/11, Americans are inclined to view terrorism as fueled by anti-Western ideology among radical Muslims with a strong theological bent. In this view, terrorism should be answered not only with a counter-ideology (a “hearts and minds” campaign) but also with forceful (even military) means to defeat an organized force. US policy is focused on apprehending individuals, so as to “decapitate” and disarm terrorist organizations.

By contrast, many Southeast Asians see terrorism more in law-and-order terms, as a problem that must be contained but that is likely to remain for an indeterminable length of time. They tend to regard extremist groups as more horizontal than hierarchical, bound together by familial and social bonds and more likely to be regenerated than decapitated.

Southeast Asians also give greater weight than do Americans to “root causes” of terrorism, commonly translated as deficits in economic and social development, particularly among minority populations. Although no direct links between poverty and terrorism have been proven, it is difficult to dismiss indirect connections, such as those that make poor young Muslim men vulnerable to extremist arguments. Moreover, Southeast Asian disillusionment with the performance of their leaders, particularly in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, is broad, encompassing all religious groups. However, these disappointments are particularly acute in Southeast Asian Muslim communities. Indonesia has only recently recovered from the Asian financial crisis. Among Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand, poor governance has exacerbated economic gaps with other groups. Minority Muslims are also critical of government performance on the protection of human rights, and here too they often find themselves on the losing end.

The “Extremist” Trap

At the official level, these differences of perspective and view between the United States and Southeast Asia are not fatal, although they matter when one side perceives the other to be too unsympathetic to their concerns and constraints.

Without doubt, in the past few years, counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Southeast Asian governments has strengthened through a number of means, from more extensive intelligence-sharing to the establishment of a regional training center in Kuala Lumpur. A more difficult problem lies with Southeast Asian societies, where support for the United States is undermined by the paradigms that influence US policy in the Muslim world. Understanding these gaps is essential to crafting effective public diplomacy campaigns, as well as broader policy.

To date, post-9/11 US public diplomacy in Southeast Asia has been poorly conceived and poorly executed, largely because it has been based on faulty assumptions about Southeast Asian Muslims. For example, the “shared values” campaign launched immediately after 9/11 was unsuccessful in Southeast Asia because treatment of Muslims in the United States is not an issue in the region. Although Indonesian and Malaysian television stations obligingly broadcast the US videos, they inspired more derision than admiration and ultimately amounted to a negative factor.

Many Southeast Asians complain that Americans tend to rely too heavily on an image of the “Arab street,” which considers all Muslims to be current or potential radicals. Even when distinctions are made, semantics can be a complicating factor. A common paradigm in US counterterrorism policy for Southeast Asia divides Muslims into “moderates” and “extremists” and aims to strengthen the former while weakening the latter. Many Southeast Asians object to categorizations of this kind, although they often admit to using such labels themselves.

Some find it more acceptable to refer to “mainstream” and “fringe” groups, because it describes relations of groups to one another, rather than classifying individuals according to Islamic intensity.

Evidence of a monolithic view of Muslims as extremists is most easily seen in US visa policies, which many Southeast Asians consider to be a manifestation of American anti-Islam feeling. Post-9/11 visa policies and their heavy-handed implementation have stirred strong resentments in Southeast Asia that will take some time to abate even if and after these policies are amended. They have resulted in dramatic drops in Southeast Asians studying in the United States—in Indonesia by 40 percent—and even some Fulbright recipients have been denied visas to the United States. This situation extends beyond the educational sector and has affected trade, as Southeast Asian business people now find it more difficult to obtain visas to travel to the United States.

Whatever labels are applied, Southeast Asian Muslims are distinct in some ways from their counterparts in other regions. Scholars point out the need to separate theology from culture in the Islamic world and identify six major cultural zones in the Muslim world: Arab, Persian, Turkish, sub-Saharan, Indian, and Malay (Southeast Asian). Each of these zones has a distinct identity, forged by theology, legal frameworks, and interaction with other religious and cultural groups. Southeast Asian Islam, the result of voluntary rather than forced conversion and filtered by passage through India, has historically differed from Muslim cultural zones farther away. By comparison, it tends to be more

accommodating to other groups. Despite these differences, and possibly because of them, Middle Eastern Wahhabis have targeted Southeast Asia for “purification” over the past two decades. In this climate, an American policy that assumes Southeast Asian Muslims to be radical risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Political Islam and Political Expression

US counterterrorism policy often conflates political Islam—broadly defined as the use of the political process to achieve Islamic goals—with terrorism. If individual Muslims are at times judged by the “Arab street” paradigm, political Islam is often viewed in the context of the “Algerian dilemma,” a reference to the 1992 election in that country that brought an Islamist party to power seeking to secular rule. To be sure, this “one man, one vote, one time” phenomenon may exist in some Southeast Asian Islamic groups. However, Southeast Asia is also home to many moderate groups that support secular government and seek to debate and decide Islamic issues through the political process.

In general, and in contrast to the Algerian paradigm, Southeast Asian societies often seek to keep Islamic groups inside the tent by encouraging their political participation. In Malaysia, political Islam is embodied by the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam SeMalaysia, or PAS). Competing for power in the formal political arena has given PAS motivation to distance itself from terrorist groups. In Indonesia, political Muslims are generally not driven by Islamic ideology; instead, they are found across a spectrum of parties and often pursue pragmatic policy goals. However, this does not preclude the possibility that a party with a

theocratic agenda could gain influence through the political party system, particularly since some Islamic parties are organized along cadre lines and can wage effective campaigns.

Another dimension to the issue of Islam and politics in Southeast Asia is the impact of democratization, particularly in conflict areas. The 2005 agreement between the Aceh independent group, GAM, and the Indonesian government can be attributed in part to Jakarta’s allowing GAM to play a political role in the post-conflict province, a longstanding GAM aim that had heretofore been denied by the central government. Although the situation in southern Thailand has deteriorated dramatically in the past year, there are intimations that opening up more democratic space could reduce violence. In the February 2005 Thai elections, voter turnout in the three southernmost Muslim-majority provinces was 77 percent. This suggests that, however disaffected they might be, Thai Muslims view themselves as Thai citizens rather than as separatists. Moreover, there was a cessation of violence during the three-day election period.

The Global Muslim View

Although history has given Southeast Asian Islam distinctive traits, world events have also nurtured a global Islamic consciousness among Muslims in the region. Southeast Asians who joined the mujahadin against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s developed ties with radical groups from other regions that helped give rise to the Jemaah Islamiyah, Southeast Asia’s regional terrorist network.

More broadly, global media has made Southeast Asians of all religious groups more aware of the

plight of Muslims in other areas. Muslims in the region are increasingly concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more inclined to subscribe to a need to defend Islam worldwide. The US intervention in Iraq has strengthened this universalist view among Southeast Asian Muslims and damaged the US image in some quarters. Until recently, US policymakers have tended to minimize this global connection and to view Southeast Asia as more parochial in its foreign policy interests and Islamic issues. At this juncture, Southeast Asian Muslims have reached a crossover point in their view of the United States, where US policies in other areas of the Muslim world are at least as important as US actions toward Southeast Asia. This suggests a serious new constraint on US policy in Southeast Asia: that relations with Muslims in that region may not improve substantially until greater progress is seen in more troubled areas of the Muslim world.

Recommendations

- 1. Create a blue-ribbon national commission on visa policy to assess the impact that post-9/11 changes in visa regulations have had on relations with the Muslim world.** This Track 2 group should include members from the executive branch, Congress, business community, and the education community. Beyond an assessment, it should be charged with making recommendations for more nuanced visa procedures that will safeguard national security without broadly alienating Muslims.
- 2. Provide training to Transportation Security Administration workers and other port-of-entry officials on Islamic culture and the Muslim world.** Reforming visa practices and regulations will be of little use if Muslims

visiting the United States are met with hostile or nativist attitudes from US officials upon arrival.

- 3. Include a broader spectrum of Southeast Asian Muslims in public diplomacy initiatives.** While there is an obvious logic to making common cause with “moderate” Muslims in Southeast Asia, such a strategy risks further alienating more radical ones and pushing them toward violent groups. In addition to supporting moderate Muslims, policymakers should attempt to widen the distance between nonviolent and violent Muslims by increasing dialogue with non-violent groups and including them in exchange programs. This is a high-risk policy with a potential for high return. However, administrators of official and non-governmental exchange programs should select participants for these programs carefully, in view of US regulations prohibiting funding of groups that may be associated with terrorists.
- 4. Promote dialogue between American Muslim intellectuals and their Southeast Asian counterparts.** The growing community of American Muslim academics is an untapped resource in public diplomacy and can act as unofficial diplomats. These scholars are experienced in interfaith dialogue and can offer insights on other religions in Southeast Asia to their co-religionists in Southeast Asia. Moreover, they see no contradiction between Islam and democracy.
- 5. Facilitate intra-Muslim networks and dialogues in Southeast Asia behind the scenes.** Many Southeast Asian groups have more

contact with their counterparts in other regions—particularly the Middle East and South Asia—than they do with one another. Fostering greater exchange within the Southeast Asian Muslim community may strengthen distinctive and positive elements of this community that discourage extremism.

Moreover, in many areas of Southeast Asia, the issues most likely to give rise to violent extremism are not between Muslims and other religious groups but within the Muslim community. The United States should support intra-Muslim dialogue but cannot be too aggressive a broker in this process. Beyond capitalizing on ad hoc opportunities, the United States should provide assistance for ongoing regional networks of Muslim scholars and civil society groups to help build permanent scaffolding for dialogue.

Given obvious sensitivities, such assistance would best be channeled through respected nongovernmental organizations.

- 6. Link counterterrorism and democracy promotion efforts in US policy in Southeast Asia.** The most obvious overlaps between these two areas are in justice and law enforcement. A revival of the rule of law movement in the American assistance sector, with a 21st-century focus on law enforcement to address transnational threats of various kinds, would be one obvious possibility. A more difficult policy problem is US attitudes toward internal security acts and other counterterrorism regulations in Southeast Asian systems. US officials should think twice before

urging such frameworks upon Southeast Asian governments without appropriate guarantees for due process and the protection of human rights.

- 7. Continue to make distinctions between international and local conflicts.** Although it can cause friction, the difference in focus between the United States (concerned primarily with international terrorist networks) and Southeast Asia (more focused on domestic threats) describes a natural division of labor. Clearly, global networks such as Al Qaeda and regional ones such as the Jemmah Islamiyah seek to influence domestic separatist movements and urge a jihadist agenda upon them. For this reason, helping to maintain a separation between international and domestic groups is in both US and Southeast Asian interests.

At the same time, the United States should stand ready to help Southeast Asians resolve domestic conflicts with appropriate means, and with a low profile. In negotiated settlements to conflicts, US assistance can help implement peace agreements. In communal conflicts, the United States should focus efforts to bridge economic and educational gaps that exacerbate tensions. This broadly describes current US policy in Southeast Asia, but domestic pressure in both the United States and Southeast Asia can make it difficult to maintain.

- 8. Take Southeast Asian concerns about the developmental “root causes” of terrorism more to heart in US policy.** To some extent US policy and assistance—in the southern

Philippines, southern Thailand, and pockets of Indonesia—already does this, but much more should be done. However, where local conditions foster religious or communal tensions, care should be taken not to focus exclusively on Muslims. This may in fact exacerbate tensions. US policies in conflict areas of Southeast Asia should aim for objectivity and address the needs and complaints of all sides. In these areas, US assistance should avoid championing, and therefore booby-trapping, one side against the other.

9. **Consider the impact on Southeast Asian Muslim views of US actions in other areas of the Islamic world.** Beyond factoring Southeast Asia's increasing universal Muslim consciousness into global US foreign policy, US officials should willingly engage Southeast Asians in dialogue on issues in other regions of the Muslim world. Washington is not likely to change direction on the Arab-Israeli conflict and other trouble spots solely in deference to Southeast Asians, but it can do a better job of explaining US policies to them.
10. **Help increase the odds that Indonesia's democracy will succeed.** It is difficult to imagine a stable Southeast Asia without a stable Indonesia. Indonesia is home to half the population of Southeast Asia. Lacking stability, its institutional weaknesses will pose a threat to the region's security, particularly in the war against terrorism, and its economic health. US relations with Indonesia have improved in recent months, offering new opportunities to take cooperation to a deeper level.

At this juncture, US policy should focus on US-Indonesian military-to-military relations, and large-scale assistance to education. Indonesia's participation in the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program has recently been restored after a hiatus of more than a decade. Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono has proposed a major US program to train mid-grade officers in the United States, arguing that it would broaden their outlook and give them firsthand experience with the role of the military in a democratic society, as well as enhance their professional capacity. Although the theory of osmosis is not always a sure way to inculcate democratic values, such training would come at a timely point in Indonesia's reform of its armed forces. Beyond IMET, the United States should expand funds for Indonesia under the Foreign Military Financing program to cover spare parts and the technical assistance to put Indonesia's C-130 transport planes and helicopters back into service. Lastly, the United States should consider providing support to the Indonesian navy to expand its capacity to combat piracy and provide maritime security in its territorial waters.

A companion policy initiative should be to establish a multifaceted joint US-Indonesian initiative that would provide assistance to train a large cadre of Indonesian Ph.D.s in the United States, while it also expands support for lower education, including Islamic schools such as pesentren and madrassahs. The \$157 million pledged for this purpose by President Bush during his brief visit to Bali in 2003 is insufficient for this purpose.

Indonesia's educational system is one of the weakest in the region, with only 4 percent of the national budget earmarked for education. Large numbers of youth attend school for only a few years. An educated electorate would significantly enhance the prospects for democracy and could also help reduce the appeal of radical Islam.

Rising to the China Challenge

American policymakers and analysts are increasingly aware of China's growing influence in Southeast Asia, but there is little consensus on Beijing's end goals. China's "rise" in the Asia-Pacific region is the inevitable consequence of its economic growth, but it is also the result of carefully crafted policies that couple economic incentives with a vigorous diplomatic campaign. In some corners of Southeast Asia, this strategy is clearly working well.

Speculation on China's role and intentions in Southeast Asia follow established lines of debate in the Washington policy community, which favor either "containing" or "engaging" Beijing. On the whole, however, Americans are beginning to display more nervousness over China's new influence in the region than most Southeast Asians themselves. In the Southeast Asian view, and with some justification, the trend lines with China are presently quite positive. However, leaders in the region are not without concern and are mindful that aggression and quiescence are cyclical in Chinese military history. Even if China has no real plans to exercise its growing military power in Southeast Asia, it may be acting out of a traditional desire to create a buffer against external influence on its borders. And historically, China's borders extended into mainland Southeast Asia.

The Chinese "Charm Offensive"

The United States and China each have distinct advantages in their relations with Southeast Asia. China has made some strides in security relations with Southeast Asia, primarily by projecting a more benign image in the South China Sea than it did in the mid-1990s. However, it cannot supplant the United States as a security guarantor for the Asia-Pacific region. The tsunami relief operation showcased the rapid response capability of the US military, and US economic assistance to the region was ten times larger than China's. (But in this as in other aspects of this issue, triumphalism is of little use—Southeast Asians acknowledged US generosity but also credited Beijing for its first major humanitarian effort.)

Security may be the prime concern over China's new role in Southeast Asia in some US policy circles, but Beijing seldom leads with that card. The possible exception to this is in relations with Burma, where China has become the benefactor of the military government in Rangoon, a process that was facilitated by the West's sanction regimes and attempts to isolate the Burmese leadership. China's strengths also include historic and cultural ties to Southeast Asia; the large ethnic Chinese population in Southeast Asia, who have assimilated in their adopted countries to varying degrees; and its geographic proximity to its southern neighbors. This last factor enables Beijing to dispatch its "A Team" to Southeast Asia on short notice. China's high-profile diplomacy in the region—Premier Wen Jiabao appears to hold the ASEAN portfolio—has implicitly thrown down a gauntlet to the United States.

Beijing's strategy is more than simply invoking family feeling in Southeast Asia. China's policy toward Southeast Asia is in some ways a shadow

play to US policy. Its economic assistance is offered without conditions. China focuses particular attention on the poorer countries of Southeast Asia that do not rank highly on the US scale: Burma, Laos, and Cambodia. Lastly, in contrast to the more bilateral US approach, China deals with ASEAN as a whole to a greater degree and has put forward significant initiatives, such as the China-ASEAN Federal Trade Agreement (FTA).

People-to-people ties are growing as well. Chinese tourism in Southeast Asia is ballooning. Arguably more important, educational patterns are changing rapidly to favor China over the United States in some countries. For example, the number of Indonesian students receiving visas for China last year was twice the number granted visas to study in the United States. This follows a larger pattern of plummeting levels of foreign students, Southeast Asian students in particular, studying in the United States.

The Centrality of Trade

But China's most significant impact by far in Southeast Asia in this new era of relations has been in trade. Southeast Asia's trade with China is its fastest growing economic relationship, and China is now a major factor in the region's economic health. In 2005 the volume of ASEAN-China trade may eclipse that with the United States, making China Southeast Asia's most important trading partner for the first time since 1873. If and when the China-ASEAN FTA is completed, it will become the world's largest free trade area.

If there is a competition between the United States and China in Southeast Asian trade, it is a close one. The United States has made consider-

able strides in trade with Southeast Asia in recent years, but China has pulled ahead more quickly. The underlying issue is whether such a pattern represents a gravitational pull toward an Asian economic community that excludes the United States.

ASEAN does have strong interests in maintaining high levels of trade with the United States. Most Southeast Asian exports to China are in raw materials, while the United States is the established market for high-tech manufactured goods. In addition, the United States is theoretically working toward a concert of free trade arrangements in the region through the US Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, a ladder of steps intended to culminate in FTAs with each Southeast Asian country. However, these ladders are too steep for the weaker economies of the region, and FTAs with the United States are not possibilities for the foreseeable future. Thus far, the United States has signed and ratified an FTA with Singapore, and is negotiating one with Thailand. Talks with Malaysia over beginning FTA negotiations are intensifying, but the list of tangible prospects falls off sharply after that. For the poorer economies, this contrasts with the promise of the China-ASEAN FTA, which includes "early harvest" payouts for the poorer members.

A major goal in its trade with Southeast Asia is China's use of the region's natural resources and markets to fuel domestic Chinese development, particularly in the southern Yunnan Province, which borders Southeast Asia. In Burma and Laos in particular, much trade with China is private and local, and therefore likely underreported. Migration into these countries accompanies

the increase in trade, particularly in the northern half of Burma, which some analysts have labeled “Yunnan South.” Chinese trade and related infrastructure projects are changing the physical face of Southeast Asia. Roads are built through Laos to connect China to Thailand. China builds dams across the Mekong for energy and widens the river’s shoals to permit barges to pass through. Some Southeast Asians are beginning to question the ecological price of this process, but have few levers against China to control it.

Southeast Asians’ motivations for increased trade with China are more defensive. They view it as an opportunity to recoup some of the trade and investment the region has lost to the economic giant to the north, especially after China entered the World Trade Organization. This trend has only been exacerbated by the abolition of textile quotas for WTO members last January, which has had particular impact on Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and the Philippines.

Some analysts forecast that Southeast Asia could lose as much as \$400 billion to China over the next 15 years. It is unlikely that the China-ASEAN FTA will stem that drain to any great degree. Indeed, there are likely to be significant economic dislocations that come with economic integration with China. Beijing has set 2010 as the target date for the reduction of tariffs with the original six ASEAN states and 2015 for the four new members. However, early experience is showing that Chinese goods may overwhelm indigenous Southeast Asian markets.

Despite China’s growing economic edge in the region, it is clear that Southeast Asia will seek a balance in trade as it has sought a balance in

other policy areas. More vigorous efforts on the part of the United States—in trade, diplomacy, and “soft” policy areas such as education and development aid—are likely to be valued well into the next decade.

Recommendations

Deeper involvement in Southeast Asia in general is the best policy for balancing China in the region and protecting American interests. A more vigorous approach to ASEAN and greater attention to Southeast Asian development in its own right will have a beneficial effect in this regard, and are examined elsewhere in this report. Recommendations more specific to the China issue include:

1. **Avoid making Southeast Asia “choose” between Washington and Beijing.** At best, this is unnecessary, particularly with long-standing US allies and friends in the region. At worst, in countries with which the United States has more tentative ties, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
2. **Support economic integration in Southeast Asia by accelerating trade policies in the region.** This will probably fall short of the comprehensive US-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) that some Southeast Asians are seeking. However, participating more fully in Southeast Asia’s economic integration will help the United States keep pace with the growing trend toward regionalism and help prevent exclusion from regional groups.
3. **Support Southeast Asia in developing stronger financial infrastructure, to help cushion the region in the event of currency**

drops and other financial shocks. Southeast Asian leaders fear that sharp economic change in either the United States or China could spark another economic crisis in the region. On a less alarming level, they worry that US attempts to persuade China to revalue the renminbi, or widen the currency band, could create dislocations in Southeast Asian economies. American policymakers should consider plans for regional currency swaps to stabilize capital flows, or consider offering a second line of defense for an impending crisis. Apart from the benefit to the US economic stake in Southeast Asia, greater cooperation in this area could help dispel lingering bitterness against the United States over the 1997 crisis, an event that boosted China's image in the region.

- 4. Shore up bilateral ties with Southeast Asia's poorer countries, to help them avoid becoming overly dependent upon a single power.** US relations with Burma will be problematic in this regard, but there are no comparable obstacles to strengthening relations with Laos and Cambodia. Approving the Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing Economies Act would boost trade with both of these countries, and help compensate for lost income in their garment sectors due to the abolition of textile quotas for WTO members. Establishing binational public-private educational partnerships for these countries would provide scholarships for study in the United States and help build long-term relations. At an appropriate interval, US policymakers should consider measures to provide Burma with alternatives to China's mounting influence in that country as well.

- 5. Consider triangular cooperation—among Southeast Asia, the United States, and China—to address transnational threats in the region.** The benefits to this are self-evident, particularly with those problems for which China is a source or transit country. Such cooperation is particularly warranted to stem a potential avian flu epidemic, but HIV/AIDS, human and drug trafficking, and illegal arms smuggling are all worthy of greater attention as well. A triangular effort could also help reduce tensions between the United States and China on competing military exercises in the region.
- 6. Take a more active role in subregional projects in Southeast Asia, such as the Greater Mekong Subregion development program.** At the very least, the United States should encourage China to be a more accountable and responsive partner in subregional development, particularly with respect to the Mekong. For example, Washington should urge Beijing to become a full member of the Mekong Commission, rather than remain an observer.
- 7. Make the most of US administration and diplomatic visits to the region.** It is unlikely that Washington will match China's level of summitry in Southeast Asia—high-level pop-in visits are considerably more difficult—but it can do better. The administration should make President Bush's planned visit to Vietnam for the APEC meeting in late 2006 an opportunity to field its own "A Team." When Secretary Rice attends the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur next July, she should take the opportunity to

visit Southeast Asian capitals she has missed thus far.

The United States and ASEAN: A Case for Group Think

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, Asia has seen a proliferation of new groups and proposed economic communities that crisscross the region, binding allies and enemies together in patterns that would have been unthinkable two decades ago. Many of these nascent arrangements are built upon the regional scaffolding provided by ASEAN. During this time, the association has expanded to incorporate four new members, making ASEAN synonymous with Southeast Asia itself.

ASEAN is one of the oldest regional organizations in Asia and, by most accounts, its most successful one. As a result, it is uniquely positioned to spark new regional initiatives. It formed the base for the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework, bringing Southeast Asia together with China, Japan, and South Korea in a regional group for the first time. It is a testament to ASEAN's success as a catalyst that the three countries of Northeast Asia now meet separately, an unprecedented new trend. The importance of ASEAN to the East Asia Summit, which will meet for the first time this December in Kuala Lumpur, is evident by the requirement that all members of the summit be signatories to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Thus far, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Russia, and (to the surprise of the United States) Australia have signed the TAC.

US Drift Away From ASEAN?

In this era of heady regionalism, many Southeast Asians perceive the United States to be increasingly out of sync. New regional trends put pressure on the United States to move away from its longstanding bilateral approach to Southeast Asia toward more extensive and concrete cooperation with ASEAN.

Washington is at times reluctant to do so. US policymakers often view ASEAN as turgid and, because of its rule by consensus, captive to the least common denominator. They tend to use bilateral channels to pursue policy objectives or to seek multilateral cooperation through APEC. The United States is a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brings 24 nations of the region together for annual dialogue. However, Washington prefers to pursue strategic objectives in Southeast Asia through the bilateral alliance or arrangements, and through the expansion of joint military exercises, such as COBRA Gold in Thailand. This is in contrast to China's initiative to help establish the ARF defense ministers' meeting.

Moreover, political differences with some member states, particularly Burma, make a closer embrace with ASEAN difficult for the United States in the near term. Indeed, Washington's most vigorous interaction with ASEAN in recent months has been its attempt to persuade ASEAN to pressure Rangoon to abdicate the ASEAN chair in 2006. Although the effort was ultimately successful, it is not clear where it leaves Burma's domestic political situation, Rangoon's role in ASEAN, or US-ASEAN relations.

Some American analysts, as well as some Southeast Asians, point out that the US image in ASEAN does not do justice to Washington's role in regional affairs. They point out that cooperation is close at the working level. However, at top levels the United States is often viewed as a *prima donna*. In this sense, ASEAN may serve as a channel for Southeast Asians to vent resentments of the United States without causing undue harm to bilateral ties.

These attitudinal issues aside, there is some concrete evidence that the United States is becoming isolated within the extended ASEAN community. There is little possibility that the United States will sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which will for the time being exclude American participation in the East Asia Summit. US officials have also noted recently that ASEAN appears increasingly to prefer to deal with China, Japan, and South Korea through the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism rather than through ARF, a trend which threatens to marginalize the United States further from regional affairs. This distance will only be exacerbated as the China-ASEAN FTA grows closer to implementation. Although the United States has offered its Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, that is essentially a collection of bilateral trade arrangements, and there is little reason to believe that it could or would be converted to a US-ASEAN FTA.

Operational or Aspirational?

Expanding US cooperation with ASEAN is made more difficult by the fact that Americans and Southeast Asians often disagree on ASEAN's basic rationale. Americans are inclined to judge the group by its tangible achievements, and from

this operational view gives it low marks. They point out that ASEAN has not played a central role in resolving disputes among its member states and that lofty plans for regional frameworks, such as Indonesia's 2004 proposal for an ASEAN Security Community, lack definitive starting points. ASEAN's two most recent crises in the region—the Asian financial crisis and the war against terrorism—have largely been managed through bilateral channels.

In response, many Southeast Asians maintain that the United States holds ASEAN to unreasonable standards. They agree with American critics that the association is more a state of mind than an operational unit, but they view ASEAN's aspirational character as a strength rather than a weakness. ASEAN's existence enables the member governments to take risks they would otherwise avoid. For example, Indonesia's agreement to allow international peacekeepers into East Timor was due largely to ASEAN's backing, even persuasion. More recently, ASEAN's loose bloc arrangement has enabled it to deal with China and Japan with greater confidence than it would on a bilateral basis. The issue is not whether the United States can remake ASEAN in its own image—clearly, it cannot—but whether the United States and ASEAN can find a meeting point in these divergent views of ASEAN that will enable the two sides to expand cooperation to their mutual benefit.

Recommendations

1. **Establish the position of a US ambassador-at-large for ASEAN.** Just as the United States has an ambassador to other regional and multilateral institutions (APEC, OECD, OAS), an envoy for ASEAN would signal the

association's importance to the United States and boost the profile of US regional policy in Southeast Asia against individual bilateral relations. Equally if not more important, it would provide a permanent channel for dialogue with Southeast Asia. Lastly, it would build advocacy for more vigorous US policy toward ASEAN within the US policy community. The appointment of an ambassador to ASEAN would need to be matched with the resources to expand and strengthen the regional office of the State Department's Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs.

2. **When political conditions permit, establish a regular US-ASEAN Summit.** This "ASEAN Plus One" process could take place on the margins of the APEC meeting or follow a more independent schedule. The establishment of a summit tradition would help to balance the high-profile diplomacy that is rapidly becoming a hallmark of China's relations with Southeast Asia. Realistically, the inauguration of a US-ASEAN Summit will likely have to await an improvement in US-Burma relations. Without such a shift, summit meetings would be a source of tension in US relations with ASEAN and unproductive as a result.
3. **Discuss with Southeast Asian leaders the prospect of giving the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) an identity separate from ASEAN itself.** Although ARF is a "talk shop," it remains the only intergovernmental security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States could make greater use of it, particularly on maritime issues, where sovereignty is of particular concern to Southeast Asians. However, as "dialogue partners," external powers have little convening power or input into the ARF issue agenda. ASEAN should retain leadership of ARF but give dialogue partners a more active role. In time, ARF should consider establishing a separate secretariat. US initiatives to strengthen ARF will help maintain the US role in the region's strategic balance, particularly in view of China's activism in the ARF defense ministers' meeting.
4. **Enter into dialogue with Southeast Asian nations to reconcile US support for nuclear nonproliferation with ASEAN nuclear-free zone initiatives.** The US-led Proliferation Security Initiative is presently the flagship effort to prevent nuclear proliferation. Its objectives overlap with many of those in ASEAN's proposal for a Southeast Asian "nuclear-free zone" under its 1984 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) initiative. The United States has reflexively opposed ZOPFAN since its inception, because of its potential constraints upon US policy. The current focus on counterterrorism gives Washington an extra incentive to enter into dialogue with ASEAN on common proliferation concerns and potential areas of cooperation.
5. **Cultivate relations with the younger ASEAN generation through educational initiatives and leadership exchange.** In several Southeast Asian countries, particularly the new members, more than half the population was born after ASEAN was established. The United States should make an

effort to reach out to this younger tier in two directions. First, educational ties should be strengthened with less restrictive visa policies and aid initiatives that provide scholarships to promising students from the poorer ASEAN countries. In this regard, it may be useful to establish a US-ASEAN Educational Council. Second, US public diplomacy programs and American NGOs should establish ongoing programs with the younger generation of ASEAN leaders and their American counterparts.

- 6. Encourage Southeast Asian nations to establish an “ASEAN lobby” to help educate Congress on US-ASEAN policy issues.** Compared to other regions of the world, Southeast Asia receives less attention from Congress, which translates into lower aid levels and fewer trade preferences. Some ASEAN governments are building effective communication strategies with the US legislature, while others have little or no contact. Moreover, ASEAN has no group identity on the Hill. Stronger relations with Congress will be an important element of expanded US-ASEAN ties. Southeast Asian governments should view congressional outreach as an ongoing task and organize coalitions of supporters issue by issue, rather than relying upon fixed country or regional “caucuses.”

Project Overview

Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century: Issues and Options for US Policy

The Stanley Foundation believes that a fresh and in-depth look at the region would be useful as post-9/11 US policy toward Southeast Asia has shifted while countries in the region are forging broad new relations with China and India. At the same time, Southeast Asian governments are facing pressure to improve human rights protection and address a host of human security problems. Each of these challenges has strained regional institutions such as ASEAN, while member states consider new roles for such multilateral organizations.

To assess these trends, as well as US policy responses to them, the foundation held several roundtable dialogues and assembled a working group of Southeast Asia experts from the academic, think tank, governmental, nongovernmental, and business communities.

Activities include:

- China and Southeast Asia
- Nontraditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia
- Political Islam and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: An Agenda for US Policy
- US Security Relations With Southeast Asia: A Dual Challenge
- US Human Rights Policy in Southeast Asia: New Issues for a New Era
- New Glue or New Gloss? Southeast Asia Regionalism and US Policy
- Islam in Southeast Asia: What Should US Policymakers Know?
- Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century: Issues and Options for US Policy

Participants

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.

China and Southeast Asia

October 16-18, 2003
Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia

Chair

David I. Steinberg, Director, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Balbina Hwang, Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia, The Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Participants

Bradley O. Babson, Consultant on Asian Affairs

Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

John W. Garver, Professor of International Relations, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology

Pek Koon Heng, Assistant Professor and Program Director, Globalization in Southeast Asia Program, School of International Service, American University

Murray Hiebert, Washington Correspondent, *Far Eastern Economic Review*

Frank S. Jannuzi, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Michael A. McDevitt, Director, Center for Strategic Study, The CNA Corporation

Marvin C. Ott, Professor of National Security Policy, National War College, National Defense University

Alan D. Romberg, Senior Associate and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center

Robert G. Sutter, Professor, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Wang Gungwu, Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

Quansheng Zhao, Professor and Director, Division of Comparative and Regional Studies, School of International Service, American University

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Cliff Brockman, Associate Producer, *Common Ground*

Michael Kraig, Program Officer

Jeffrey G. Martin, Vice President and Director of Programs

Susan R. Moore, Conference Management Associate

Richard H. Stanley, President

Leslie Winter, Program Associate

Nontraditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia

October 16-18, 2003
Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia

Chair

Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, The National Peace Corps Association

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Jeremiah Grossman, Graduate Student in Law and International Development and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Participants

Jean Bush Aden, Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Christina Asha Arnold, Executive Director, Project HOPE International

Priscilla A. Clapp, Consultant

Peter F. Geithner, Independent Consultant

Kim Ninh, Program Director, The Asia Foundation

Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Thailand

Peter W. Riggs, Program Officer, Sustainable Development Program in East Asia, Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Lionel A. Rosenblatt, President Emeritus, Refugees International

Kirk Talbott, President, First Voice International

Lee Thorn, Chair, Jhai Foundation

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Cliff Brockman, Associate Producer, *Common Ground*

Michael Kraig, Program Officer

Jeffrey G. Martin, Vice President and Director of Programs

Susan R. Moore, Conference Management Associate

Richard H. Stanley, President

Leslie Winter, Program Associate

Political Islam and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: An Agenda for US Policy

October 16-18, 2003
Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia

Chair

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Todd Andrews, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, The George Washington University

Participants

Zachary Abuza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Simmons College

Azyumardi Azra, Rector, State Islamic University, Indonesia

John J. Bresnan, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, East Asian Institute, Columbia University

Robin Bush, Director of Programs in Islamic Civil Society, The Asia Foundation

Paul M. Cleveland, President, The United States-Indonesia Society

Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

James L. Huskey, State Department Rusk Fellow, Georgetown University

Karl Jackson, C. V. Starr Distinguished Professor and Director, Asian Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

R. William Liddle, Professor of Political Science, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, The Ohio State University

Eugene Martin, Executive Director, The Philippine Facilitation Project, United States Institute of Peace

Edward Masters, Cochairman, Board of Trustees, The United States-Indonesia Society

Bronson E. Percival, Counterterrorism Coordinator, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State

Nongnuth Phetcharatana, Deputy Chief of Mission, Royal Thai Embassy

Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Thailand

Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asian Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

Santanina T. Rasul, Chairperson, Magbassa Kita Foundation, Inc.

Bruce Vaughn, Analyst, Southeast and South Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

Meredith Weiss, Assistant Professor of International Studies, DePaul University

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Cliff Brockman, Associate Producer, *Common Ground*

Michael Kraig, Program Officer

Jeffrey G. Martin, Vice President and Director of Programs

Susan R. Moore, Conference Management Associate

Richard H. Stanley, President

Leslie Winter, Program Associate

US Security Relations With Southeast Asia: A Dual Challenge

Sponsored by
The Stanley Foundation and National War College,
National Defense University
March 11-12, 2004
Washington, DC

Cochairs

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Marvin Ott, Professor of National Security Policy, National War College, National Defense University

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Elna Noor, M.A. Candidate, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Participants

John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation

M. Lyall Breckon, Senior Analyst, CNA Corporation

Frederick Z. Brown, Associate Director, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Nayan Chanda, Director of Publications, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University

Paul M. Cleveland, President, The United States-Indonesia Society

Barry Desker, Director, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Dana Robert Dillon, Senior Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Evan P. Garcia, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Philippines to the United States

Edward Gresser, Project Director, Progressive Policy Institute

Jeannie Henderson, First Secretary Political, Embassy of Australia to the United States

Pek Koon Heng, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

Murray Hiebert, Washington Correspondent, *Far Eastern Economic Review*

Frank S. Jannuzi, Democratic Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

G. Eugene Martin, Executive Director, The Philippine Facilitation Project, US Institute of Peace

James W. McCormick, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on International Relations

Ann Marie Murphy, Research Scholar, Columbia University

Larry Niksch, Policy Analyst for Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

Bronson E. Percival, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State

Chirachai Punkrasin, Minister/Deputy Chief of Mission of Thailand to the United States

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asian Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

David I. Steinberg, Director, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Panitan Wattanayagorn, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US-ASEAN Business Council

Observers

Janet Kang, Student, Georgetown University

Stephanie Dang, Student, Georgetown University

Beth Gleason, Student, Georgetown University

Clare Merrill, Student, Georgetown University

Loren Keller, Writer/Editor, The Stanley Foundation

**US Human Rights Policy in Southeast Asia:
New Issues for a New Era**

Sponsored by
The Stanley Foundation and Carnegie Council on Ethics
and International Affairs
May 10-11, 2004
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs,
New York, New York

Cochairs

Joanne Bauer, Director of Studies, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Scott W. Harold, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Columbia University

Participants

Zachary Abuza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Simmons College

Jean Bush Aden, Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Muthiah Alagappa, Director, East-West Center Washington

Maureen Aung-Thwin, Director, Burma Project and Southeast Asia Initiative, Open Society Institute

John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation

John J. Bresnan, Senior Research Scholar, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University

Nayan Chanda, Director of Publications, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University

Paul M. Cleveland, Senior Consultant, The United States-Indonesia Society

Dana Robert Dillon, Senior Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Craig C. Etcheson, Visiting Scholar, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Rosemary J. Foot, Professor of International Relations and John Swire Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of East Asia, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, St. Anthony's College, United Kingdom

Goenawan Mohamad, Editor, *Tempo*, Indonesia

Pek Koon Heng, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

Frank S. Jannuzi, East Asia Specialist, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Tom Kellogg, Orville Schell Fell, Asia Division, Human Rights Watch

Jeffrey G. Martin, Executive Vice President and Director of Programs, The Stanley Foundation

John McAuliff, Executive Director, Fund for Reconciliation and Development

Mary Byrne McDonnell, Executive Director, Social Science Research Council

Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Executive Director, Ateneo Human Rights Center, School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines

Ann Marie Murphy, Research Scholar, East Asian Institute, Columbia University

Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, National Peace Corps Association

Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asian Division, Office of East Asia Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

Sriprapha Petcharamesree, Director, Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development, Mahidol University, Thailand

David I. Steinberg, Director, Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Elizabeth Wong, Secretary-General of the National Human Rights Society, Malaysia

Sean H. Woo, General Counsel, Office of Senator Sam Brownback, United States Senate

Sam Zia-Zarifi, Acting Director, Asia Division, Human Rights Watch

Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US-ASEAN Business Council

Observer

Amy Bakke, Creative Director, The Stanley Foundation

New Glue or New Gloss? Southeast Asia Regionalism and US Policy

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation and The Southeast Asia Forum, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
September 23-24, 2004
Stanford University, California

Cochairs

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Donald K. Emmerson, Director, The Southeast Asia Forum, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Elina Noor, M.A. Candidate, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Participants

Bradley O. Babson, Consultant on Asian Affairs

John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation

Frederick Z. Brown, Associate Director, Southeast Asia Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Termsak Chalermpananupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Jakarta

Kavi Chongkittavorn, Assistant Group Editor, *The Nation*, Bangkok

Annette Clear, Assistant Professor of Politics, University of California, Santa Cruz

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dino Patti Djalal, Director of North and Central America Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

Edward Gresser, Project Director, Progressive Policy Institute

Heng Pek Koon, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

Murray Hiebert, Washington Correspondent, *Far Eastern Economic Review*

Marie Huhtala, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State

Edward Masters, Cochairman, The United States-Indonesia Society

Ann Marie Murphy, Research Scholar, Columbia University

Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Jakarta

T. J. Pempel, Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, National Peace Corps Association

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asian Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Donald E. Weatherbee, Donald S. Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Richard L. Walker Institute of International and Area Studies, University of South Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US-ASEAN Business Council

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Leslie Winter, Program Associate

Loren Keller, Writer/Editor

Islam in Southeast Asia: What Should US Policymakers Know?

Sponsored by
The Stanley Foundation and The Asia Foundation
November 18-19, 2004
San Francisco, California

Cochairs

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Gordon R. Hein, Vice President of Programs, The Asia Foundation

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Elina Noor, M.A. Candidate, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Participants

Zachary Abuza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Simmons College

Osman Bakar, Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia, Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University

Douglas Bereuter, President, The Asia Foundation

John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation

Bahtiar Effendy, Lecturer, State Islamic University Jakarta

Donald K. Emmerson, Director, The Southeast Asia Forum, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

Edward Gresser, Project Director, Progressive Policy Institute

Heng Pek Koon, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

Marie Huhtala, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State

Erik Jensen, Senior Law Advisor, The Asia Foundation

Kasit Piromya, Ambassador of Thailand to the United States

James Klein, Representative for Thailand, The Asia Foundation

R. William Liddle, Professor of Political Science, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, The Ohio State University

Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

G. Eugene Martin, Executive Director, The Philippine Facilitation Project, United States Institute of Peace

Patricia Martinez, Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya

Edward Masters, Cochairman, The United States-Indonesia Society

Ann Marie Murphy, Assistant Professor of Comparative Foreign Policy and Asian Politics, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University

Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, National Peace Corps Association

Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asia Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

Amina Rasul-Bernardo, Convenor, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy

Sheldon W. Simon, Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Mark Woodward, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Arizona State University

Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US-ASEAN Business Council

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Leslie Winter, Program Associate

Loren Keller, Writer/Editor

**Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century:
Issues and Options for US Policy**

Sponsored by The Asia Foundation and The Stanley Foundation
March 13-15, 2005
The Oriental Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand

Cochairs

Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

James R. Klein, Representative for Thailand and Laos, The Asia Foundation

Project Manager

Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Rapporteur

Elina Noor, Research Associate, The Brookings Institution

Participants

Zachary Abuza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Simmons College

Paisit Boonparlit, Acting Director, North American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation

Frederick Z. Brown, Associate Director, Southeast Asia Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Termsak Chalermpananupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Jakarta

Kavi Chongkittavorn, Assistant Group Editor, Nation Multimedia Group

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Barry Desker, Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Bahtiar Effendy, Deputy Director, Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics

Donald Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

Roland Eng, Former Ambassador of Cambodia to the United States

Heng Pek Koon, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University

Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

Allene Masters, Senior Advisor, The United States-Indonesia Society

Edward Masters, Cochairman, The United States-Indonesia Society

James McCormick, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, United States House Committee on International Relations

Carlos P. Medina, Executive Director, Ateneo Human Rights Center, School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University

Ann Marie Murphy, Assistant Professor, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University

Nguyen Van Tho, Acting Director-General, Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam

Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Bronson Percival, Senior Advisor, Southeast Asia, The Center for Naval Analyses

Sriprapha Petcharamesree, Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development, Mahidol University

Nongnuth Phetcharatana, Director-General, Department of American and South Pacific Affairs

Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Thailand

Teerawat Potamanonda, Member, Academic Board, National Defense College, Supreme Comm and Headquarter, Thailand

Douglas E. Ramage, Representative for Indonesia, The Asia Foundation

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asian Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State

Amina Rasul-Bernardo, Convenor, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy; Trustee, Magbassa Kita Foundation

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Panitan Wattanayakorn, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Frances A. Zwenig, Counselor, US-ASEAN Business Council

Staff

Poonsook Pantitanonta, Director of Management, The Asia Foundation

Loren Keller, Associate Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

Elaine Schilling, Program Assistant, The Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. It is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation that focuses primarily on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. For us, *principled multilateralism* means working respectfully across differences to create fair, just, and lasting solutions.

The Stanley Foundation's work recognizes the essential roles of the policy community, media professionals, and the involved public in building sustainable peace. Our work aims to connect people from different backgrounds, often producing clarifying insights and innovative solutions.

The foundation frequently works collaboratively with other organizations. It does not make grants.

Stanley Foundation reports, publications, programs, and a wealth of other information are available on the Web at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

The Stanley Foundation
209 Iowa Avenue
Muscatine, IA 52761 USA
563-264-1500
563-264-0864 fax
info@stanleyfoundation.org