Why is the war on terror going wrong in the Middle East? Several reasons exist, but one of the primary obstacles to better policies is the definition of threats used in U.S. media and policy circles.

American thinking about security is masking real-world divisions between vastly different terrorist groups and Islamic sects, raising the probability of military confrontation with Iran while lessening the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

To start with the latest headlines: Iran's nuclear-energy program indeed has strong potential for use in weapons production, which could cause further nuclear proliferation by Saudi Arabia and dramatically raise regional tensions. Iran also supports Hamas and Hezbollah, two anti-Israeli groups that could evolve toward normal political activity - like Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland - but whose current violent activities block any regional peace effort.

But this is where popular accounts of the Iranian nuclear and terrorist threat falter. The implied argument of most U.S. security pronouncements is that Iran desires to hand over nuclear weapons to global terrorist groups determined to kill as many Americans as possible. This confuses Iran's active aid to regional terrorist groups with the type of antiglobalization terrorism represented by 9/11 and al-Qaida.

If Hamas or Hezbollah were to use nuclear weapons, each would obliterate its own homeland. These groups are largely tied to "local" concerns in the Middle East neighborhood - neither are credible candidates for attacks against New York or Los Angeles.

Hezbollah represents Shiite citizens in Southern Lebanon, a large, ethno-religious demographic chronically shortchanged by the minority cliques that control most wealth and government programs in Beirut. Hezbollah also aids Shiite brethren in Iraq against both militant Sunni groups and U.S. forces, and it views violent opposition to Israel as a part of its founding identity and mission. Hamas opposes Israeli actions in the West Bank through terrorist attacks on Israelis and by providing social services and political representation for the Palestinians.

Despite their actions in Iraq, Lebanon and Israel, neither wants to strike American soil; neither is radically opposed to globalization; and neither would have any obvious use for a nuclear device.

In contrast, al-Qaida wants to strike American soil again, is vehemently opposed to the cultural implications of globalization and would love to have a working nuclear bomb to wreak maximum destruction on civilian targets. Al-Qaida is a utopian group that has hijacked Islam to create a revolutionary and nihilistic ideology with global implications. Al-Qaida has made clear that it cannot live with free trade, free information flows, and the growing influence of foreign cultures across borderlines.

Instead, it wants to depose all Middle East rulers to create a regionwide Islamic theocracy, effectively fencing the Middle East off from all "impure" influences. Attacks against civilians in Asia, Europe, and the United States are a method of reaching these goals.

Ironically, these radical Sunni terrorist cells hate Iran, the national home of Shiite Islam, a denomination viewed by Sunni fundamentalists as heretical. Saying that Iran would hand over nuclear weapons to al-Qaida is like claiming that Iran would willingly commit national suicide.

What are the ultimate costs of threat conflation? If Iran's nuclear and anti-Israeli policies are equated with the global terrorist threats of radical Sunni groups, then U.S. bargaining with Iran is impossible - because there is no way the United States can negotiate with groups like al-Qaida.

This creates a perceived world in which the only viable U.S. policy option is military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, which would further escalate violence throughout the Middle East. Iran would react by strengthening the most militant elements of anti-Israeli groups, doing all it could to undermine a sustainable peace. Arab citizens, already disillusioned by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, would further challenge the legitimacy of U.S.-friendly Arab regimes.

America's leaders once made meaningful distinctions between different threats in the Cold War - such as those posed by China in Asia and the global threats posed by the Soviet Union - resulting in markedly different policies toward the two Communist giants. Today's decision makers must start making similar distinctions. Both U.S. and global security depend on it.

MICHAEL KRAIG is director of Policy Analysis and Dialogue at the Muscatine, Iowa-based Stanley Foundation.