On 1 October 2007, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established as a sub-unified command of the European Command (EUCOM), initially with responsibility for American security relations with 42 of the 53 countries in Africa. One year later, AFRICOM became fully operational as an independent unified command in its own right, assuming responsibility for the remaining African countries previously covered by the Pacific Command (PACOM) and the Central Command (CENTCOM). While American officials have continually tried to portray the creation of AFRICOM as primarily an internal bureaucratic shift, a more efficient way of organizing the American military’s relations with Africa which would enhance America’s overall support for the development of African security capabilities, the undertaking has nonetheless met with a not insignificant amount of concern, if not outright apprehension, across the continent.

African reactions to the creation of the Pentagon’s sixth geographic combatant command varied greatly. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf offered to host its headquarters. South African Defense Minister Mosioua Lekota failed even to respond to a formal request to meet with General William E. Ward, then commander-designate of the new command. Majority opinion, both governmental and private sector, lies somewhere in between, although the inadequate American efforts to explain the rationale for the new command and its role within existing diplomatic, development, and defence relationships have created a great deal of confusion and possibly amplified scepticism, as James J.F. Forest and Rebecca Crispin document in their enlightening study. Furthermore, the controversy over the possible location in Africa of the headquarters for AFRICOM – now to remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future – likewise prematurely raised suspicions and generated a public backlash that was unhelpful to the launch of the new initiative, to say nothing of its impact on the achievement of its long-term objectives, including the feasibility of establishing command headquarters within the actual area of responsibility.

Fortunately, as Forest and Crispin note and this author has had the occasion to observe first-hand, the leadership of AFRICOM has worked assiduously to overcome these inauspicious beginnings, engaging a wide variety of stakeholders to explain their now better-defined mission of conducting ‘sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy’ – and doing so in a new type of organization, premised on a non-traditional security paradigm.
A Familiar Acquaintance

What is curious, however, is that amid all the controversy that the establishment of the new command engendered, one would be excused for mistaking from the arguments adduced by both its critics and its some defenders that American security engagement in Africa was an entirely new phenomenon, rather than one with a history dating back two centuries. In the late 18th century, the Barbary Pirates of the semi-autonomous Ottoman regencies of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, as well as the independent Moroccan empire constituted one of the early American republic’s first foreign policy challenges, with one distinguished historian noting that ‘few events in the post-independence period [having] a more transformative impact on America’ as this threat in North Africa which ‘prompted former colonies to coalesce and pool their resources, to create naval strength and project it far from America’s shores’.8

A few decades later, the establishment of what would become Liberia came under the watchful eye of the US Navy, with the first group of settlers sailing across the Atlantic Ocean in 1820 under the escort of the frigate USS Cyane and their landing the following year at Cape Mesurado, site of present-day Monrovia, secured by the armed schooner USS Alligator under the command of Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton, later commodore of the US Navy in the eastern Pacific during the Mexican–American War and military governor of California.9 Subsequently, between 1842 and 1861, the Africa Squadron, the US Navy’s first flotilla to be permanently assigned to patrol waters away from the American mainland, stood watch against the transatlantic slave trade along a stretch of the West African spanning roughly 3,000 miles from Rio Pongo in present-day Guinea in the north to São Paulo de Loanda, present-day Luanda, Angola, in the south.10

At the beginning of the 20th century, a team of seconded US Army officers, led by the then-Major Charles Young, later to become first African-American promoted to the rank of colonel in the regular army, helped establish a permanent professional military force for Liberia. The Liberian Frontier Force was designed to both assure internal security and ‘effectively occupy’ the country’s territory against European colonial powers which threatened to carve slices off the hitherto poorly defended frontiers of the African republic.11 In fact, apart from a brief period in the 1990s when some defence planners thought that the United States could hold itself aloof from engagement on the African continent because they could ‘see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa’ and thus convinced themselves that ‘America’s security interests in Africa are very limited’,12 US Defense Department agencies have been continuously conducting a number of security cooperation efforts across Africa, responsibility for the implementation of which is now being assumed by AFRICOM.

In late 2002, for example, the State Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from US Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe. Funding for PSI was modest, amounting to under $7 million in fiscal year 2004, most of which was spent on
training military units from the four partner countries. US Marines were also involved with certain aspects of the training and Air Force personnel provided support, including medical and dental care for members of local units as well as neighbouring residents. The programme’s modest funding was stretched to provide non-lethal equipment including Toyota Land Cruisers, uniforms, and global positioning system devices for participating military forces. As a follow-up to the PSI as well as to overcome what Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan called its ‘Band-Aid approach’, the State Department-funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was launched in 2005 with support from the Department of Defense’s Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara. TSCTI added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the original four PSI countries. Funding for TSCTI (slightly renamed as Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program, TSCTP, in 2007) has increased steadily from $16 million in 2005 to $30 million in 2006, with incremental increases up to $100 million a year through 2011. The participation of Algeria and Morocco is significant since Algiers has voiced official opposition to the creation of AFRICOM and even Morocco, long one of America’s closest allies, has expressed misgivings about being asked to host any part of the command.

Recent years have also seen, alongside the predominantly Army-led initiatives on shore, demonstrations of the US Navy’s commitment to African security off the continent’s littoral. To date the most significant naval contribution to has been the Africa Partnership Station (APS), a part of Navy’s ‘Global Fleet Station’ initiative which is designed to provide a platform with the capacity and persistent presence to support training and other partnership efforts in parts of the world where access and sustainment have historically been challenging. Building on progressively more intense engagements dating back to July 2004, when the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise led a battle group of some 30 vessels from nine countries, including Morocco, in exercises off the western coast of Africa as part of worldwide ‘Summer Pulse ‘04’ deployment, APS is designed to promote maritime safety and security in Africa through a collaborative effort focusing, at least initially on the Gulf of Guinea.

The maiden voyage of APS, which concluded in early 2008 and involved the six-month deployment of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry, accompanied by HSV-2 Swift, included 18 ports of call in ten countries, during which American personnel provided shipboard training to more than 1,700 officers and sailors from partner nations in everything from small-boat handling, port security, and maintenance to non-commissioned officer leadership and international maritime law. During part of the Fort McHenry-led inaugural deployment of APS, the naval presence off Africa was also augmented by the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Annapolis, which became the first US submarine ever to make a visit to sub-Saharan Africa, and the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto. Altogether, the first APS cruise included visits to Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Togo. Subsequently APS continued with the two-month deployment in mid-2008 of the Hamilton-class
cutter USCGC *Dallas*, which visited Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Senegal.

It is worth noting that in addition to these major initiatives, a vast array of lower-key engagements regularly take place between elements of the American armed forces – now operating under the aegis of the Africa Command – and African countries. Even with South Africa, whose former defence minister was perhaps the new command’s most vociferous public critic, these security relations continue to be cultivated, the controversies surrounding AFRICOM notwithstanding. In October 2008, for example, the aircraft carrier USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, accompanied by ships from its strike group, visited South Africa at that country’s invitation as part of an ongoing bilateral effort to reinforce relationships, increase interoperability, and address maritime issues. Furthermore, each year more than 1,000 African military officers and other personnel receive professional development at US military schools and other training assistance through the State Department-administered International Military Education and Training programme. On an even broader scale, the Global Peace Operations Initiative is training and equipping 75,000 military troops, the majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations on the continent. Both programmes are State Department-funded, but engage with the Africa Command which administers and supports the security cooperation programme.

**AFRICOM’s Largest Component**

The Africa Command’s largest military operation in Africa is currently the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), established in 2002 as a subordinate command of CENTCOM. Headquartered since 2003 at Camp Lemonier, a onetime French Foreign Legion post in Djibouti, the only permanent American base in Africa is composed of approximately 2,000 sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines, as well as civilian government employees and contractors. Originally conceived as an anti-terrorism unit actively engaged in kinetic operations, CJTF-HOA’s mission has evolved into conducting ‘unified action in the Horn of Africa combined joint operation area of the Horn of Africa to prevent conflict, promote regional stability, and protect U.S. and Coalition interests, [and] to prevail against extremism’.

Thus while American special operations forces are present and actively engaged in action against terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa has a separate mandate focused on indirect activities aimed at denying extremist ideologies as well as individuals and groups the ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of the nations and societies in the subregion. The task force’s operational concept includes a number of measures to foster interagency integration, including close coordination with American diplomatic missions throughout the region by posting of liaison teams at each of the embassies as well as a senior military advisor to the US Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the presence in CJTF-HOA’s command element of a senior State Department officer as the Commander’s foreign policy advisor and a veteran USAID officer as senior development advisor. In addition to American personnel, CJTF-HOA also embeds military
personnel from a number of Coalition partner countries in its staff, involving them in all operational phases, including strategic and operational planning and execution.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to training with partner militaries in the region, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa has worked closely with African regional and subregional institutions on their initiatives, including the stand-up of the Eastern Brigade of the African Union’s African Standby Force and the development of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. CJTF-HOA has also implemented more than 50 humanitarian projects as of mid-2008, besides carrying out multiple medical civic action programmes, dental civic action programmes, and veterinary civic action programmes aimed at winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population in its area of responsibility.

If Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa presents a microcosm of what one ought to expect to see, on a larger scale, in AFRICOM’s future efforts to ‘promote a stable and secure African environment’, it also underscores some of the potential pitfalls. While arguably the greatest security challenge in the task force’s theatre of operation is the chaotic conditions prevailing in the territory of what was, until 1991, the Somali Democratic Republic. However, not only does Somalia lack an effective government with which CJTF-HOA might partner – the internationally recognized ‘Transitional Federal Government’, the fourteenth such attempt at a national framework for governance since 1991, is on the verge of total collapse at the time of this writing – but the Africa Command lacks the naval resources with which to combat the piracy that is one of the consequences of the disorder on land. Consequently, the multinational task force being assembled to carry out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters will be spearheaded by US Naval Forces Central Command – thus returning out of necessity to sort of fragmentation of responsibility for operations in Africa that the creation of AFRICOM was supposed to eliminate.\textsuperscript{20}

**Conclusion**

The birth of the new command has not been easy. To some Africans with memories of liberation struggles still fresh in their minds, the idea smacked of a neocolonial effort to dominate the continent anew – a notion not entirely unreasonable given the history of efforts by some erstwhile European imperial powers to continually meddle in the internal affairs of their former colonies as witnessed by France’s nearly three dozen interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{21} Others question the long-term sustainability of the effort, recalling the cyclic nature of past American engagements. Still others, noting the increased attention paid by American analysts to the role in Africa being played by China,\textsuperscript{22} India,\textsuperscript{23} and other countries, worry about the possible polarization of the continent in some sort of new scramble between the great powers of the 21st century. All these are, of course, legitimate concerns which American political leaders – including President Barack Obama, whose election was met with genuine enthusiasm across the continent – as well as the commanders of the Africa Command need to forthrightly address. However, given the long history of the American security engagements on the continent and the continuing receptivity of many African
states to those initiatives, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that AFRICOM will eventually find the welcome and acceptance that has thus far eluded it.

NOTES


2. Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, as well as the waters of the Indian Ocean, excluding those north of 5° S and west of 68° E (which are in the responsibility of the Central Command) and those west of 42° E (which were covered by EUCOM).

3. CENTCOM’s African area of responsibility had included Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the waters of the Red Sea and the western portions of the Indian Ocean not covered by PACOM. After the establishment of AFRICOM as an independent command, Egypt remained with CENTCOM due to the country’s importance to the Middle East, although it would also be involved in AFRICOM-related activities insofar as they relate to Egyptian interests in Africa.


17. CJTF-HOA’s African ‘area of interest’ aligns with the African Union’s subregional organization to include the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.


19. At the time of this author’s visit to Camp Lemonier in early 2008, Coalition officers including personnel from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, Pakistan, Romania, Seychelles, Mauritius, South Korea, Uganda, Yemen, and the United Kingdom.