Conference on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and Next Generation Nuclear Security

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Overview

In March 2012, the second Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) will bring together over 50 heads of state in South Korea, in an attempt to enhance global nuclear security and prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism. The next summit will seek to build upon the success of the 2010 NSS in Washington, D.C., where world leaders agreed that “nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to global security” and that “strong nuclear security measures” are the most effective means of preventing the threat from being realized. Many countries made specific, public commitments to strengthen their nation’s nuclear security. However, to reach the goal of “securing all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years,” participating countries must be able to demonstrate substantial progress at the 2012 NSS.

Opening Remarks (video)

Chang Sang-Ku, President of the KINAC, welcomed participants and emphasized that, despite the Fukushima crisis and the possibility that terrorists could target civilian nuclear facilities, the nuclear energy renaissance is likely to continue as few alternatives exist to meet the growing global demand for energy. As a result, it is necessary for countries to work together to enhance nuclear security and prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Alexandra Toma, Co-Chair of the FMWG and Executive Director of the Connect U.S. Fund, challenged experts and the media to enhance the general public’s knowledge of the nuclear terrorist threat and to elevate the importance of nuclear security to the highest levels. In order to fully take advantage of the opportunities that
the 2012 NSS presents, Tom argued that participating countries need to ensure that they follow through on their 2010 NSS commitments, identify persisting gaps in the regime, and make additional, bolder pledges.

Keynote Address

Ambassador Kim Bong-Hyun, Deputy Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs for the Republic of Korea and “Sherpa” for the 2012 NSS, delivered the conference’s keynote address. Ambassador Kim indicated that nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats to international security, particularly considering the devastating consequences that a nuclear attack would have on the global economic system. The NSS process is significant because it provides the “highest level political impetus” for enhancing nuclear security, as was demonstrated by the 2010 NSS.

The 2012 NSS will address two additional issues that were not discussed in 2010: securing radioactive materials that could be used in dispersion devices or “dirty bombs” and the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety to prevent terrorist attacks on civilian facilities. The Seoul summit will produce both a communiqué, as in 2010, and also voluntary national progress reports on efforts to enhance nuclear security and meet commitments.

Ambassador Kim indicated that the 2012 NSS represents a midway point in the four year effort to secure all vulnerable fissile materials. Therefore, he argued, there needs to be at least one more summit in 2014 to assess progress made and determine what additional steps need to be taken.

Lastly, Ambassador Kim indicated that the 2012 summit would send a strong and firm message on the importance of maintaining peace and pursuing denuclearization with North Korea. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak invited Kim Jong-Il to attend the 2012 NSS on the condition that North Korea agrees to abandon its nuclear program.
the global environment since 2010, including the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, which highlighted the fact that low-probability, high-consequence events can and do happen. Hinderstein also explored the impact of the death of Osama bin-Laden, the Arab Spring, and the global financial crisis on nuclear security. Lastly, Hinderstein emphasized that the NSS process needs to continue to demonstrate substantial progress in order to justify the time that world leaders and other high-level officials devote to the issue.

Noramly bin Muslim, University of Kabangsaan professor and former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Licensing Board in Malaysia, described Asia’s importance to the nuclear security regime and what steps Malaysia has taken since the 2010 NSS. Malaysia, a growing trans-shipment hub that the A.Q. Khan network exploited to obtain sensitive nuclear technology, fulfilled its 2010 NSS commitment to pass national export control laws. An ongoing challenge, bin Muslim noted, is to educate policymakers on the importance of adhering to international legal frameworks in the nuclear security and non-proliferation sphere.

Hahn Choong-hee, Sous Sherpa and Spokesman of the Preparatory Secretariat of the 2012 NSS for the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, emphasized that the 2010 NSS helped create consensus on the nuclear terrorism threat, spurred countries to make concrete national pledges, and was a rare success story for the nonproliferation agenda. Hahn indicated that the Seoul communiqué will seek to move from a “political declaration to a practical vision,” highlighting and prioritizing key nuclear security objectives. Korea, as the host country, will seek an additional round of national commitments or “house gifts” and to address two additional issues: radiological security and the interface between nuclear security and safety. Lastly, Hahn shared the slogan of the 2012 NSS—“Beyond Security, Towards Peace.”

The final panelist, Chin Siew Fei, Counsellor and Singapore’s Alternate Governor to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board, and Sous Sherpa for the 2012 NSS, addressed the views of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) toward nuclear security and the NSS process. Chin indicated that 17 of the 47 NSS participating countries belong to the NAM. While no common platform for the NAM participating countries exists, they do share many commonalities. First, many are of the belief that true nuclear security will not exist until nuclear disarmament is achieved, and that nuclear security must address both civilian and military stockpiles. Some countries also believe that efforts to enhance nuclear security will be used to block their national aspirations to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Additionally, she said, some are suspicious because they see the primary push for enhancing nuclear security coming only after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Chin noted that Asia is likely to see a rapid expansion in the development of nuclear power which will necessitate substantial efforts to bolster the region’s regulatory frameworks and pool of expertise. Lastly, she detailed Singapore’s efforts to bolster nuclear security.

Session Two

Key Issues for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit: Regional and International Perspectives (video)

Hwang Il Soon, Professor at the School of Energy Systems Engineering at Seoul National University, moderated the conference’s second panel, which focused on unique challenges in global nuclear security that the 2012 NSS will seek to address.

Togzhan Kassenova, Associate with the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and FMWG Steering Committee Member, began by discussing the benefits and detriments of addressing radiological security at the 2012 NSS. The 2010 summit focused narrowly on the security of fissile materials—highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—because they are viewed as the more dangerous materials. However, many radiological sources could be used in a dispersion device to create a “dirty bomb.” These materials are used for many civilian purposes, are more widely dispersed than fissile materials, and many countries do not have a system to track and account for them. As a result, radiological security is a challenge that needs to be addressed, although it is not clear that the 2012 NSS is the proper forum in which to do so.

Igor Khripunov, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, addressed the international legal framework for nuclear security, which he indicated is “characterized by inconsistency.” Many of the available legal instruments suffer from insufficient monitoring, inadequate domestic implementation, poor vertical and horizontal coordination, and grey zones which leave important issues undefined. In order to achieve the goal of a comprehensive nuclear security regime with a clear mandate and enforceable standards, it is necessary to arrive at a shared threat perception based on the knowledge that low-probability, high-consequence threats can and do occur. Additionally, states need to incentivize nuclear security improvements by identifying synergies between nuclear security and national development, and rationalize the regime by strengthening the measures already in place.

Finally, Duyeon Kim, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, discussed the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety, as well as how North Korea should be addressed in the summit context. Kim indicated that the Fukushima crisis was a wake-up call that major nuclear catastrophes are still possible, and that they could be caused by natural disaster, operator error, or the intentional action of a malefactor. Due to the overlap between nuclear security and nuclear safety, the 2012 summit should seek to raise awareness of and improve the interface; establish international standards; and strengthen the IAEA’s role in nuclear security and safety. Additionally, Kim indicated that while North Korea’s nuclear program will not be a major focus of the agenda at the 2012 NSS, it would be a failure if it was not addressed in some capacity by the world leaders that will be gathering for the summit. She proposed including language in the Seoul communique that calls on all states to abide by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, roll back nuclear weapons programs, and cooperate in securing vulnerable nuclear materials.

Session 3
Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance (video)

The third panel was moderated by Lee Dong-Hwi, Professor at IFANS. The panel addressed institutional improvements necessary to improve nuclear security governance and how the 2012 NSS process can enhance them. Lee indi-
cated that there are three levels to good governance, including domestic legal frameworks and institutions, intergovernmental cooperation, and strong ties between governments and international institutions.

Kenneth Luongo, Co-Chair of the FMWG and President of the Partnership for Global Security, briefed participants on how the 2012 NSS can be used to create a next generation nuclear security regime. Luongo indicated that the 2010 NSS was a success in that it raised the profile of an issue mired below the political level, but it failed to push the boundaries of what we need to do to secure fissile material. The 2012 NSS should be a major pivot point and not just an incremental improvement from the 2010 summit. In order to transform the regime, the 2012 NSS needs to work to develop standards for nuclear and radiological security, address the interface between nuclear security and safety, create a twenty-first century architecture involving important stakeholders such as experts and the nuclear industry, and adequately finance improvements to the regime that are needed for future progress. Whether or not the NSS process continues after Seoul, Luongo argued that high-level political engagement is needed to move the regime forward.

Shin Chang-Hoon, Research Fellow and Director of International Law and Conflict Resolution Program at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, discussed how to innovate the legal aspects of the nuclear security regime. He argued that the international community has already woven a complex web of legally binding and non-binding instruments to combat nuclear terrorism, but while some might argue that this web is sufficient to suffocate potential nuclear terrorists, others would argue that the web is an obstacle to effective law enforcement. In order to ensure effective law enforcement implementation, this web needs to be rearranged and streamlined. These changes, in addition to the establishment of a peer review system, would help make nuclear security governance viable for the future.

Murakami Kenji, Visiting Professor of Nuclear Safety Engineering and Part-time Lecturer at Tokyo City University, addressed the aftermath of the Fukushima crisis and its impact on the interface between nuclear security, safety, and safeguards. While Fukushima was a nuclear safety event, it had critical implications for nuclear security as well. It proved that accidents can surpass expectations. While earthquakes, tsunamis, and lost power were all planned for, the combination of all of these factors was not considered. The panic and confusion that followed demonstrated the need for strong accident response and management. In order to enhance nuclear security, safety, and safeguards, the IAEA has a clear role to play, but the Secretariat is not a collection of super heroes; without the proper mandate or resources, the IAEA cannot act. Lastly, Murakami emphasized that each state needs to follow through on its commitments to nuclear security, safety, and safeguards, which the Fukushima incident emphasized.

The panel’s final speaker, John Carlson, Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and Counsellor to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, indicated that while international interest in nuclear issues was one of the first items on the agenda of the newly-created United Nations in 1946, they remain under the purview of national sovereignty. While under nuclear
safety there is a peer review process, nuclear security is limited to recommendations that states can choose to adopt or ignore. Some states have questioned whether the IAEA should play a role in nuclear security at all and its nuclear security operations are funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions. Fukushima has demonstrated that a nuclear terrorist attack will have global repercussions, and that neither individual states nor the international community as a whole are well served by relying exclusively on national oversight of nuclear activities. While mandatory inspection of nuclear security remains a long way off, peer review could be a powerful mechanism to ensure proper security performance that is also less threatening. Hopefully, the 2012 NSS can enhance international supervision of the nuclear security regime.

Irma Arguello, Founder and Chair of the NPS-Global Foundation in Argentina, presented a vision for achieving a new nuclear security architecture. As the nuclear security regime is an “intricate constellation of complex instruments,” there is a strong need to simplify and harmonize existing commitments and identify gaps. The current regime is a heavy burden on states, while having limited impact on the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Consensus on multilateral control versus state sovereignty is lacking, which leaves little clear indication on how to move forward. In order to advance the regime, Arguello argued, the NSS process should define universal standards, integrate overlapping initiatives, reassess the roles of multilateral organizations, and promote the reduction of fissile stockpiles and conversion of HEU reactors. The 2012 NSS should set the foundation for a new nuclear security architecture that improves efficiency and incentivizes effective implementation.

R. Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, discussed how to improve fissile material governance and India’s regional perspective on nuclear security. He emphasized that while South Asia poses unique nuclear security challenges, India and Pakistan account for roughly

Session 4
Nuclear Security Beyond 2012 (video)

Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill, former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, moderated the conference’s final panel, which addressed the future of the nuclear security regime. Ambassador Brill indicated that nuclear terrorism is a “boundable” problem which can be addressed in a reasonable timeframe with the proper political will and resources.
one percent of the world’s stocks of fissile materials. Despite the fact that neither has signed the NPT, they cannot be ignored in refining the international governance of nuclear material. Rajaraman also indicated that there is a distinction between transparency and the actual level of fissile material security. Many countries, while opaque, maintain a high nuclear security standard which should not be overlooked. True nuclear security will not be achieved until nuclear weapons are delegitimized by the public, which will pave the way for disarmament efforts and allow for the elimination of fissile materials that could fall into the wrong hands.

Yim Man-Sung, Professor and Head of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, indicated that as nuclear technology becomes more widespread, the international community must join together to ensure that the threat of nuclear terrorism is reduced and eliminated. Critical actors cannot be excluded from the process as the threat is a global one. Additionally, the public needs to be heavily involved, which will necessitate strong outreach and educational efforts by NGOs throughout the world. While fissile materials should be the primary concern of the 2012 NSS, there are other issues that need to be addressed as well, such as radiological security and the nuclear security-safety interface. Additionally, there need to be strong efforts to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis on nuclear security financing. As a nuclear terrorist attack would have tremendous consequences in our tightly globalized world, all nations should join together to ensure steady funding for nuclear security programs.

Ambassador Brill concluded the panel by indicating that disparate views of the nuclear terrorist threat exist throughout the world. Thus, civil society can play a critical role by educating the public and moving toward a common understanding of the threat. The current regime is more of a “shantytown” or “favela” than a true nuclear security architecture, with current gaps so large that you could drive a nuclear transport truck through them. IAEA officials can only do what they’re allowed and funded to do. The NSS process should be a catalyst to push for a framework agreement that makes nuclear security guidance binding and enforceable. It appears as if the major outcomes of the 2012 NSS have already been determined. Civil society and the nuclear industry need to push the envelope in the decade ahead to generate new ideas that more fully address holes in the regime.

Closing Remarks

Kenneth Luongo closed the conference by summarizing its utility to the NSS process. It was not only a detailed briefing of what will be pursued at the 2012 NSS, but also provided participants with forward, innovative policy analysis and recommendations from some of the world’s top thinkers on nuclear security and safety. Consensus formed around keeping high-level political attention on nuclear security, pushing the regime beyond what currently exists, and protecting individuals from danger during the nuclear renaissance.
Dr. Jun Bong-geun, Professor and Director of the Center for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security at IFANS, thanked participants for attending and indicated that the conference had helped to set a vision for the future of nuclear security. Jun expected that the 2012 NSS would make substantial progress, and indicated that, while difficult, the four year goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials is still achievable.

About the Organizers

The FMWG brings together more than sixty-five nonproliferation and nuclear security organizations working toward sustainable, effective global nuclear security. The Korean co-hosts of the conference, KINAC and IFANS, are also the organizers of an expert symposium to take place just prior to the 2012 NSS on March 23, 2012 in Seoul. KINAC, a government-affiliated organization, performs both research and regulatory functions on nuclear security, safeguards and nuclear export control. IFANS, also a government-affiliated think tank, is a leading research and training organization on foreign policy and national security fields in Korea. For more information on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, please visit www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org.

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