Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo

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RAPPORTEUR’S NOTE

This report is a joint publication of the Stanley Foundation and the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The National Defense University’s Institute of Strategic Studies hosted the Phase I meetings in Washington, DC. Analysts from the National Defense University participated in the discussions, but do not endorse all of the report’s conclusions.

In writing this report, I have tried to faithfully convey the content, tone and essence of the discussions among the US, Japanese and Chinese participants. The report is not organized in strict chronological order. Some parts of the discussions have been rearranged to make it easier for the reader to follow the discussion and debate. In keeping with the Stanley Foundation rules, remarks made during the meetings were not attributed to individual participants. All the conferees participated in their personal capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations. The Executive Summary distills the main points of the conference discussions, but does not represent a consensus among the participants.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY: VIEWS FROM WASHINGTON, BEIJING AND TOKYO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Missile Defenses and Asian Security

- The United States is paying high political costs for pursuing missile defense systems whose potential military benefits lie far in the future. Uncertainty about the final performance of missile defense systems still in varying stages of development aggravates this problem, because other countries adopt worst case assumptions that the systems will be highly effective and respond accordingly.

- Chinese concerns about missile defense focus mainly on political questions such as the impact on Japanese militarization; whether theater missile defense (TMD) would encourage Taiwan independence; and US intentions toward China. US decisions about missile defense deployments should take this broader political context into account and should not be based solely on narrow military criteria. The negative impact of missile defense deployments on Sino-US relations could potentially be reduced by offsetting them with political and economic measures to reassure China.

- The Japanese government is interested in missile defense as a means of defending Japan against missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and strengthening the US-Japan security alliance. However, Japanese policymakers have a number of concerns about cost, effectiveness and the impact on Sino-Japanese relations and global arms control efforts. Although Japan is conducting joint-TMD research with the United States, it has not committed to deployment. Its position is like a poker player who keeps anteing up and waiting to see the next card before deciding whether to stay in the game or fold.

National Missile Defense

- The United States and China hold drastically different views on the aims, role and potential of a national missile defense (NMD) system. US policymakers see NMD as an insurance policy to support US national defense if deterrence fails, which is viewed as a real possibility. In contrast, China opposes NMD on two levels: military and political. Militarily, Beijing believes that NMD is structured, sized and focused to negate China's nuclear forces. Politically, Beijing believes that NMD deployment amounts to a concrete manifestation of US determination to consolidate its position as a global hegemon and a clear manifestation of hostility toward China.

- China will react to current US NMD deployment plans by accelerating its strategic modernization, developing countermeasures to defeat the system and increasing the overall size of its nuclear force. Most US participants believe it would be dangerous to try to negate this larger Chinese nuclear force with an expanded NMD architecture because such efforts would likely fail and would cause serious damage to bilateral relations in the process. The United States should expect a proportional Chinese nuclear buildup in response to NMD deployment.

- Confidence-building measures and strategic dialogue could help diffuse tensions over NMD deployment. The United States could seek to reassure China that NMD is not intended to undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrent, while China could be more transparent about the ultimate size of its strategic forces. Several Chinese participants supported starting a serious official dialogue on NMD and strategic stability to clarify the nature of the US-China strategic relationship and to avoid negative misperceptions.
China’s anti-NMD diplomacy plays on Russian and European fears that unilateral deployment of NMD would disrupt strategic stability. US and Japanese participants agreed that an NMD agreement with Russia could help reduce the effectiveness of China’s anti-NMD diplomatic campaign. One possibility would be significant bilateral US-Russian reductions in offensive arms mixed with deployments of limited defensive systems.

Japanese views on NMD are mixed. Some believe NMD will strengthen the US defense commitment and enhance the credibility of extended deterrence. Others believe that deployment outside a modified Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty would undermine strategic stability by provoking China and Russia. Additionally, some Japanese are concerned that NMD deployment will mark the end of nuclear arms reduction efforts.

**Theater Missile Defense**

- The likely regional consequences of TMD vary with the political footprint and capabilities of each system. One set of Chinese concerns is linked to where the systems would be based, with Chinese objections strongest on Taiwan and somewhat less on Japan. A second set of concerns varies with the potential effectiveness of each system, with less concern about PAC-3 and other lower-tier systems and more concern about upper-tier systems.

- Beijing opposes all forms of TMD deployment in Taiwan because it believes missile defense promotes stronger military ties between Taipei and Washington and claims such deployments encourage pro-independence sentiments within Taiwan. Similarly, Beijing is skeptical about Tokyo’s effort to achieve a TMD capability because it sees this as a means for Japan to expand its regional role and influence.

- Despite joint research with the United States, Japan is not yet committed to development or deployment of the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system. While the Japan Defense Agency and Foreign Ministry actively support missile defense, others in the government and the Diet have concerns about cost and effectiveness. Positive developments on the Korean Peninsula or in cross-Strait relations could decrease political support for NTW.

- TMD advocates in the United States and Japan want to use missile defense cooperation as a means to strengthen US-Japan security ties, but they do not want TMD cooperation to become a litmus test for the overall health of the alliance.
弹道导弹防御与东北亚安全

来自华盛顿、北京和东京的看法

提要

导弹防御与亚洲安全

- 美国正在为导弹防御系统付出高昂的政治代价，而这种系统军事上的潜在收益要在很远的将来才能体现出来。这些导弹防御系统仍处于不同的研制阶段，其实效效能又不得而知，这就加剧了上述问题的严重性。因为其他国家将做该系统会极为有效这种最坏的打算，并据此采取相应的反措施。

- 中国对导弹防御的关切主要集中在政治方面，例如：对日本军事化的影响；战区导弹防御（TMD）是否会鼓励台独；美国对中国的意图。美国关于导弹防御部署的决定不应只基于狭隘的军事标准，而应把更广泛的政治因素考虑在内。部署导弹防御系统对中美关系的消极影响，有可能通过辅以打消中国疑虑的政治/经济措施而减小。

- 日本政府对导弹防御感兴趣，将其视为抵御导弹和大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）威胁和加强美日安全联盟的手段。然而，日本的决策者在TMD成本、效能及其对中日关系和全球军控努力的影响等方面有一系列忧虑。尽管日本正在和美国联合研制TMD，但并未承诺部署。日本的立场很象一个不停下注、伺机而动的扑克牌手，它在等待看到下一张牌，才会决定继续下去还是退出牌局。

国家导弹防御

- 美中两国对国家导弹防御（NMD）系统的目标、作用和潜力的看法截然不同。美国的决策者把NMD视为一种“保险政策”，一旦威慑不能发挥作用（他们认为确实存在这种可能性），NMD则可起到支持美国国防的作用。然而，中国在两个层面上反对NMD，即军事和政治层面。从军事上讲，北京认为NMD从结构、规模到防御重点都是专门用来抵销中国的核力量的。从政治上讲，北京认为部署NMD具体体现出美国巩固其全球霸主地位的决心，也鲜明地显示了美国对中国的敌视。

- 针对目前的美国NMD部署计划，中国将会加速其战略力量的现代化，发展能够击败这一系统的反措施，并增加其核力量的整体规模。多数美国与会者认为，试图通过扩展NMD系统来对付中国这种扩充了的核力量将很危险，因为这样的努力很可能不会奏效，而且，美中关系也必将在这一过程中受到严重破坏。美国应该预料到，中国会针对NMD的部署相应地扩充其核力量。
• 建立信任措施和开展战略性对话有助于缓和围绕NMD部署的紧张气氛。美国可以努力消除中国的疑虑，使其相信NMD并非旨在削弱中国的核威慑力量；另一方面，中国亦可在其战略力量的最终规模上有更高的透明度。几位中国与会者支持中美就NMD和战略稳定问题展开认真的正式对话，以澄清美中战略关系的性质，避免消极的误解。

• 中国反对NMD的外交，利用了俄罗斯和欧洲对（美国）单方面部署NMD而破坏战略稳定的担忧。日方与会者认为，美国与俄罗斯就NMD达成协议，将有助于削弱中国反对NMD外交努力的效果。美国妥协的一种可能形式为，双方大幅度削减进攻性武器，同时部署有限的防御系统。

• 日本与会者对NMD的看法各不相同。一些人认为NMD会加强美国的防务承诺和延伸威慑的可信性。另一些人则认为，如果不修改《反导条约》就部署NMD，就会使中、俄与美反目，从而破坏战略稳定。此外，一些日本人士担心部署NMD会标志着核裁军努力的终结。

**战区导弹防御**

• 每一种TMD系统都具有不同的政治影响和军事性能，因此，这些系统对地区的影响也各异。中国的一些关切和这些系统的部署地点密切相关。中国最反对在台湾部署，其次反对在日本部署。中国的另外一些关切是基于各种系统潜在的有效性。比如，中国对“爱国者 - 3”型和其他低层系统的关切，就不如对高层系统的关切那么大。

• 北京反对任何形式在台湾部署TMD。因为中国相信，导弹防御将加强台北和华盛顿（有可能还有日本）之间的军事关系，并表示这种部署将助长台独的情绪。同样，北京对东京谋求TMD能力的努力也心存疑虑，因为它会提高对日本扩大其地区作用和影响的一种途径。

• 尽管美日在联合研制TMD，但日本并未承诺发展或部署海军全战区系统（NTW）。虽然日本防卫厅和外务省都积极支持导弹防御，其他政府部门和议会则担心这种系统的成本和有效性。朝鲜半岛形势的积极进展或台海两岸的关系改善，都会减少政治上对NTW的支持。

• 美国和日本倡导TMD的人士都希望把导弹防御作为加强美日安全纽带的手段，但不愿让TMD合作成为评判美日联盟整体健康与否的试金石。
弾道ミサイル防衛と北東アジアの安全保障—米国、中国、日本の見解

概要

ミサイル防衛とアジアの安全保障

・米国は潜在的な防衛上の利益が遠い将来にしかないミサイル防衛システムを追求するために、高い政治的代償を払っている。この問題に拾いをかけているのは、ミサイル防衛システムの開発が今だ異なる段階にありその最終効果が不確実であることだ。なぜなら、他国がミサイル防衛システムは非常に効果的であるとする戦事態を想定しつつにお詐言をとるからである。

・中国のミサイル防衛対象に対する懸念は、日本の軍事力強化への影響や米国の対中政策、戦域ミサイル防衛（TMD）により台湾独立が助長されるかなど主に政治的な問題から生じている。ミサイル防衛配備に関するのは、このような幅広い政治的枠組みを考慮して決定されるべきであり、狭い軍事的な枠組みのみに基づく決定でななおらない。ミサイル防衛配備が米中関係に及ぼすマイナスの影響は、中国の懸念を払拭するような政治・経済施策を一体化することで潜在的に緩和される。

・日本はミサイルや大量破壊兵器（WMD）の脅威からの国家防衛手段および日本安全保障同盟の強化手段として、ミサイル防衛に関心を抱いている。しかしこの政策立案段には、費用、効果、日中関係や国際的な軍縮の努力へ及ぼす影響など数多くの懸念がある。日本は日米TMD共同研究を行なっているが、配備を決定してはいない。日本の立場は、ポーカー・ゲームで降りるかどうかを決定する前に、次のカードを持ちうけて掛け金を吊り上げるポーカー・プレイヤーのようなものである。

国家ミサイル防衛

・国家ミサイル防衛（NMD）システムの目的、役割、その潜在性に関する米中間の見解は大幅に異なる。米政策立案段は、極めて明確であると考えられている、抑止が失敗した時の国家防衛をサポートする保険としてNMDを考えている。それに反して中国は軍事と政治の2段階でNMDに対抗している。軍事レベルでは、NMDが中国の核戦力を否定することを目的として構成され規模が決定されていると考え、政治レベルでは、NMD配備は米国の世界的な制裁主義を強固にする具体的な示威行動、さらには中国へのあからさまな敵対心の表れだと見なしている。

・中国は米国の国家ミサイル防衛の現状に対し、戦略兵器の近代化、NMDシステムを打破する対抗手段の開発、核戦力の全体的な強化により応じる計画である。概して、米側参加者はこの中国の核戦力増強を、NMD拡大構想で抑制することは危険であると考える。その範囲内対策は失敗する傾向にあり、そのプロセスにおいて二国間関係に深刻な影響を与えるからだ。米国はNMD配備に相応した中国の核増強を予期すべきである。

・NMD配備をめぐる緊張は、信頼醸成措置と戦略的対話をとおして、緩和が期待される。米国は中国に対し、NMDが中国の核抑止を損なう意図を持たないことを再保証するよう努力すべきだ。一方、中国は戦略的軍事力の最終規制に関してより透明性を高めなければならない。中国側参加者からは、NMDに関する真剣な公式対話を開始し、戦略的米中関係の性質を明確にして誤解を避けるよう意見が出された。
戦域ミサイル防衛

TMDの地域的な影響は政治的なり経済的な経済や各システムの能力により異なる。中国の懸念の一つはどこにTMDが配備されるかという事であり、台湾への配備については極力反対であるが、日本配備に対する中国の反対は幾分弱い。二つめの中国の懸念の度合いは各システムの潜在的効果により異なる。PAC-3や他の下層システムに対しては弱く、上層システムに関しては比較的強い。

中国は、ミサイル防衛が台湾と米国（また潜在的に日本）の軍事的なつながりを助長すると考え、TMD配備は台湾における独立の気運を高めると主張し、台湾へのいかななる形の配備にも反対である。同様に、日本のTMD努力を日本の地域的な役割と影響を拡大する措置であるとみなしている。

共同研究にもかかわらず、現在、日本は海上戦域（NTW）システムの開発と配備には参加していない。防衛庁および外務省が積極的にミサイル防衛を支持する一方で、政府や国会議員のなかには費用対効果を懸念する意見もある。朝鮮半島または中台関係における進展によりNTWへの政治的支援が弱まる可能性がある。

日米のTMD提唱者は日米安全保障関係を強化する手段としてミサイル防衛協力を望むのであり、TMD協力が両国の同盟関係全般の強固さを試すリトマス試験紙になることを望んでいるわけではない。
INTRODUCTION

The US debate about ballistic missile defense (BMD) has largely focused on national missile defense (NMD) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Current US diplomatic efforts have emphasized initiatives to overcome Russian concerns and objections to NMD. The almost exclusive focus on the ABM Treaty has steered the debate toward Russia, since China and Japan are not parties to the treaty. The regional security implications of NMD and theater missile defense (TMD) deserve more extensive examination by US national security officials and Congressional experts.

Discussions about alternative NMD deployment modes by experts have shown a similar bias. Many defense policy commentators are now embracing “boost-phase” NMD systems as a better political and technical alternative to the system proposed by the Clinton administration. A number of independent analysts assert that boost-phase systems would be more technically feasible than the Clinton administration’s proposed system and would also respect the spirit of the ABM Treaty. These analysts emphasize that a boost-phase NMD system would not undermine the strategic, long range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China. However, these various NMD and TMD deployment modes are being discussed principally in relation to Russia’s policy viewpoints, while China’s and Japan’s views have been given only brief treatment. The potential political consequences of boost-phase NMD deployments in the East Asian theater remain largely unexamined by US officials and policy experts.

Furthermore, the regional politico-military implications of TMD deployments have not been fully discussed with Japanese and Chinese experts and officials. Much of the US debate has emphasized the military requirements and effectiveness of TMD without fully considering the likely foreign policy reactions of China and Japan to such deployments. Broader US interests in the region, maintenance of US alliances and nonproliferation goals have not been systematically connected to the TMD issue. Public debate has focused on national rather than theater missile defenses, even though the US Army and Navy are pursuing TMD systems that will likely reach full operational status years before any of the NMD architectures under consideration.

Project Outline

To address these issues, the Stanley Foundation, in conjunction with the National Defense University and the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), sponsored a series of three conferences to conduct a thorough examination of the regional security implications of US TMD and NMD plans. The conferences were part of the Stanley Foundation’s Emerging From Conflict program, which seeks to improve bilateral relations between the United States and a set of countries considered key to US national, regional and global interests. (For more information on the program, see www.emergingfromconflict.org.)

The conference series “Ballistic Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: Implications for Security Relations Among the Regional Powers” engaged a wide variety of experts from the United States, China and Japan to gain insights on the security implications of US missile defense plans. A US-only meeting was held in Washington in mid-November 2000, with the second (US-China) and third (US-Japan) meetings in Monterey in early December 2000. In the course of the discussions, security specialists from the United States, China and Japan explored the potential political and military implications of specific US BMD deployment modes. This effort had two objectives: (1) to promote a dialogue between military-technical specialists and regional security experts, and (2) to link discussions of specific deployment
options to analyses of the East Asian security environment.

The first meeting (Phase I) was hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC. Phase I included US government officials from the Department of Defense and State Department along with Congressional staff members and experts from various nongovernmental research institutes. The Phase I agenda and participant list are at www.emergingfromconflict.org/bmd/phase1/phase1.html.

In Phases II and III, a core group of 10 US participants from the Phase I discussions held separate bilateral meetings with Chinese and Japanese counterparts. Chinese and Japanese participants were drawn from a wide variety of government ministries, government research institutes and academic organizations. In each of the meetings, the US participants sought to assess likely Chinese and Japanese reactions to specific TMD and NMD deployments. The second series of meetings was hosted by CNS at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Information on Phase II can be found at: www.emergingfromconflict.org/bmd/phase2/phase2.html.

The final phase of the project consists of the joint publication of this report by the Stanley Foundation and the Monterey Institute’s CNS. This report details the major findings of the three conferences and is divided into three parts summarizing each of the conference discussions. Analysts from the National Defense University contributed to the discussions, but do not endorse all of the report’s conclusions. The principal conclusions and policy recommendations will also be disseminated and briefed to the policy and think-tank communities in Washington, DC. Dissemination of this report’s findings will be consistent with the Stanley Foundation’s rule that all publications and accompanying publicity—printed or electronic—will not attribute remarks to individual participants.

**PHASE I: US CONSULTATIONS**
**Washington, DC**
**16-17 November 2000**

The first phase of the conference series brought together US technical military experts and specialists on China and Japan to discuss different missile defense architectures and to assess the likely impact of deployment on relations with China and Japan. This mix of participants raised the level of technical understanding about BMD systems among regional security specialists while sensitizing technical experts to the regional political and security implications of BMD deployment. The project also encouraged discussion and dialogue between experts inside and outside the US government. The two-day discussions covered several topics including: US BMD architectures, Chinese and Japanese strategic goals and objectives, possible regional consequences of US BMD programs and policy options for the next administration.

The goal of the Phase I discussions was to establish a baseline understanding among the US participants about the technical and security issues facing the United States, China and Japan as the United States develops both national missile defenses and theater missile defenses. The Phase I discussions helped the group identify critical gaps in the US understanding of the regional security implications of missile defense in Northeast Asia. The Phase I discussions also helped to isolate key questions to ask Chinese and Japanese participants during the second phase of the conference series.

**US BMD Architectures**

A significant portion of the Phase I discussions was spent discussing NMD and TMD technologies in an effort to establish a proper technical baseline for understanding the implications of BMD deployments. This discussion was especially valuable for regional experts less familiar with missile defense systems and technologies.

Participants identified several key concepts that provided the foundation for technical discussions about TMD and NMD. First, lower-tier and upper-tier TMD systems have very different characteristics. Lower-tier TMD systems are endo-atmospheric, defend a small area, in-
tercept missiles with ranges up to approximately 1,400 kilometers and generally are used for point defense and force protection purposes. Upper-tier TMD systems are exo-atmospheric, defend an area far larger than lower-tier systems, use a different interceptor able to maneuver outside the atmosphere and can defend against missiles with ranges up to 4,000-5,000 km (though they are only tested against missiles with a range up to 3,500 km due to ABM Treaty restrictions.) (The appendix on page 25 contains a Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) chart that illustrates the relationship between proposed US TMD systems and missiles of various ranges). Second, current US plans envision a “family of systems” that provides for comprehensive defense by layering the various lower-tier and upper-tier TMD systems on top of each other. The image of overlapping “bubbles” of protection was commonly used during the discussions. Both types of systems are necessary because lower-tier systems have very limited capabilities against longer range missiles, while some exo-atmospheric upper-tier systems cannot intercept shorter range missiles because their trajectories remain largely within the atmosphere. (See the appendix on page 26 for a BMDO chart that illustrates the “family of systems” concept). Third, US TMD systems are designed to operate in a stand-alone mode, but can also use space-based cueing to enhance their capabilities. Some TMD systems demand organizational and training structures which, if exported, would require greater military cooperation between the vendor and the purchaser.

The discussion included a review of key characteristics of US BMD systems currently under development.

**Lower-Tier TMD Systems**

The **Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)** system has three configurations, all of which include qualitative upgrades from the PAC-2 system. PAC-3 Configuration 1 and 2 include more advanced fire control and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) capabilities. PAC-3 Configuration 3 will include a new hit-to-kill interceptor optimized for an anti-ballistic missile role. Its expected IOC (Initial Operational Capability) is late 2001. PAC-2 and PAC-3 systems have dual roles as both air defense and missile defense systems, but the United States plans to deploy a mix of less expensive PAC-2 interceptors (which can be used for multiple air defense missions) and more advanced hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptors in order to maximize performance and reduce costs.

**Upper-Tier TMD Systems**

The **Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)** system is a land-based area defense system under development with an expected IOC of 2007. It could potentially be deployed in Japan, but so far the Japanese have not expressed interest in it. THAAD is primarily an exo-atmospheric system, but also has some capability against shorter range missiles operating inside the atmosphere. The **Navy Theater Wide (NTW)** system has two forms: one uses the Standard Missile-3, Block I missile and defends an area 10 times greater than the NAD system. Its IOC is approximately 2007-08. A second version, the Block II interceptor, will defend a footprint twice as large as the Block I missile and will be able to defeat most tactical ballistic missiles operating in the exo-atmosphere. Its expected IOC is around 2010-12. The position of the ship relative to the missile launch point is critical to the effectiveness of the NTW system, but NTW does not have to be located in the target area to be effective. Because the NTW interceptor is designed for exo-atmospheric operation, the system cannot defend against missiles with ranges less than 600 km.

**Sea-Based NMD Systems**

Several participants with technical backgrounds noted that among the several options currently being explored, using existing cruisers equipped with the Aegis system as the basis for
a sea-based NMD system might not be the most practical technical option. Another proposed system would use interceptor technology derived from the NTW system and a small, naval X-band radar to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the ascent or mid-course phases. Despite the publicity these options have received, these systems are only in the conceptual stage right now and many participants argued that there is far too much optimism surrounding them. The earliest possible date for such a system would be 2015.

**Boost-Phase Systems**

The Airborne Laser (ABL) is being developed by the US Air Force and is the only US missile defense program not run by the BMDO. The system mounts a giant air-borne laser on a 747 aircraft. Initial testing has been encouraging, but the system still faces numerous technical and operational obstacles. In particular, a number of fighters would be needed to protect the 747 laser-platform when it is deployed near the ballistic missile-launching country.

Participants also discussed the Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) concept advocated by Richard Garwin and other experts. BMDO is studying Garwin’s boost-phase options. Technical experts at the conference noted that the BPI option faces several technical hurdles that would be difficult to surmount. BPI requires faster interceptors and new sensors on the interceptor that can see through the missile plume. BPI would also require highly advanced command, control and early-warning capabilities to respond rapidly to missile launches and to avoid the risk of shooting down a peaceful space launch vehicle. In addition, a boost-phase system would require development of new battle management software, would need to be deployed close to and down range from the target and would clearly violate the ABM Treaty. Finally, the political and diplomatic implications of a ground-based boost-phase system have not yet been thoroughly studied. For missiles launched from North Korea, interceptors would need to be deployed close to and down range from the target missile, which would require basing in eastern Russia (basing in Northern Japan is theoretically possible, but would pose additional technical challenges). This would require negotiating new cooperative military agreements.

Several technical experts in the group also criticized proposals for a sea-based boost-phase system, noting that an NMD system using existing Aegis-equipped cruisers was not a practical technical option. Current cruisers are not designed to support the requirements of such a system. Substantial modifications would be required, including the addition of a small X-band radar and changes to the vertical launch system to accommodate the larger and faster interceptors needed to successfully hit an ICBM in the first few minutes of flight time. It might be easier to produce new cruisers not equipped with the Aegis system as the basis for a sea-based boost-phase system. Because of these difficulties, technically adept participants agreed that there was far too much optimism surrounding the possibility of transforming a future NTW system into a boost-phase NMD system. Although more realistic sea-based BPI options are being studied, these ideas are only in the conceptual stages. The earliest possible date for even the simplest system would be 2015.

**Japan and Theater Missile Defenses**

The Phase I discussion sought to evaluate Chinese and Japanese strategic goals and objectives. Regarding Japan, US experts noted that Japan’s most immediate security priority is protection from North Korea. The Chinese missile threat—although potentially more significant—is a more remote and secondary motivation. Within the context of these security concerns, Japan’s missile defense debate is influenced by
various domestic political interests such as the military, the Diet and public opinion. TMD also serves as a means to buttress the security alliance with the United States.

Participants agreed that Japan faces a number of constraints on the eventual deployment of TMD systems. Despite a joint research program with the United States, a Japanese government decision to develop and deploy NTW (or an indigenous upper-tier naval TMD system derived from this research) is by no means a fait accompli, but rather the subject of continued and heated debate in government circles in Tokyo. The constraints come in several forms: budgetary, political and technical. Given Japan’s continuing recession and growing budget deficits, the cost of deploying the system will be a factor in the decision to proceed from research to the development and deployment phases. In terms of political constraints, TMD is currently the subject of bureaucratic infighting between various ministries in the Japanese government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) support a robust upper-tier system, whereas the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force has expressed interest in pursuing a PAC-3 lower-tier system to ensure that it has a role in missile defense decisions. Several US participants noted that parts of the Japanese bureaucracy have concerns about the military effectiveness and costs associated with the TMD system. As a result, they are reluctant to fully support the program. While current Japanese spending on research is fairly limited, TMD deployment would divert significant amounts of funding away from equally critical military programs, given Japan’s policy of limiting defense spending to about one percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Other political concerns manifest themselves in fears that deploying a highly capable TMD system could entangle Japan too tightly with the United States and might drag Japan into a military conflict. By contrast, other US experts noted that many Japanese defense experts recognize the need to be involved in the development process to influence the evolution of the TMD system in ways that serve Japanese economic and security interests. The Japanese want to shape the upper-tier naval TMD system, but are not fully committed to it due to concerns about cost and military effectiveness. The structural limitations on Japan include the fact that Japan’s governmental decisionmaking structures are not well suited to making these kinds of decisions quickly. These deficiencies are compounded by weaknesses in Japan’s C3I infrastructure. Japan’s C3I systems will need to be reformed over the next 10-15 years in order to support an effective operational TMD system. US experts on Japan pointed out that integrating C3I with US forces will be a contentious political issue in Japan because it raises a host of controversial issues, such as the level and degree of defense integration and the nature of the security alliance.

US participants agreed that it is too early to accurately assess Japan’s interest in deploying a highly capable upper-tier TMD system. The Japanese have only agreed to joint research on the NTW system, nothing more. One participant compared Japan’s position on TMD to that of a poker player who keeps anteing up and waiting to see the next card before deciding whether to stay in the game or fold.

China and Missile Defenses

US experts identified China’s principal national priorities as economic development and the continued rule of the Communist Party. These two priorities have an indefinite but overriding influence on US-China debates about missile defense. Several US specialists argued that the priority China places on economic development will constrain its ability to respond to a US NMD system. China will not respond in a way that threatens continued growth or social stability. Participants noted that the next several years will be critical for the leadership in Beijing because of pending leadership changes in 2002 and numerous economic challenges such as the impact of integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO). NMD and TMD also play into the issue of regime credibility. Given China’s weak naval and air force capabilities, ballistic missiles are one of the few tools that China can use to deter or coerce Taiwan and Japan. TMD threatens to undermine this strategic comparative advantage in missiles and remove Chinese leverage. Similarly, China’s leaders need to be seen as responding to the perceived challenges to
China’s national interests posed by NMD and TMD. For many in China, NMD and TMD function as a litmus test of US intentions.

Within the context of these national priorities, China has several specific concerns about US NMD and TMD programs. Most participants agreed that China’s objections to missile defense are based primarily on political concerns about US military relations with Taiwan and Japan, not narrow military-technical considerations. China’s central concern about TMD is the degree of military integration between the United States and Taiwan. A secondary concern is Japan’s use of NTW in a conflict over Taiwan and the possibility that TMD might promote Japanese militarism and rearmament. Several participants noted that China has grudgingly accepted the prospect of lower-tier TMD deployments in Japan to protect US forces. In terms of NMD, participants noted that whether by accident or by design, the proposed US NMD system would compromise the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent. Chinese experts infer that the United States is targeting China with NMD and are not persuaded that a “rogue missile threat” really exists. US participants agreed that China would respond to NMD deployment by doing whatever is necessary to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.

US participants debated two main issues involving China and missile defense. First, some China specialists maintained that the United States and China are entering a period of strategic transition in which the United States is downsizing its nuclear arsenal, while China is expanding its nuclear capabilities. Some argued that these divergent trends will change the character of the deterrent relationship between the United States and China. At the same time, US deployment of NMD would inject an additional element of uncertainty and confusion into bilateral relations. Other China specialists argued that China is merely shifting from a poor minimal deterrent to a more effective minimal deterrent and that this transition will not significantly alter the deterrent relationship between Beijing and Washington.

The second issue was China’s likely response to the US transfer of advanced PAC-3 systems to Taiwan. Discussions focused on what the United States can “get away with,” how severe China’s reactions will be and whether the United States is willing to bear the costs. The greatest disagreement revolved around the consequences of a PAC-3 sale, since virtually everyone agreed that the transfer of Aegis-equipped ships (either in a traditional air-defense, anti-submarine role or as a platform for TMD) would definitely result in a major disruption of bilateral relations. Some participants argued that China would make only a pro forma protest in response to a PAC-3 sale, while others predicted a more serious reaction.

Chinese Responses to US Missile Defense Policies

US participants discussed a wide range of Chinese responses to three different possible scenarios: US TMD transfers to Taiwan, US TMD cooperation with Japan and US NMD deployment. In terms of US TMD sales to Taiwan, there was a consensus among participants that removing Taiwan from the TMD equation would make the missile defense issues far more manageable for US-China relations. Many participants argued that lower-tier systems in Taiwan have only a limited ability to protect against China’s medium range missiles and barrage tactics, but that the Taiwan government wants lower-tier TMD systems not for military purposes, but to address the popular fear of vulnerability to Chinese missiles and to reduce the risk of panic in the event of a military conflict. Another goal is to use TMD to increase military ties with the United States. Despite their limited military effectiveness, lower-tier TMD systems would probably reduce China’s ability to use missiles to intimidate and coerce Taiwan.

Phase I participants differed, however, on China’s likely reaction to TMD transfers to Taiwan. One group argued that PAC-3 sales would elicit a harsh response from China. The Chinese fear that PAC-3 sales are an indication of US interest in expanding its defense relationship with Taiwan and that such transfers would pave the way for the establishment of a de facto military alliance. While most participants agreed that China could overwhelm a PAC-3 system
with missile salvos and longer range systems, this group maintained that Chinese leaders fear the US use of “salami-tactics” to gradually and incrementally transfer TMD technologies to Taiwan (and thereby strengthen US-Taiwan defense relations). This approach would avoid the provocative act of providing a complete system at once. Chinese officials might view sales of PAC-3 technologies (regardless of their scale) as the first of a series of further sales of increasingly more advanced TMD technologies and systems to Taiwan. It is this perception that could invite a harsh response from Beijing.

TMD sales to Taiwan might therefore cause China to escalate its missile proliferation activities, including the export of missile defense countermeasures. China would likely renege on some of its previous nonproliferation commitments. Coastal deployment of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and military exercises would likely increase as well. China could also respond by becoming obstructionist in various international arms control forums at the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. Several Asia specialists noted that China’s response to TMD transfers to Taiwan would have repercussions for the regional security environment as well. China would likely harden its position on Korea and might also lead efforts to evict US forces from Korea if the North and the South reunify.

By contrast, others argued that strident Chinese rhetoric opposing lower-tier TMD sales to Taiwan is merely a diplomatic bluff; China is not willing to react harshly to the sale of a PAC-3 system to Taiwan. China needs the United States far more than the United States needs good relations with China. The sale of PAC-3 would therefore not fundamentally change US-China relations. The United States can expect to sell PAC-3 to Taiwan and maintain a reasonable relationship with China. The real diplomatic “red-line” for China is the sale of an upper-tier missile defense system to Taiwan; lower-tier systems are a false threshold for China. Several participants added that the United States possesses a large degree of flexibility in terms of shaping a Chinese reaction to a PAC-3 sale; PAC-3 sales could take several forms and therefore should not been seen as a “black and white” issue.

However, even those participants who predicted a minimal Chinese response to a PAC-3 sale agreed that China would respond harshly to the provision of NTW to Taiwan. The sale of advanced upper-tier TMD to Taiwan is a clear “red-line” for China. Several participants cautioned that if the United States chooses to sell PAC-3 or other missile defense technology to Taiwan, then the United States should wait until the technology is fully tested and ready for delivery before making an official deployment decision. This strategy would avoid paying the diplomatic costs before the system can deliver any security benefits.

Sale of a PAC-3 system to Taiwan might also influence Japan’s deployment decisions. A strong Chinese reaction to PAC-3 sales to Taiwan (such as increased MRBM deployments) could increase support in Japan for NTW.

In contrast to the dominant role political factors play in Chinese concerns about Taiwan and TMD, Chinese views about TMD in Japan include both political and military concerns. Participants agreed that China’s response to US-Japan joint TMD deployment would be more muted and that the United States and Japan would have more chances to shape China’s response. On one level, China has already grudgingly accepted that lower-tier TMD systems are needed to protect US troops and bases in Japan. On another level, the principal Chinese concern is that a Japanese naval TMD system could be deployed to defend Taiwan during a crisis. Some argued that Chinese responses would be restrained because there is a growing willingness among Chinese policymakers to let China and Japan compete if the US-Japan alliance falls apart. Some Chinese are skeptical that Japan could emerge as a major threat. However, other Chinese experts feel that a TMD system could serve as a shield that would permit Japan to develop nuclear weapons and other offensive capabilities. China also fears that a NTW system based in Japan could serve as a forward deployed part of a US NMD system. China would likely react by placing greater emphasis on modernization of naval platforms such as submarines in an effort to counter any combined NTW/NMD system.
Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security

China’s responses to US NMD deployment might provoke the most troublesome reactions with the greatest long-term impact on bilateral relations. US participants agreed that China’s response would be shaped by the success or failure of US-Russian NMD negotiations. Likely reactions include increasing numbers of ICBMs, building countermeasures, backtracking on nonproliferation commitments and halting active participation in global arms control forums.

US Policy Options and Constraints

Phase I participants were divided on the Bush administration’s policy options and on the best way to manage international reactions to US NMD policy. Many participants pointed out that the Clinton administration was not effective at managing international reactions to US missile defense plans. The United States is now paying enormous negative political costs for NMD and TMD even though the systems have not yet been fully developed, tested or deployed. The United States is letting the diplomatic fallout get ahead of the technology.

Several participants cautioned that the United States should be very careful about trying to capture (i.e. negate) China’s nuclear deterrent with NMD. Most participants were skeptical this goal was possible and noted that if the United States tried to accomplish it and failed, then the outcome for US security would be far worse than had it never tried in the first place. China’s military modernization would move in new directions, relations would be permanently damaged and there would be little hope for any bilateral progress on security issues such as nonproliferation. Many in the group agreed that NMD would push China to increase its missile arsenal to levels larger than currently projected, but participants disagreed about whether growth in the size and sophistication of China’s missile modernization program was inevitable.

The United States could try to respond to some of China’s concerns by pursuing more military-to-military exchanges, confidence-building measures (CBMs) and arms control initiatives. However, prospects for a cooperative solution are limited and the chances of a negative Chinese response to US deployment of NMD are great. Adoption of CBMs will be difficult because Chinese experts and policymakers are unlikely to accept US statements about the technical capabilities of a limited NMD system. To be safe, they will adopt worst case assumptions about issues such as interceptor-to-missile ratios and assume that NMD will be highly effective. This might result in a larger expansion of Chinese nuclear forces than the United States expects, which many in the United States would regard as provocative. In addition, the political environments in Washington and Beijing are not conducive to the types of cooperative proposals currently being explored with Russia. Participants agreed that the central diplomatic challenge for the United States is to convince China to accept NMD as a “second best” solution that will not seriously compromise Chinese national security. A US-Russian agreement on NMD deployment would make this much easier.

Participants also extensively discussed possible changes in US NMD policy under a Bush administration. First, the notion of deterrence in perpetuity with China could be rejected. Several US government officials noted that there is a possibility that a Bush administration will no longer tell China in official briefings that US NMD plans are not targeted at China. This is currently one of the most prominent talking points in working level exchanges. Such a dramatic policy shift could cause China to redirect its missile modernization efforts, which would inevitably affect US-Russian arms control negotiations.

One participant defended such a policy shift, arguing that arms control is a passé concept that will not offer a solution to NMD debates with China. Chinese reactions are ultimately irrelevant because the United States will eventually develop the ability to negate China’s deterrent. However, although a few participants implied that it was possible to neutralize the Chinese nuclear deterrent with an NMD system, no one was willing to actively defend this position when pressed.

Many conference participants focused on Russia’s role in dealing with China. In fact, a majority of participants agreed that Russia will likely serve as the key to securing Chinese acquiescence to US NMD plans. In pursuing a possible arms control solution with Russia and
China, the United States should emphasize forging a deal with Russia first. If the United States is able to reach a compromise with Russia in terms of some form of offense-defense mix that formed a new basis for strategic stability, then China would have little leverage in opposing US NMD plans. China would be isolated and would lack the diplomatic support necessary to mobilize international opposition to NMD. If the United States reaches an agreement with Russia, then Moscow is also likely to try to persuade China not to dramatically increase the size and sophistication of its missile program. In short, the best way for the United States to minimize Chinese reactions to NMD is to work out an agreement with Russia.

Several officials added that a US-Russian agreement on NMD that included offensive reductions coupled with limits on missile defense deployments would have the added advantage of providing China with a sense of certainty about the size and scope of the future US NMD effort. This would help limit Chinese reactions to the US NMD program. The United States needs to develop a paradigm to inject strategic certainty into NMD discussions with China; forging a deal with Russia is one possible avenue. Many participants added that the United States also needs to make sure that its allies, especially Japan, Australia and NATO, are consulted during the NMD development process to ensure their agreement with US NMD plans. If the United States is not able to reach agreement with its allies, then the negative repercussions of deploying NMD increase dramatically.

PHASE II:  
US-CHINA CONSULTATIONS  
Monterey, California  
30 November - 2 December 2000

Chinese and US Views of Proliferation and Regional Missile Threats  

Discussions among US and Chinese officials and experts revealed both similarities and differences about the threat posed by global and regional ballistic missile proliferation. US and Chinese participants differed over the scope and the severity of the missile proliferation threat. The Chinese did not see missile proliferation as an urgent concern, but rather as one of several negative factors influencing the international security environment. Differences were most acute in terms of respective assessments of the balance between the intentions and capabilities of proliferants such as North Korea. In evaluating the missile proliferation threat, the Chinese were more concerned with intentions, while US participants focused on military-technical capabilities. The Chinese clearly see US foreign and military policies as a greater threat to China than regional missile proliferation. In particular, many of the Chinese participants view US NMD and TMD policies as signs of increasingly hostile US intentions toward China. Chinese participants argued that US nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities were sufficient to deter attacks from small states like North Korea and that the United States was exaggerating the missile threat.

Chinese participants articulated a variety of views on proliferation and the regional missile threat in East Asia. They universally agreed that China is opposed to missile proliferation and has concerns about the growing number of missile-capable states in Asia and around the world. Yet the Chinese considered missile proliferation a regional security issue. Several Chinese experts emphasized that Beijing supports a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and that North Korea should be more restrained in its missile export and testing activities; several also expressed concerns about India’s nuclear and missile programs. None of the Chinese participants addressed missile proliferation in the Middle East or responded to questions from Americans about Middle East threats. In addition, some Chinese noted that China’s concerns
about missile proliferation are reflected in its changing attitudes toward the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and its growing missile nonproliferation commitments. Several Chinese participants noted that the mid-November 2000 statement on missile nonproliferation was a clear indication of China's growing concern about missile proliferation.

US views on global missile proliferation and appropriate responses contrasted sharply with Chinese perceptions. US participants stressed that missile proliferation is a real and demonstrable threat to US national security interests. Iraq used Scud missiles against US troops during the Gulf War; the largest number of casualties during the Gulf War came from destruction of a US army barracks by a Scud. This highlighted the missile threat to US national security interests and sparked increased missile defense research since the early 1990s. The August 1998 launch of the Taepodong missile had a similar galvanizing effect. US conferees pointed out that the United States is not alone in its concerns about proliferation. Russian leaders have also expressed concern about global missile proliferation; Russian President Putin recently acknowledged this concern in official dialogues with Clinton.

Chinese participants stressed that Beijing sees nuclear deterrence as sufficient to address concerns about missile proliferation. Several Chinese emphasized that the United States overestimates the threat posed by North Korea's missile program while simultaneously undervaluing the effectiveness of deterrence. Senior Chinese officials and experts emphasized that improving political relations with other countries is the key to solving the missile proliferation problem; military-technical solutions are not long-lasting and can generate negative consequences. The United States should make greater efforts to improve political ties with North Korea rather than simply trying to protect itself from North Korean missiles. The Chinese lauded the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, which sought to address the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through a diplomatic agreement.

In response, some US experts argued that deterrence and preventive diplomacy are not always sufficient to ensure national security. It is impractical, naïve and inconsistent with the history of both international relations and the development of military technology to forego missile defense for the sake of diplomatic tools. The two approaches should be mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.

Lastly, several Chinese experts noted that they feel far more threatened by US foreign policies and use of military force than by the spread of missiles and related technologies. Many Chinese see missile proliferation as an excuse for the United States to develop and deploy missile defense systems. Most Chinese participants were skeptical that the United States would scale back or cancel its missile defense programs even if the missile proliferation threat from North Korea and other rogue states were to diminish significantly. Many argued the United States would simply generate "another excuse" to deploy missile defenses. Several Chinese participants suggested that BMD was part of a US effort to guarantee its ability to act anywhere in the world with impunity. In short, China's opposition to missile defense is based partly on the perception that NMD deployment would allow the United States to act unilaterally with few constraints.

US participants responded that differences in Chinese and US threat perceptions are intimately tied to the contrasting US and Chinese roles in the world. The United States is an activist world power with varying interests in most parts of the world, whereas China principally acts as a regional power and possesses limited global interests. Global missile proliferation has a constraining influence on US foreign and military policies, but for China the implications are less severe and less direct. Thus, Washington views missile defense as a solution to a serious problem that limits US ability to maintain peace and stability around the world.

One US expert argued that there appeared to be a contradiction in Chinese opposition to NMD. China accepts that lower-tier TMD is needed to protect US troops deployed abroad, but is opposed to NMD. Yet NMD is also necessary because it provides US troops with freedom of movement in regional contingencies. NMD is needed to ensure that US troops deployed all over the world can fully execute military missions without risk to the US homeland,
thereby enhancing extended deterrence. Thus, Chinese opposition to NMD is inconsistent with its acceptance of lower-tier TMD deployments to protect US troops.

Regional Consequences of US Missile Defense Options

Discussion of the regional consequences of US NMD and TMD plans highlighted and reinforced fundamental differences between the United States and China concerning Taiwan, missile deployments and regional stability. Chinese concerns revolved around political considerations, such as the perceived negative influence of TMD on Japanese military aspirations and on Taiwan’s support for independence. Significant differences exist on the role of missiles in the cross-Strait context. The Chinese viewed their missiles as an explicit and highly effective means of deterring movement toward Taiwan independence, whereas US participants argued that Chinese missile deployments provoke and reinforce independence sentiments in Taiwan. Chinese participants also expressed concerns about the methodological approach of the discussion, arguing that US officials and experts were trying to gauge China’s precise response to each of the various TMD and NMD systems. One Chinese participant noted that these efforts might produce unreliable conclusions, because the variety of views in China made it impossible to predict precise responses.

In analyzing and evaluating US-Japan TMD cooperation, the Chinese advanced a variety of arguments. Many were familiar, but the Chinese provided more depth and nuance to these previously articulated positions. First, several Chinese participants acknowledged that Japan has a sovereign right to deploy missile defense systems and that China can not deny Japan’s right to protect itself. Nevertheless, they argued that Japan should choose not to deploy TMD. Chinese experts maintained that the United States has dragged Japan (and Taiwan as well) into its missile defense programs.

Chinese participants oppose Japanese TMD for two reasons. First, they expressed deep concern that Japanese upper-tier TMD could be used to defend Taiwan. In the event of a cross-Strait conflict, Japan could deploy a sea-based upper-tier system to protect Taiwan from Chinese missile strikes. Japan might also share TMD technical secrets with Taiwan. Several Chinese experts noted that Japanese deployments of PAC-3 (or other land-based missile defense systems) to protect military bases and critical infrastructure could also make Japan more willing (or less reluctant) to get involved in a Taiwan conflict. PAC-3 deployments would weaken (but not entirely erode) China’s ability to hold Japanese territory and US troops based in Japan at risk in order to deter Japan and the United States from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. These arguments contrasted with China’s previous grudging acceptance of the need for lower-tier TMD to protect US bases and troops in Japan.

Second, several Chinese experts argued that TMD deployments in Japan could accelerate the growth and expansion of Japanese militarism. Some Chinese suggested that TMD would function as a litmus test for the future direction of Japanese military power. Several referred to the classic Chinese position that once Japan develops defensive systems (the shield) then it would be free to develop offensive weapons (the sword.) Interestingly, a few Chinese participants noted that China might be content with a public commitment from Japan that TMD would not be used to protect Taiwan.

US officials and scholars disagreed with the Chinese position that TMD would revive Japanese militarism and lead to the development of offensive missile and nuclear capabilities. US participants argued that TMD does not provide enough security for Japan to remilitarize behind an invulnerable shield, that Japan already had the technological base for missile development (and that it would be technically impossible for Japan to adapt TMD technology to make a ballistic missile) and that the US nuclear umbrella provides a large disincentive for Japan to develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.

Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security

Several US participants sought to dampen China’s worries by arguing that Japan’s role in the world is changing and that China should not overreact to these trends. Japan, for example, will likely assume a greater role in collective defense activities, but this should not be seen as a shift toward remilitarization.

US participants added that Japanese deployment of an upper-tier TMD system is not a fait accompli. Japan and the United States are currently conducting joint research on NTW, but the Japanese government has not yet committed to either development or deployment. Chinese statements and actions can influence (either positively or negatively) Japan’s interest in missile defense. US participants argued that exaggerated Chinese statements of concern were unhelpful and contributed to regional tensions. China’s anxieties and anti-Japanese rhetoric could push Japan toward more extensive TMD deployments. Beijing’s concerns about the possible impact of TMD also suggest that China is actively targeting Japan with missiles and possibly nuclear weapons.

The Chinese position on TMD deployment in Taiwan was far more strident than the discussion about Japan. Chinese participants firmly maintained that their coastal missile deployments are aimed at deterring Taiwan independence. For them, missiles are both a necessary and a sufficient tool to prevent Taiwan from gradually moving toward independence. Provision of any form of TMD would create a false sense of security that might prompt Taiwan’s leaders to accelerate movement toward independence. Many Chinese rejected US arguments that Chinese missiles provoke Taiwan and therefore increase the desire for TMD and that Chinese missiles do not deter anyone in Taiwan.

Several US participants noted that China could easily overcome lower-tier TMD by using longer range missiles or barrage tactics. One senior Chinese scholar asked why the United States was so interested in selling TMD to Taiwan if it will not be militarily effective. This question suggested that the United States had ulterior motives in providing TMD to Taiwan. Building on this argument, some Chinese participants argued that US TMD transfers to Taiwan would be the first step in the restoration of a de facto military alliance with the United States.

Chinese participants also listed other negative implications of TMD transfers to Taiwan. They maintained that it would deeply scar bilateral relations, lead to long-term problems for US-China relations, increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait and lead to a deadlock in bilateral arms control and nonproliferation discussions.

US participants firmly rejected the apparently universal Chinese position that its coastal missile deployments deter movement toward Taiwan independence. TMD, many US experts argued, does not offer sufficient protection for Taiwan to feel safe enough to move toward independence. The incentives for Taiwan’s leaders to deploy TMD come from the Taiwanese people, who want to be protected from the growing Chinese missile threat. If the missile threat diminishes, then demand for TMD will diminish proportionally.

US participants noted that the relationship between Chinese missile threats and support for TMD sales to Taiwan is particularly strong in US policy circles. One senior US expert noted that since 1996, China’s military maneuvers around Taiwan and in the coastal regions have reinforced independence sentiments on Taiwan, not weakened them. The recent election of a president from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party is the most current example of this trend. Chinese leaders misunderstand the relationship between their demonstrations of military force and the impact on Taiwan political sentiments. Furthermore, several US experts noted that Taiwan’s democratization has significantly changed the cross-Strait situation. Taiwan’s democratic status fosters political imperatives for the United States to intervene if a conflict occurs.

Regarding NMD, Chinese participants raised a number of political, economic and technical issues that collectively influence their reaction to US NMD policies. One of the most prominent themes was that NMD and TMD are indicators of US strategic intentions toward China. Many Chinese see NMD as a litmus test and argue that NMD is aimed at capturing China’s nuclear deterrent. Several Chinese noted that the United States is sending China mixed signals on this issue, which undercuts trust and reduces China’s interest in bilateral consultations. The Chinese did not believe that
North Korea is the main target of US NMD efforts and accurately noted that the architecture of the Clinton administration's initial NMD system is perfectly sized to neutralize China's small ICBM capability.

One Chinese participant with substantial technical expertise provided a detailed presentation outlining possible Chinese responses to NMD and the variables that might influence which responses are chosen. Chinese options included increasing the number of land-based missiles, developing countermeasures and decoys, deploying mobile ICBMs and building multiple warhead missiles. Variables influencing which responses are chosen include: feasibility, visibility (to maintain deterrent relationships with other nuclear powers), affordability, moderation (so as not to increase American perceptions of a “China threat”), compatibility and the need for precautionary steps (in order to prepare for possible scientific surprises that might degrade the effectiveness of countermeasures). Based on this analysis, this scholar concluded that China should not respond with dramatic increases in numbers of land-based ICBMs or development of multiple warhead missiles. Rather, he argued that development of countermeasures and decoys is the option which best meets his criteria. This option is the least expensive, is technologically feasible, would not increase the threat to others and does not exclude the development of other responses in the future if the US NMD system expands.

This Chinese scholar continued that deploying more mobile ICBMs would increase China’s confidence in the survivability of its deterrent against a US first strike without threatening the United States. China’s deterrent currently depends on uncertainty about the numbers of Chinese ICBMs. Mobile missiles would allow China’s deterrent to rest on uncertainty about where the missiles were deployed, which would be more secure and more stable. As China’s nuclear deterrent becomes primarily based on mobile launchers dispersed throughout the country, China may eventually become more willing to be transparent about the size and capabilities of its nuclear force structure. (See the appendix on page 27 for a summary of China’s options to defeat NMD).

The Sino-US discussions about NMD were not entirely negative, however. A senior Chinese scholar with diplomatic experience noted that the time was now ripe for a formal, “track-1” dialogue on NMD and broad concepts of strategic stability. This comment, echoed by several other Chinese participants, stood in stark contrast to much of the official anti-BMD campaign and the stilted nature of official US-China dialogue on the issue. A Chinese technical expert suggested that while most discussions of compromises on NMD focused on limitations on the numbers of interceptors, a more promising area would be “constraints on the capabilities of the NMD system or a change in the structure of the defense.” He suggested that the United States might be able to convince China that NMD was not aimed at it by constraining the speed of the interceptors, changing their locations and limiting their operational capabilities. This scholar argued that some common ground could be found between the two extremes of a full SDI-type system and minimal civil defense policies. However, other Chinese suggested that these compromises were not widely accepted in China. Many Chinese leaders, especially within the military, have far more conservative views about transparency, deterrence and US strategic intentions that inhibit consideration of cooperative solutions.

US participants questioned a number of Chinese arguments about the aims and capabilities of NMD. A US official compared the US motivation for deploying NMD to an insurance policy. NMD should be viewed as a defense of last resort, not as a license for the United States to act incautiously. The United States would not use NMD to facilitate intervention all over the world. Just because someone purchases fire insurance for his home does not mean they will play with matches in the house; a similar logic applies to the US desire for an NMD system.

This official argued that prima facie evidence exists that NMD is not targeted against China. In talks with Russia, the United States has offered to limit the capability of its NMD system. At the same time China would be free to adjust its ICBM force in response to the levels of US defenses, and the United States has indicated that it would be comfortable with China’s reaction. If the United States sought to target China
Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security

with NMD, then it would not accept any limits on the size and scope of the system and would object to an expansion of the Chinese ICBM force. The US official argued that US tacit acceptance of a larger Chinese ICBM force in response to NMD deployment was the best possible signal of benign US intentions.

However, US experts agreed that the United States is sending mixed signals to China on NMD. Some in the United States want to reduce US vulnerability to Chinese strategic missiles and build a system capable of capturing the Chinese nuclear deterrent, regardless of the implications for Sino-US relations. Several scholars pointed out that US policymakers and politicians were still debating whether China is “a big rogue” or a “small Russia.” Until this debate is resolved, US strategic intentions would remain somewhat unclear. Thus far, US policy has emphasized the importance of a stable deterrent relationship with China, though this might change in coming years.

US participants did not believe it was possible to build an NMD system that would negate an expanded Chinese nuclear force and recognized that trying and failing would seriously damage bilateral relations. Most accepted the inevitability of a strategic deterrent relationship with China, but wanted the relationship to be stable even in an environment with missile defenses.

One US participant highlighted that US NMD deployment plans could spark a dangerous action/reaction cycle. Advocates of NMD argue that China will modernize and expand its nuclear forces regardless of US NMD decisions. Meanwhile, some Chinese say that NMD is clearly aimed against China, so China should accelerate its strategic modernization in response. Statements by hard-liners in one country are used by hard-liners in the other to advocate tougher policies. Absent a genuine official strategic dialogue, there is a real danger that mutual suspicions and actions on each side could destabilize bilateral relations.

Assessment of Future Trends and Possible Solutions

Discussion of possible cooperative solutions was divided into three sub-areas: Japan, Taiwan and NMD. In each sub-area discussions focused on various bilateral mechanisms that might address US concerns about ballistic missile threats and Chinese concerns about US TMD cooperation with Japan and Taiwan and plans to deploy NMD.

Japan and TMD: The discussion focused on North Korea’s missile capabilities, Tokyo’s perception of a missile threat, the political debate in Japan about TMD cooperation with the United States and the possibility of a negotiated solution.

The Chinese were not optimistic about the possibility of a missile deal between the United States and North Korea. Several Chinese participants noted that the political climate in the United States is not conducive to a US-North Korean agreement on curbing the North’s missile exports and deployments. Several Chinese experts suggested that conservatives in the United States want to use the North Korean threat to justify higher defense spending and missile defense. The Chinese argued that even if the threat of North Korean missiles vanished, then another threat would arise to justify NMD and TMD. One senior Chinese expert argued that Japan’s real motivations for TMD are tied to concerns about China, not North Korea. He noted that while the Japanese people fear North Korean missile strikes, Japan’s policymakers and political leaders are more worried about Chinese missiles. The North Korean missile threat is being used by Japanese policy-makers to justify policies aimed at China.

US participants responded to these arguments on two levels. They first addressed the issue of Japan’s involvement in a conflict over Taiwan. Many maintained that if a conflict arises, then Japan will almost certainly be involved. The United States can therefore do little to reassure China about Japanese involvement in a Taiwan conflict. The real question will be the level of Japanese involvement, which could range from mere logistics support to deployment of troops for non-combat military operations such as minesweeping.

Secondly, US participants argued that Chinese assessments of Japanese support for TMD were somewhat exaggerated. Several experts and officials suggested that if the United States and North Korea reached a missile deal that included restrictions on Nodong development,
support in Japan for TMD would diminish. Several US experts on Japan maintained that TMD advocates in Japan face strong political opposition and numerous technical and financial barriers. Political support for TMD could shift in favor of the opponents if the North Korean missile threat dramatically declined.

Several US experts argued that the best way for China to convince Japan not to deploy TMD was to help resolve the North Korean missile issue. China could continue to pressure North Korea to act with restraint in its missile activities. A senior US expert added that if China fears Japan will use TMD against it, then China should explain to Japan and other countries where its DF-21 MRBMs are aimed. The range and basing of these missiles appear to be tailor-made for targets in Japan. The burden of managing threat perceptions lies with China as well as Japan, even if the latter deploys TMD.

Taiwan and TMD: Similar disagreements occurred in the discussions about Taiwan. The discussion principally revolved around the possibility of a cross-Strait missile deal where China would agree to withdraw its coastal missile deployments in exchange for Taiwan not purchasing TMD. The Chinese participants universally rejected the possibility of such a deal at the present time, but the basis of their objections differed. Some cited current political trends in China, arguing that it would be impossible for a Chinese leader to initiate such a policy, especially given Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s reluctance to accept the “One China Principle.” Chinese leaders feel they have already made enough concessions and are not willing to do more. The Chinese military, in particular, would fiercely oppose such a deal. Other experts noted that from a technical arms control standpoint this proposal was not a good deal. China should receive some form of tangible benefit for withdrawing the missiles. Taiwan’s agreement not to do something in the future was an insufficient payoff for a concrete Chinese action. Either the United States or Taiwan would need to provide China with a deliverable.

Other Chinese participants expressed concern that withdrawal of Chinese missiles would send confusing signals to Taiwan, suggesting that China was not willing to use force to achieve reunification. This might push Taiwan toward independence and eventually result in a military crisis. These concerns aside, many Chinese participants expressed rhetorical support for the adoption of confidence-building measures, while acknowledging that both China and Taiwan lacked the political will to take the first step to initiate this process.

Several US officials noted that an arms race had already begun across the Taiwan Strait that might escalate out of control if neither side demonstrated restraint. US participants argued that Chinese policymakers have misinterpreted certain cross-Strait political and military dynamics. The more China emphasizes missiles and its willingness to use force, the greater the support for TMD in Taipei and in Washington.

US participants argued that China would benefit from initiating a cross-Strait missile deal with Taiwan. Either China or Taiwan has to make the first move, and China is better positioned to initiate a missile draw-down. If Taiwan does not respond or violates the deal, China can easily re-deploy its missiles and will not have lost strategic ground. If China took such a step, there would be significant pressure on Taiwan—especially from the United States—to reciprocate. China would also gain an enormous political advantage from initiating such a gesture. US participants stressed that this deal is a “no-lose” proposition for China. A US official raised another possibility regarding Taiwan’s acquisition of TMD: he suggested that the United States might sell the advanced PAC-3 system to Taiwan but agree not to transfer interceptors unless a crisis broke out. Throughout the discussions, US participants stressed that many in the United States, especially in Congress, view China’s policies toward Taiwan as a measure of Chinese long-term intentions and regional ambitions. Given this context, a missile deal would go a long way toward softening China’s image in the eyes of many Americans.

NMD: Discussions on NMD included a frank and open debate between US and Chinese specialist and officials on possible solutions or compromises. The discussion of possible solutions or compromises was more extensive and detailed than in previous unofficial “track-2” discussions. Chinese discussions about NMD and confidence and security building measures
(CSBMs) moved from insistence on a deal that banned NMD deployment to consideration of a mix of limitations on an NMD system and political reassurances that responded to Chinese concerns. US participants acknowledged that China would respond to NMD deployment by increasing its arsenal to a certain level that both the United States and China could accept. US and Chinese conferees agreed that some form of negotiated solution was possible, but that political obstacles on each side might prevent an agreement.

Several Chinese stressed that China's opposition to NMD is not based on the fear that it would neutralize China's nuclear deterrent, because China could always respond by building up its forces to a level sufficient to offset the capability of the system. Chinese participants noted that China could not exclude the possibility that a US NMD system would expand in the future, and that China's response would have to be gauged accordingly. They suggested that NMD deployment would trigger a more extensive Chinese strategic modernization program, regardless of the domestic or international situation.

Chinese participants stressed that US NMD plans are intimately tied to the Chinese debate about the “American threat.” One Chinese military expert noted that the actual limits on NMD are not as important as efforts by the United States to demonstrate that it does not view China as an enemy. The most significant step the United States could take would be the declaration of a unilateral no-first-use nuclear pledge toward China. However Chinese participants acknowledged the obstacles the US would face in making such a statement.

Several Chinese participants called for the United States and China to begin a serious strategic dialogue at the formal diplomatic level, arguing that “track-2” discussions have gotten ahead of the “track-1” talks. These formal talks should seek to use arms control agreements as a means to reassure China by demonstrating that the United States does not seek to cancel out China’s deterrent. One suggestion was that the US promise not to undermine China’s deterrent while Beijing commits not to develop a first strike capability.

US participants suggested a variety of steps that both sides could take to prevent NMD from damaging bilateral strategic stability. US experts and officials acknowledged that no matter what kind of NMD system the United States ultimately deploys, it will affect China’s deterrent due to the small size of Chinese strategic forces. US participants stressed that most US experts and policymakers understood (and acknowledged) that China would probably respond to NMD deployment by expanding the size of its nuclear forces.

US participants urged Chinese officials to rethink their anti-NMD diplomatic campaign. China’s inflexible opposition to NMD pushes it into a corner in terms of possible solutions and compromises. If NMD deployment is inevitable (which most US participants believe), then China’s interests are best served by shaping the evolution of the system. China’s involvement could include efforts to negotiate limits on the size and capabilities of the system. The current Chinese strategy ties Beijing’s hands and could lead to a US NMD deployment which does not take China’s interests into account and which severely damages Sino-US relations. Indeed, several US officials noted that the United States and Russia might develop a “grand bargain” in which both sides reduced their deployed arsenals to around 1,000 warheads while simultaneously deploying missile defenses. Strategic stability in the future could become increasingly tied to mixtures of offense-defense capabilities. One US suggestion was for the United States to issue a statement acknowledging the current existence of a deterrent relationship with China in exchange for China accepting upper limits on its ICBM and sea-launch ballistic missile (SLBM) programs.

However, US participants noted that the political climate in Washington made it hard to imagine the United States pursuing the same type of cooperative missile defense and early-warning proposals with China that it was exploring with Russia. Chinese participants expressed an interest in various compromise solutions, but doubted that an agreement was currently possible given the tense political climates in Washington and Beijing. US and Chinese conferees agreed that a negotiated solution was possible but not probable.
PHASE III:  
US-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS  
Monterey, CA  
3-5 December 2000

TMD and NMD as a Domestic Political Issue in Japan

The US-Japan consultations began with a discussion of the domestic political dynamics in Japan that influence decisions on missile defenses. Japanese participants addressed a number of factors that affect the Japanese debate. These included threat perceptions, the August 1998 North Korean missile launch, the role of public opinion and the Diet, changing regional security dynamics and alliance politics. One theme that emerged consistently from the discussions was that Japan’s participation in TMD remains very limited and its future role is not predetermined. The government has not committed to pursue TMD beyond current joint research on advanced TMD technologies. Several Japanese participants stressed that the government is studying a mix of technologies and continues to survey the international security environment to determine the appropriate level of Japanese involvement in TMD programs.

First, on the issue of the appropriate TMD architecture, the Japanese participants noted there is a strong bias toward co-developing the NTW system with the United States. NTW will be cheaper and easier since Japan already has Aegis-equipped destroyers and Japan’s defense industries can participate in the technical development of the system. In contrast, most THAAD technology is already developed and Japan has concerns about the coverage and capabilities of the THAAD system. Furthermore, several Japanese experts noted that the government has also not decided whether to deploy advanced PAC-3 systems for point defense purposes. Such systems could be used to protect critical infrastructure in Japan as well as US bases. A senior Japanese military official said that it was too early to make a public case in favor of the PAC-3 and suggested that the Japanese government should avoid a situation in which the politics get ahead of the procurement. A US official added that it would be a few years before the newest version of PAC-3 could be deployed in Japan because of its slow production rate.

Most of the discussion focused on Japanese threat perceptions and the contours of the domestic debate on TMD. Several foreign ministry and defense officials stated that public opinion is a major constraint on missile defense planning. Debates about TMD in Japan occur within three circles: government agencies, the Diet and the Japanese public. In government circles, the debates are principally focused on financial and military issues. The Ministry of Finance is likely to oppose the initiation of a large weapons program during a recession, and some defense officials have concerns about the trade-offs associated with TMD development. In addition, the government will closely watch the future direction of US TMD policies as a guide to Japan’s approach. These concerns aside, Japanese participants noted that support for TMD in government circles is far more consistent than in the Diet or the general public. Government support is driving forward Japan’s role in TMD research with the United States. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have been consistent supporters. In the Diet and among the Japanese public, debates focus on a mix of issues including financial concerns, threat perceptions and the scope of US influence over Japan. One official explained that Japanese public opinion can be roughly divided into three groupings: the anti-China group (which favors TMD), the arms control group (which has concerns about TMD) and the pacifist group (which opposes TMD).

In all three circles, threat perceptions about North Korea and China occupy a central part of the debate. The Japanese participants provided a variety of insights about North Korea’s role in Japanese debates about missile defenses. Several officials stressed that MOFA and the JDA were ready to move forward with joint TMD research prior to North Korea’s August 1998 launch of the Taepodong missile. The North Korean missile launch merely provided an opportunity to easily make a public case for TMD cooperation with the United States. The Taepodong missile launch influenced the nature and the pace of the missile defense debate in Japan, but was not the fundamental cause of the debate. The North Korean missile launch scared large parts of the Diet and the public into supporting TMD; by contrast the JDA was
already concerned about the North Korean threat based on other North Korean missile activities dating back to 1993. North Korean activities and policies became directly linked to public debates about TMD, even though many Japanese participants felt these issues should not be so intimately linked. As a result of this implicit linkage, the recent détente on the Korean Peninsula and normalization discussions have begun to change the dynamics of domestic debates about TMD, making the government’s task in building public support for missile defense much more difficult. A senior Foreign Ministry official noted that in 2003 (when Japan is slated to make major TMD-related decisions) the regional security architecture could look totally different. Several JDA officials argued that Japan should promote TMD separately from the North Korean missile issue because missile defense serves multiple purposes for Japan and is consistent with Japan’s evolving concept of defense. Several commentators noted that if the North Korea threat vanishes, then Japan will also have to confront a host of other security issues related to the continued viability and purpose of the US-Japan alliance.

In explaining the current evolution of the debate, Japanese officials and experts noted that public concerns have begun to shift away from North Korea and toward China. This shift raises problems for Japanese security policy. Several participants argued that Japan cannot say that China is an enemy given their past history and the fact that the two countries have a peace treaty. Yet many Japanese see China as a potential enemy. Some have concerns about an economically strong China becoming militarily aggressive. Others are worried about a weak China that becomes irrational and unstable. The main motivation for Japan to continue to provide economic aid to China is to prevent the latter scenario from arising.

Several Japanese participants argued that Chinese actions and policies are partially to blame for the growing fears about China. China’s strident opposition to Japanese missile defense polices suggests to many Japanese that China is targeting them, possibly with nuclear weapons. Chinese diplomacy creates other dilemmas for Japan. On the one hand, Chinese officials claim that the United States is pushing Japan into accepting TMD like an obedient client, but on the other hand, the Chinese also claim that Japan’s interest in TMD demonstrates Japanese ambitions to become more militarily aggressive. This diplomatic strategy offends Japan and its lack of internal consistency complicates bilateral discussions about missile defense. Japanese defense officials surmised that China has two long-term concerns: China doesn’t want Japan to play any role in regional security affairs (given historical Chinese concerns about Japanese remilitarization) and TMD upsets China’s vision of itself as a regional hegemon.

Japanese participants added that debates about missile defense are occurring against the backdrop of broader discussions about Japan’s role in regional security, including participation in UN regional peacekeeping activities and possible changes in the constitution. There is also growing sentiment in Japan that as financial resources to conduct traditional diplomacy are dwindling due to persistent budget deficits, Japan should compensate by having its military play a larger diplomatic role. To date, Japan has not fully exploited its military resources for diplomatic purposes. TMD could be part of a strategy to integrate military tools with other diplomatic instruments.

The latter part of the discussion shifted to the issue of US and Japanese normalization talks with North Korea. US participants questioned the slow pace of Japan’s normalization negotiations with the North. Japanese participants explained that US and Japanese normalization efforts should not be compared because Japan has its own agenda and must pursue normalization based on national interests, not diplomatic expediency. There are two issues of central concern to Japan: North Korea’s missiles and its past terrorist activities, especially abductions of Japanese citizens. Normalization will proceed only when both issues are resolved. The Japanese public is pressing the government to only accept terms that are strictly reciprocal. Japanese participants noted that they would welcome assistance from the United States in resolving these issues.
Sino-Japanese Relations and Missile Defense

US and Japanese participants discussed four core issues connecting Sino-Japanese relations and TMD: the overall state of Sino-Japanese relations, the origins of China’s concerns about Japan’s missile defense plans, possible Chinese responses to Japanese TMD deployment and potential confidence-building measures. Many Japanese participants were optimistic about future bilateral relations; they argued that TMD plays a small role in a bilateral relationship which is improving. US and Japanese participants mostly agreed about the origins of China’s concerns about TMD in Japan and the difficulties associated with addressing them. Differences emerged on the issue of the possible Chinese responses. US and Japanese participants also expressed a variety of views about whether missile defense would contribute to Japanese security and improve alliance relations.

Regarding the current state of Sino-Japanese relations, many Japanese participants (and especially Foreign Ministry representatives) were optimistic. The overall bilateral relationship is becoming far more important to both countries. Leaders in Japan and China have begun to recognize the need to accommodate each other. Chinese leaders now realize that they need Japan to accomplish their economic and political goals in the Asia-Pacific theater. One senior official called Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s November 2000 visit to Japan a “watershed” event that placed bilateral relations on a new footing. During the visit, Japan and China began to discuss global concerns and did not limit themselves to regional issues. Very little of the bilateral discussions focused on controversial historical issues, marking a dramatic shift from Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit, which was dominated by Chinese lecturing on historical issues. One Japanese participant noted that there are no major problems on the horizon in Sino-Japanese relations and that all foreseeable problems are manageable. China will always have concerns about Japan’s alliance relations with the United States, its policies toward Taiwan and its role in regional affairs. China grumbles about TMD behind the scenes but has not yet made it a significant issue in bilateral consultations. One senior Japanese defense representative noted that Chinese opposition to TMD did not dominate the talks during the recent China-Japan defense consultations.

US and Japanese participants broadly agreed on the nature and origin of China’s opposition to Japanese participation in US TMD programs. The Japanese conferees stressed that the central Chinese concern was that TMD would limit China’s responses during a conflict over Taiwan. First, China fears that an NTW system could be redeployed around Taiwan during a crisis to protect the island from Chinese MRBMs. Second, China’s ability to deter Japanese intervention/assistance in a conflict would be much more limited if Japan possessed TMD capabilities. TMD would provide protection for US bases as well as for critical leadership and infrastructure facilities in Japan. During a conflict over Taiwan, a central Chinese goal is to limit US involvement; minimizing Japanese assistance to US military forces is a key way of doing this. Linked to the Taiwan contingency is Beijing’s broader concern about losing the ability to hold Japan at risk. Several US participants pointed out that there is a domestic political element to Chinese concerns as well. Chinese leaders have staked some of their political legitimacy on anti-Japanese nationalism, and Japan’s TMD cooperation with the United States challenges this. China currently wants to maintain the status quo in its security relations with Japan; TMD directly threatens this strategy. China is reacting to TMD out of a sense of fear and weakness.

In addition, several US participants stressed that Japan’s use of TMD in a Taiwan scenario is only China’s proximate concern. Beijing’s long-term strategic worries stem from fears of an emergent Japan that becomes highly active in regional security affairs, Japanese remilitarization and the use of the US-Japan alliance as a containment mechanism. China’s fundamental fear about TMD is that it will set in motion a chain of events that will lead to a more proactive Japanese foreign and military policy which will challenge China’s role in the Asia-Pacific region. According to one senior Japanese defense official, although TMD is defensive in nature, NTW is actually a strategic weapon that will fundamentally alter political and military relations between Japan and China.
Differences between US and Japanese participants emerged over the issue of possible Chinese responses to TMD and ways to address them. Many Japanese participants stressed that China’s reactions would be confined to economic and diplomatic measures. China, for example, might respond by suspending defense talks and annual security consultations. China could also cancel major deals such as the planned purchase of high-speed trains from Japan. However, China would not take steps that could cause a major rupture in bilateral relations because long-term political and economic ties are too important to Beijing.

Several Japanese participants stressed that China ultimately has few options and could do little to stop Japan’s deployment of PAC-3 or the NTW system. China will never agree with Japan’s plans, but the more China opposes TMD the greater Japanese support for it will become. A Foreign Ministry official noted that the best Japan can do is to try to address China’s concerns, but that Tokyo’s options are limited. Several defense officials stressed that the United States and Japan could mobilize the resources necessary to get China to accept TMD in Japan, akin to their efforts in 1997 to revise the defense guidelines. China vocally opposed that move, but eventually was forced to accept it. A similar strategy could be adopted for TMD. However, several Japanese officials stressed that TMD is not yet a major issue in Sino-Japanese relations; overall bilateral relations are improving. According to one official, NMD is a major issue for China, but TMD is “small potatoes.”

Japanese participants also stressed that the context in which TMD is deployed will greatly influence the character of China’s reaction. The Japanese assess that within the next year there will be renewed statements about the importance of the alliance for Tokyo and Washington. To address China’s concerns about TMD within the context of a strengthened US-Japanese alliance, the Japanese stressed that the United States should not treat China as an enemy and should adopt a consistent approach toward Beijing. This latter factor was particularly important for the Bush administration. Japanese defense officials noted that Japan does not see China as an enemy so long as China does not object to Japan playing a more active role in regional affairs to fill the vacuum left by Russia.

A critical question for Japan is whether TMD deployment would spark an arms race. Japanese experts differed on this issue. Some officials felt China’s response would be confined to diplomatic protests. A few Japanese noted that they expect China to respond by modestly increasing DF-21 deployments, but it was unclear that this would spark an arms race. This would depend partly on domestic political trends in China and Japan. Several Japanese defense officials noted that China’s missile modernization is inevitable and that TMD will not dramatically influence the pace and scope of these plans. Some Japanese participants expressed an interest in pursuing an arms control solution, but were highly skeptical about the prospects for success. The defense ministers of Japan and China recently met for the first time in decades. Because the bilateral defense talks were formal and not very forthcoming, it was not realistic for the two countries to engage in complex and highly detailed arms control negotiations.

Many US participants agreed that China lacked significant leverage to successfully oppose Japan’s TMD plans. Several Americans noted that one of the problems with China’s anti-TMD strategy is that it highlights the fact that China is targeting Japan. China’s opposition to Japanese TMD reveals Beijing’s own hypocrisy. China would not fear Japan’s acquisition of TMD unless it invalidated a capability that China relied upon. US officials and scholars stressed that Japan should try to divorce TMD from the Taiwan issue; at a minimum, Japan should maintain its consistent policy on Taiwan.

US participants agreed that China’s most substantial reaction to TMD in Japan would be to increase political and diplomatic pressure on Tokyo. Like Japanese participants, US conferees were divided on whether China will deploy more MRBMs in reaction to PAC-3 or NTW deployments. US participants disagreed with some of the Japanese officials that US NMD was the sole cause of the acceleration of China’s strategic modernization and argued that Japanese deployment of advanced missile defense
systems could also have an impact on China’s future force structure. If China did decide to deploy additional MRBMs, US experts noted that the potential size and capability of the NTW system meant that China would have to produce large numbers of missile to overcome the system.

Overall, several US experts agreed that China could do little to significantly damage Japan’s security. The most that China could do is to deploy more missiles and develop asymmetric military technologies. China will also continue to oppose US NMD plans by working with Russia and US allies. In terms of possible solutions, US scholars suggested the initiation of bilateral arms control discussions but also recognized the inherent difficulties with this option.

**TMD, NMD, the Security Alliance and Relations with the United States**

Regarding missile defense and the implications for the security alliance, US and Japanese participants first assessed the impact of specific lower-tier and upper-tier systems on alliance relations. Several Japanese stressed that the United States and Japan should avoid a public conflict over TMD. Such a debate could send the wrong signal to nations like China, who could seek to exploit it.

Both US and Japanese scholars and officials stressed that deployment of PAC-3 systems needed to be handled carefully to avoid damage to the alliance. Japan is committed under a 1975 agreement to provide air-defense for US bases; some US participants regard PAC-3 deployments to be a logical extension of this commitment. Japanese officials said the purchase of PAC-3 systems is unlikely to be a contentious political issue in Japan because the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force also wants to buy PAC-3 to protect key sites in Japan. However budget constraints might foster delays in acquiring and allocating these systems. Some Japanese defense officials noted that a public debate could erupt over the purchase and proper allocation of PAC-3 batteries between US bases and Japanese sites, especially in a crisis.

With respect to upper-tier defenses, Japanese participants said there has been relatively little debate in Japan about the NTW joint research program. Several Japanese stressed that NTW should not be seen as a test of the credibility of the alliance. Rather, NTW should be viewed as one potential tool to bolster the credibility of the US commitment to Japan’s security. US-Japan TMD cooperation should neither dictate nor undermine the alliance.

US participants expressed mixed views on the relationship between TMD and the credibility of the alliance. While they noted that the “free rider” issue is not a political problem in the United States anymore (due to Japan’s economic problems), several US officials stressed that at a minimum, Japan should deploy PAC-3 systems around US bases. Japan needs to be seen by US leaders as meeting its responsibilities under the alliance. US participants expressed differing views on whether both PAC-3 and NTW were needed to ensure the viability of the alliance. There was agreement that if the issue was handled badly, TMD could cause political problems for the alliance in both countries.

The final part of the US-Japan consultations focused on three issues: the impact of NMD on alliance relations, the arms control implications of NMD and possible US strategies to overcome Chinese opposition and deploy NMD. Most US and Japanese participants agreed that China would respond to US deployment of NMD and to Japanese deployment of NTW. US and Japanese participants agreed that China would react to NMD by increasing its ICBM force to ensure the credibility of its deterrent. Japanese defense officials noted that an increase in Chinese ICBMs is largely irrelevant to Japan and does not directly affect Japan’s security. A number of Japanese participants argued that NMD would bolster the credibility of the security alliance as a deterrence mechanism. With NMD, the United States would be more willing to make threats and take actions to protect Japanese security. One indication of this positive linkage is the fact that cooperation on NTW is perceived in the United States and Japan as an indication of the good health of the alliance. To be sure, some Japanese also expressed concern about this linkage and argued that joint research on NTW should not be used as an indicator of the health of the alliance. On balance, a slight ma-
Majority of US and Japanese participants felt that US NMD deployment would make a positive contribution to Japan’s security; other participants questioned the ultimate effectiveness of NMD and the potential negative consequences.

On arms control issues, some Japanese expressed concern about US plans to modify or abandon the ABM Treaty. Public support for the ABM Treaty is strong in Japan. A US withdrawal would create tensions in the alliance and raise questions about Japan’s TMD policies. Several Japanese officials suggested that the public could be persuaded to accept a “grand bargain” in which the ABM Treaty is modified to allow the United States and Russia to deploy limited missile defense systems while reducing their levels of strategic arms. Japanese participants were particularly concerned that a US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would produce detrimental spill-over effects for Japan’s relations with both Russia and China. Japanese participants supported the negotiation of a grand bargain, but were wary of other options for fear of alienating Russia and China while placing a large stress on the alliance.

Both US and Japanese participants strongly supported a US effort to engage Russia in an effort to reach a grand bargain on NMD. US participants argued that if Russia and the United States can negotiate an offense-defense package, then China has few options but to accept it. A US-Russia deal on NMD would undercut China’s ongoing efforts to mobilize international opposition to NMD deployment. There was some doubt on the US side that Washington would have enough faith in the current NMD system to reach a deal that limited future development. In contrast, Japanese defense officials actively supported the strategy of dividing China and Russia on NMD; they cited Japan’s experience in the late 1960s when the Russian threat to Japan lessened after China began to target Russia. Some Japanese expressed concern that if China became too isolated, it might react by accelerating its military modernization efforts. They argued that efforts to isolate China on the NMD/ABM Treaty issue should be combined with efforts to engage China on regional security issues and economic exchanges. US and Japanese participants noted that if China became too isolated it might react in unexpected and irrational ways; the growth of Chinese nationalism was noted in this regard.

Several US experts mentioned the difficulty in executing such a strategy. It is inherently difficult to assess China’s actual reactions to NMD deployment. US experts noted continuing debates in China about NMD and US intentions and the difficulty in distinguishing bluff from reality. If the United States pursues a strategy of isolating China on NMD, it should be implemented with great care and with due attention to the danger of causing irreparable harm to US-China relations and Asia-Pacific security.
CONCLUSION

East Asia faces a number of critical uncertainties and daunting security challenges in the coming decade. These include questions about the future US military role in the region, historical distrust between major powers, the continued existence of divided states, ongoing military modernization programs, territorial disputes, resource conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and continuing shifts in relative economic and military power. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and between China and Taiwan each have the potential to escalate into a military conflict that would profoundly alter the security landscape throughout the region. These security challenges all exist in a region that lacks the network of interlocking economic, political and security institutions that helped Europe manage political and military conflicts.

US interest in deploying NMD and TMD is partly a response to military developments in East Asia, including China’s missile buildup across the Taiwan Strait and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long range ballistic missiles. It also reflects changing US attitudes about the stability of traditional nuclear deterrence and the nature of threats in the post-Cold War world. BMD deployment would clearly have significant military, political and diplomatic implications for all the major powers in Asia. Given the changing strategic landscape, BMD deployments could alter political and security relationships in Asia in unpredictable (and possibly destabilizing) ways. NMD and TMD deployment might also be a vehicle that forces major powers in the region to address controversial issues such as the nature of future US-China strategic relations, the extent of US defense commitments to Taiwan and the character of US-Japanese security relations.

The central challenge for US and foreign policymakers is to balance the potential security contributions of national and theater missile defenses with the requirements of continued stability in Asia. As the conference discussions demonstrate, US missile defense plans provoke mixed reactions from US, Japanese and Chinese participants. These reactions include varying degrees of support for, confusion about, and opposition to US plans to deploy missile defenses to protect the US homeland and to assist US friends and allies in Asia. US regional and security experts need more extensive consultations with their Asian counterparts to gain a fuller understanding of the implications of particular BMD deployments. US policymakers also need to consult closely with Asian governments, particularly Japan and China, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of missiles defense on regional and global stability. Good diplomacy and appropriate use of confidence and security building measures can help mitigate potential adverse consequences of ballistic missile defenses. Attention to these political factors matters greatly, because the goal of any missile defense deployment is to enhance US security and regional stability, not to inadvertently undermine it. Given the multiple and overlapping challenges to Asian stability in the coming decade, handling the issue of missile defense deployment properly could have a significant impact on the continued security and prosperity of the region.
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Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

Lower Tier
- PAC-3
- Navy Area
- MEADS

Upper Tier
- THAAD (Endo / Exo)
- Navy Theater Wide (Exo Only)

Ascent Phase
- Navy Theater Wide (Exo Only)

Boost Phase
- Airborne Laser

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- PATRIOT
- Navy Area
- MEADS
- THAAD

---

Ascent Phase
Endoatmosphere
Lower Atmosphere
Exoatmosphere
Boost Phase
2,500 Taepo Dong 2
2,000 Shahab 4
1,500 Taepo Dong-1 Ghauri
1,300 Shahab 3
1,000 No Dong 1
600 M-9
300 Scud B
100 Scud Mod 2

---

Boost Phase
Airborne Laser
---

Navy Theater Wide (Coverage Dependent On Ship Location)
LAYERED DEFENSE
TMD LOWER AND UPPER TIER IN THE FUTURE

[Diagram showing layered defense systems including MEADS, PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area, and Navy Theater Wide]
## A Chinese Assessment of Possible Responses to NMD

### Criteria for Evaluating Chinese Responses to NMD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options to Defeat US NMD</th>
<th>Feasible</th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Affordable</th>
<th>Compatible</th>
<th>Precautionary</th>
<th>Challenging</th>
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<tr>
<td>Build more silo-based ICBMs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build more mobile ICBMs</td>
<td>Soon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRVing ICBMs</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decoys</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>Chaff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar Stealth</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrared Stealth</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maneuvering warheads</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile ICBMs</td>
<td>Soon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place Missiles on Alert</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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ABOUT THE CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES

Based at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) seeks to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and by disseminating timely and informative data, research, and policy analyses. With offices in Monterey, Washington, DC, and Almaty, Kazakhstan, CNS has a staff of over 55 full-time and 65 part-time personnel, making it the largest nongovernmental program in the world devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.

Established in 1995 as one of five major research programs at CNS, the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) is dedicated to research and training related to East Asian nonproliferation issues. With a staff of eight full-time and part-time researchers, EANP works with East Asian partners to build communities of nonproliferation analysts in the region, and links this new generation of professionals to the international community of nonproliferation specialists. EANP’s work includes capacity building activities in East Asia; visiting nonproliferation research fellowships and training programs; database and information dissemination, and policy-oriented research, consultations; and publications.

Additional information about the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (including publications and conference reports) is available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/index.htm

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